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3Abstract
This thesis studies an international trade game modelled as a coordination game,
where countries interact by following a simple behavioural rule of trying to reduce
the gap between the maximal payoff and their own payoff. Countries are allowed
to choose from one of two strategies – E (integrate into the world economy) or A
(remain in autarky). D’Artigues and Vignolo [33] find that in this coordination
game, the desire to imitate the leading country is frustrated by the impossibility of
doing so. Hence, paradoxically, the desire of convergence into the world economy
may lead to a more partitioned world economy. Envy is found to be the central mo-
tive behind developing countries opting for rejection of globalisation, and with suf-
ficiently large heterogeneity in payoffs, spiteful behaviour overcomes imitation.
The presence of envious people in a class of symmetric coordination games helps
players to coordinate on a particular strict Nash equilibrium, which is always risk-
dominant. This thesis first analyses the trade dynamics for a simple 2-country and a
3-country model and then derives conclusions on the more general n-country mod-
el. Results for the first trade model are based on the model output obtained for
strict equilibria and strictly stable states of the trade game via numerical computa-
tions. This model is then extended by allowing countries to choose intermediate
strategies, so that they can choose the level of integration with the world economy
by a small strategy size 0  . The trade dynamics for this continuous strategy
trade game model are then derived for the 2-country scenario, which suggest that
the lagging country can catch up with the leading country, leading to non-existence
of any long-term equilibria.
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Chapter 1
Introduction and Overview
World trade has been increasing over the centuries via discovery of trade routes
and the advancements in communications, technology and transport. Globalization1
began in the earliest nineteenth century driven by declines in transportation costs.
While there seem to have been many advantages of economic interdependence
such as efficient use of resources and reduction in international conflict, numerous
criticisms have been made of globalization such as growing poverty and environ-
mental damage; see Miles and Scott [88]. Theorists like Montesquieu and Imman-
uel Kant asserted that economic relations between nations pacify political interac-
tion. According to Gartzke, Li and Boehmer [54], multiple studies, many identified
with democratic peace, link interstate trade with reduction in militarized disputes
or wars. However, there have been fears of growing inequality and poverty –
Deardorff [35] uses his model to show that poor countries converge to a low steady
state while rich countries converge to a high one2. Mountford [92] suggests interna-
tional trade can cause the world economy to sort itself out into groups of fast and
slow growing economies, while Sutcliffe [129] finds that overall inequality seems
to have fallen while the ratio of the extremes have risen over the 20th century. Sala-
i-Martin [114] also finds that global income inequality (reduction in the across-
1 In economic terms, globalisation occurs when barriers between national markets (for goods and
services, capital or labour) disappear and a single market with a single price is created.
2 The high and low steady states refer to the level of savings out of wages for the countries. Conver-
gence to a high steady state means that the countries earn high savings out of wages, making them
richer while convergence to a low steady state means that the countries earn low savings out of wag-
es, making them poorer.
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country disparities) has reduced in the recent years. Jaumotte, Lall and Papageor-
giou [68] state that trade globalization is associated with a reduction in inequality
whereas financial globalization is associated with an increase.
On average, trade liberalisation increases GDP growth, but not always (see
Wacziarg and Welch [136]). According to Miles and Scott [88], econometric evi-
dence suggests that increased openness to trade does raise the long-run rate of eco-
nomic growth, although it is difficult to accurately isolate the impact that trade pol-
icy alone has on GDP, and although on average trade liberalization boosts growth,
success is not guaranteed. Rodrik [110] says ‘Globalization’s soft underbelly is the
imbalance between the national scope of governments and the global nature of
markets. A healthy economic system necessitates a delicate compromise between
these two. Go too much in one direction and you have protectionism and autarky.
Go too much in the other and you have an unstable world economy’. Therefore,
nations need a balance between integrating into the world economy and fostering
trade within the nation. This thesis investigates whether it is advantageous for
countries to fully integrate into the world economy, remain in autarky or to find a
balance between the two.
Evolutionary games have considerable potential for modelling substantiative eco-
nomics issues, which tells the applied economist what sorts of behaviour can
evolve over time (see Friedman [50]). International trade and cooperation have
been modelled as coordination games - even though they cannot capture all the
complexities of trade between countries and economic growth, yet they can pro-
vide valuable insights into how countries interact with one another and how it af-
fects international cooperation. Snidal [124] compares models of Prisoner’s Di-
lemma games and Coordination games and finds that the latter better characterizes
the issues between international political regimes and international cooperation.
This thesis studies an international trade game modelled as a coordination game as
considered in D’Artigues and Vignolo [33], where countries interact by following a
simple behavioural rule of trying to reduce the gap between the game’s maximal
payoff and their own payoff. In the first model, countries are allowed to choose
16
from one of two strategies – E (integrate into the world economy) or A (remain in
autarky). D’Artigues and Vignolo [33] find that in this coordination game, the de-
sire to imitate the leading country is frustrated by the impossibility of doing so.
Hence, paradoxically, the desire of convergence into the world economy may lead
to a more partitioned world economy. Envy is the central motive behind develop-
ing countries opting for rejection of globalisation, and with sufficiently large heter-
ogeneity in payoffs, spiteful behaviour overcomes imitation. In his model, Vignolo
[134] finds that the presence of envious people in a class of symmetric coordina-
tion games helps players to coordinate on a particular strict Nash equilibrium,
which is always risk-dominant. This thesis first attempts to find the trade dynamics
for a simple 2-country and a 3-country model and then derives conclusions on the
more general n-country model. Numerical computations are then used to obtain the
model output and subsequently the strict equilibria and the strictly stable states of
the trade game are analysed. This model is then extended beyond the D’Artigues-
Vignolo model by allowing countries to choose intermediate strategies, so that they
can change the level of integration with the world economy by a small strategy
size 0  . The trade dynamics for this continuous strategy trade game model are
then derived for the 2-country scenario.
The rest of this thesis is organised as follows:
Chapter 2 explores the sociological background of globalization and the economics
behind international trade, degree of openness and economic growth. Globalization
advantages and disadvantages are reviewed in order to find the winners and the
losers of international trade. International policies that can be implemented in order
for countries to gain from world trade are then discussed. The literature concerning
international trade modelled as co-ordination games is reviewed and the long run
equilibria of coordination games in general is also briefly discussed.
Chapter 3 re-defines the D’Artigues-Vignolo trade game modelled as a 2 2 coor-
dination game. The game dynamics for the 2-country and the 3-country models are
analysed and represented graphically, highlighting the possible strict equilibria and
strictly stable states. The 4-country model is also briefly discussed, highlighting the
17
states that cannot be strict equilibria, with the rest of the states left to be explored
via numerical computations in Chapter 4. For the more general n-country model,
the notions of strict equilibria and strict stability are formalized and the complex
conditions required to hold true for the homogeneous as well the heterogeneous
states to be equilibria and strictly stable states are obtained.
In Chapter 4, a mathematical model is constructed and implemented in Mathemati-
ca and the model output obtained for the existence of strict equilibria and strictly
stable states over a varied range of parameter values, for different models (ranging
from the 3-country model to the 200-country model). The results for the 3-country
and the 4-country models are graphically presented to analyse the likelihood of the
varied heterogeneous states being strict equilibria. For 4n  , the model output is
obtained for the fully integrated states (where all the countries are open to interna-
tional trade and play strategy E) and the completely autarkic states (where none of
the countries participate in world trade and choose to remain in autarky by playing
strategy A). The results for up to 200 countries are graphically presented and then
analysed to draw conclusions for the model.
Chapter 5 extends the trade game model considered in Chapter 3 to allow for in-
termediate strategies, so that countries can choose their level of integration into
world trade. Instead of choosing between the fully integrated or completely autar-
kic strategies, countries are allowed to change their strategy by a small strategy
size, 0  . Unlike the previous model in Chapter 3, the countries also have vary-
ing degrees of openness to trade with varying countries, which is determined by the
trade weights matrix. The complex dynamics for the fully integrated state, the all-
in-autarky state and the heterogeneous states are analysed.
Chapter 6 analyses the 2-country trade game with strategy size . Based on the
trade weights matrix and the payoffs to the countries, the dynamics obtained are
presented graphically. The analysis suggests that the leadership of countries can
show cyclic behaviour, where one country can overtake another country, and vice
versa.
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Chapter 7 concludes the thesis, highlighting the important results from both the
models discussed. The first model predicts a greater likelihood of countries not
participating in world trade but choosing to remain in autarky, possibly because of
envious behaviour, which arises due to competition between countries and the lag-
ging countries desire of imitating the leading country. The second model predicts
that the lagging country can catch up with and overtake the leading country, which
lends plausibility to the future world economy predictions where economies like
China and India can overtake economies like the US and the UK. The thesis ends
by discussing possible applications of analysis and results to other games and sug-
gesting areas of further research.
Finally, note that the more technical material of many chapters is relegated to the
appendices. These appear at the end of the corresponding chapters.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
Globalization refers to the way in which national economies are becoming increas-
ingly interconnected with one another. In economic terms, barriers between nation-
al markets (whether for goods and services, or capital, or labour) disappear and a
single market with a single price is created. This chapter reviews the relevant lit-
erature on globalization and lays the foundation of the trade game analysed in this
thesis. Varied views on globalization are discussed along with predictions of the
future world economy that tie up the results of the game model developed in the
forthcoming chapters.
In the first section, some economic aspects of international trade are discussed and
the literature on globalization is reviewed. First, a brief history of globalization is
discussed – how trade between countries started and evolved over time. The effect
of globalization on the world economies and the advantages and disadvantages of
the removal of trade restrictions are then reviewed3. Finally, a forecast of the world
economy in 50 years’ time is analysed, taking into account potential global eco-
nomic crises.
2.1 The Economics of International Trade
This section reviews various aspects surrounding the economics of international
trade – from history of globalization to its advantages and disadvantages, and dis-
3 General ideas presented are taken from Miles and Scott [88], Portes [103] and Scott [119].
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cusses policies for developed countries to make globalization work for all. The sec-
tion ends with a brief insight into the future of international trade.
2.1.1 The History of Globalization
World trade has been increasing for centuries as explorers have discovered trade
routes and the technology of transport has improved.
The first wave of globalization began in the early nineteenth century as transport
costs fell, coming to an end in the early twentieth century due to World War I
(WWI). After the end of WWI in 1918, trade resumed but collapsed dramatically
during the early 1930’s due to the Great Depression and protectionist measures.
After World War II (WWII), most countries wanted to construct international insti-
tutions that would minimize the threat of conflict and foster international economic
relations. Therefore, national governments coordinated to create international insti-
tutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the
General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs4 (GATT). The resulting decline in trade
tariffs initiated a second wave of globalization that accelerated in the 1980’s and
1990’s as increasing numbers of emerging markets adopted trade-oriented policies
in an effort to boost their GDP growth. This lays the foundation for the trade game
model developed in this thesis.
In 1990 total trade in goods and services (both exports and imports) amounted to
32% of GDP for Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) economies5 and 34% for emerging markets. By 2001, these numbers in-
creased to 38% and 49%, respectively. In 1960, 15.6% of the countries in the
world, representing 19% of its population, had open trade policies, in the sense
4 This was later transformed into the World Trade Organization (WTO).
5 These economies include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Turkey, United Kingdom and United States.
21
deﬁned by Sachs and Warner [113]6. In 2000, a total of 73% of the countries in the
world, representing 47% of the world population7, were open to international trade,
see Figure 2.1. Therefore, an increasing number of world economies are opening
up to international trade in order to raise their GDP.
Figure 2.1. Increasing Globalization - Over the period 1960-2000, an in-
creasing number of countries have opened up to trade (Source: Wacziarg and
Welch [136]). Notes: Openness is defined according to Sachs and Warner
[113] criteria (discussed later). The sample includes 141 countries.
In the 1950s, when many emerging markets were gaining independence, inward-
looking strategies8 dominated9 to encourage the development of domestic indus-
6 A country is defined to have a closed trade policy if it has at least one of the following characteris-
tics: non-tariff barriers covering 40% or more of trade; average tariff rates of 40% or more; a black
market exchange rate that is depreciated by 20% or more relative to the official exchange rate.
7 Wacziarg and Welch [136] find that the world’s two most populated countries, China and India,
remain closed as of 2000. This accounts for the discrepancy between the open trade countries and the
percentage of world population living in open countries.
8 Impose tariffs on manufactured imports and use revenue from primary exports to fund domestically
oriented development, with extensive government intervention.
9 For example, Latin American countries such as Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, Chile, Uruguay and
Venezuela until the 1980s.
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tries and import substitution10. However, import substitution did not work. Gov-
ernments ended up paying too much in subsidies as the infant industry11 argument
was being applied to industries in all sectors rather than selectively to a few. This
put a strain on fiscal finances and led to substantial rent seeking and inefficiencies
in both industry and government. Governments had to extend protectionism12 for
less competitive industries as removing the subsidies and tariffs would cause the
industry to suffer from global competition. Import substitution led to high capital
goods prices and domestic firms having to use low-level technology. Protectionism
resulted in large subsidies, low revenue, corruption and rent seeking, overvalued
exchange rates that hindered exports. Once introduced, tariffs and controls were
hard to abolish. Therefore, countries moved to externally oriented development
programs following the evident success of South East Asia.
Starting in the 1970s, there was a huge shift towards outward-looking strategies.
Brazil and other Latin American countries began liberalization of trade policies in
the mid-1980s13. India on the other hand lowered its protectionist trade policies in
the 1980s and experienced a fast growth rate14. Scott [119] finds that trade liberali-
zation works as an important component of a wide range of policy reforms as a
means of boosting GDP growth. Now international agencies advocate free trade
and liberalization. For example, the World Bank aims to develop a global partner-
10 Substituting imports with domestically produced goods.
11 Industries in developing and emerging markets that are protected against international competition
by the governments, so that they can establish themselves.
12 Protectionism refers to the notion of introduction of economic policies (such as tariffs on imported
goods, restrictive quotas, etc.) by Governments to restrict international trade in order to protect the
domestic economy. Protectionism can boost the domestic economy as the domestic firms have less
competition due to a decrease in imported goods (as a direct result of tariffs imposed on imported
goods). Unemployment rates also drop, as domestic firms require labour to produce goods that were
previously being imported. However, protectionism implemented by one country may lead to retalia-
tion from another country leading to hostility, which hampers the production of specialized goods in
both countries, damaging their economies (see Altman [7]).
13 However, Brazil did not show signs of growth after the 1990s due to lack of favourable macroeco-
nomic and institutional environment (see Moreira [90]).
14 However, the growth can be attributed to other factors too such as domestic consumption, increase
in employment, and rise in investment.
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ship for development amongst other goals, the IMF provides international mone-
tary cooperation and facilitates expansion of balanced growth in trade, and the
WTO leads global trade negotiations. Global integration now substitutes for devel-
opment strategies. As increasing number of world economies open up to interna-
tional trade, this thesis examines if engaging in world trade is equally beneficial to
all the countries.
2.1.2 Advantages and Disadvantages of Globalization
Advantage - Economic Growth
Proponents of trade liberalization suggest emerging markets should adopt outward
looking policies based around free trade, exports and encouraging inward Foreign
Direct Investment (FDI). It has been claimed that globalization contributes to
world peace by reducing the risk of war between nation states. For example, Mon-
tesquieu [7] asserts, “Commerce cures destructive prejudices”. However, world
trade was growing rapidly before WW1, but this did not prevent either WW1 or the
Russian revolution of 1917. D’Artigues and Vignolo [33] also use their model to
present terrorism as a result of competition between countries.
David Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage demonstrates that two nations
without input factor mobility can produce more goods at lower costs through spe-
cialization and trade with one another than in isolation (see Formaini [48]). The
theory of comparative advantage can be illustrated numerically as in Ricardo [108].
Consider two countries, England and Portugal, producing two commodities - wine
and cloth, using labour as the sole input. England requires the labour of 100 men
for a year to produce cloth and 120 men for a year to produce wine. Portugal on the
other hand requires the labour of 80 men for a year to produce wine and 90 men for
a year to produce cloth. It would be advantageous for England to produce cloth and
import wine. Similarly, it would be advantageous for Portugal to produce wine and
import cloth from England as it could get more cloth from England by exporting its
wine produced by the labour than it could produce cloth on its own by diverting the
wine producing labour to cloth production. Therefore, a country has a comparative
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advantage if it can produce that good at a lower opportunity cost15 than another
country. Thus, England would have the comparative advantage in cloth production
relative to Portugal if it had to give up less wine to produce an extra unit of cloth
than the amount of wine that Portugal would have to give up to produce an extra
unit of cloth.
All countries can gain from the removal of trade restrictions if Ricardo’s example
above is extended to all countries16; for example see Figure 2.2. In other words, the
international trade game is not a zero sum game. Countries can gain as long as they
produce goods they are most efficient at producing and import other goods from
abroad. The logic of comparative advantage implies that countries gain in varying
amounts as shown in Figure 2.2. On an average, trade liberalization increases GDP
growth, but not always17. Figure 2.3 shows improved growth performance for some
emerging markets, however, there is considerable variation across countries in the
success of trade liberalization. This variation can be viewed as an influential driver
of destructive envy behaviour as defined by Wobker and Kenning [138] in the
D’Artigues-Vignolo model.18
15 The amount of another good that must be given up in order to produce one more unit of the good,
or in other words the cost of the alternative good that must be forgone to produce the good.
16 The idea of static comparative advantage theory has been subject to a lot of criticisms. Some econ-
omists explain that agricultural products are characterized by low price income elasticities whereas
manufacturing faces high-income elasticity, so as countries get richer, demand for manufactured
goods rises faster and the price of agricultural goods falls relative to the price of manufactured goods.
This is discussed in the section on disadvantages of globalization.
17 Negative growth effects of liberalization can be attributed to various reasons across countries. For
example, persistent amounts of debt and current account deficits despite implementing the IMF re-
structuring program in the 1990’s in Hungary; macroeconomic instability and lack of structural re-
forms post liberalization during the late 1980’s in Mexico.
18 Note that comparative advantage is incorporated into the model presented in this thesis via adjust-
ment in parameter values so that countries have added benefits of international trade.
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Figure 2.2. Estimated gains from comparative advantage from removing
remaining post-Uruguay Round trade restrictions as a percentage of GDP
(Source: Data taken from Brown, Deardorff and Stern [19]).
The Solow Model19 assumes that GDP is produced according to an aggregate pro-
duction function technology. Solow [125] finds that the growth rate of an economy
depends only on the technological progress of the economy, the rate of capital
stock growth and the rate of labour force growth. Within the Solow model, Total
Factor Productivity (TFP)20 is used as a measure of technological progress. The
model is defined as:
1
t t tQ AK L  , 0 1  ,
where Q denotes the output, K denotes the capital input, L denotes the labour input
and tA denotes TFP,  is the production elasticity. This model reaches a steady
19 Also known as the Exogenous growth model or the Neo-classical growth model.
20 TFP, in simple terms, is a measure of efficiency with which firms turn inputs into outputs.
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state when Q and K grow at the same rate as L21. Once this steady state is reached,
the growth in per-capita income can only be attributed to TFP22. One of the most
important implications of this model is absolute convergence – countries with low-
er per-capita income will grow faster than richer countries, resulting in the conver-
gence of the per-capita income of all countries.
The Endogenous growth theory23 model allows the productivity increase to be gen-
erated endogenously. According to Fine [46], this can depend on increasing returns
to scale in production function, or application of produced research and develop-
ment (R&D), or production of human capital. This theory implies that economic
growth can be promoted by economic policies that embrace openness, change and
innovation, while slowing change in the form of protecting industries can result in
slow growth. Romer [111] presents a neoclassical model with technological
change, augmented to give an endogenous explanation of the source of the techno-
logical change. He suggests that free international trade can act to speed up growth.
21 At any given time t, let the output per worker be defined as follows: 1Q Kq A L LL L

      
 Ak f k  , where k is the amount of capital per worker. Let c denote the amount of consump-
tion, s denote the savings rate and y denote the output. Then the following equation is obtained:
 1c s y  . If i denotes investment, then y c i  as all output is either consumed or invested. Sub-
stituting  1c s y  in y c i  gives:  i sy sf k  . If n denotes the percentage by which the
population increases, and there is a depreciation of  (the rate at which the capital wears out), then
new investment is required to offset this loss over time. This defines the steady state as a state where
capital per worker is constant over time, so that     0k sf k n k     . Now if    sf k n k  ,
then the capital stock will grow. If    sf k n k  , then the capital stock will shrink. When the two
are equal, no adjustment to capital will be required, and the steady state will be reached when
 
1sAk n


     
. Since there is no change in k , the output per worker and capital per worker are
constant.
22 The model suggests that unless trade affects TFP it does not influence long-run growth.
23 The Endogenous growth theory or the New growth theory was formed in the 1980’s as a result of
the criticism of the Neo-classical growth theory; see Aghion and Howitt [1].
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Figure 2.3. Impact of trade liberalization on economic growth in a sample of
countries24. The vertical axes represent the growth rates25. Note that coun-
tries like Hungary, Israel, Mexico, etc. experience a negative growth effect
of liberalization. Countries like Colombia and Philippines experience no
growth rate due to trade liberalization, whereas countries like Ghana, Tai-
wan, Uruguay, etc. experience a positive growth effect of liberalization.
(Source: Wacziarg and Welch [136]).
A vast majority of case studies, cross section and panel data studies show that
economies that are more open grow faster. Parikh and Stirbu [100] find that liberal-
24 The vertical lines indicate the year of liberalization T, the left horizontal lines represent the average
growth before T and the right horizontal lines represent the average growth after T.
25 This is the real per capita growth rate of GDP per year.
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ization contributes significantly to economic growth in their study of 42 developing
countries spread over Asia, Africa and Latin America. Rao and Singh [107] find
through their panel co-integration tests26 that there is a well-defined long run rela-
tion between output, trade ratio and capital. They also find that openness to trade
has made a significant contribution to the long-term growth of output by 1999-
2003. Sheehey [120] measures trade openness by the rate of growth of the share of
exports in GDP and finds that there is a close relationship between exports and
growth in a cross section of countries. A positive relationship between growth and
trade can be achieved if trade reform occurs simultaneously with domestic policy
reforms.
Disadvantage - Increased Poverty
A common criticism of globalization and trade openness is that it leads to increased
poverty especially in nations that are already poor. Leete, Mason, Naohiro,
Mahmud and Chaudhury [78] presents the views of five panelists on the adverse
effects of globalization on population and poverty - Chaudhury and Naohiro pre-
sent the case that globalization is adversely affecting poverty; while Mason and
Mahmud present the case that globalization is not affecting poverty. Chaudhury
states that liberalized market policies27 can erode household income and conse-
quently give rise to poverty. He presents the case of Azerbaijan where the loss of
income (due largely to the loss of jobs and price hikes) led to increased poverty and
worsened income distribution led to increased inequality. He also includes evi-
dence from East and South Asia28 that indicates that globalization has exacerbated
poverty and inequality. Naohiro discusses the case of Japan in the early 1990s,
when the recession and Japan’s poor economic growth performance led to unem-
ployment and poverty. Mahmud gives examples of countries like South Korea and
Malaysia that were able to increase human-development levels and significantly
26 The tests were based on selected East Asia countries - Hong Kong, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore,
Thailand and the Philippines.
27 For example, privatization of industries, which leads to the retrenchment of workers and unem-
ployment, and instability of food prices.
28 Countries include Bangladesh, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia and Pakistan, South Korea, Thailand.
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reduce poverty levels through increased trade and economic growth. Mason states
that poor countries benefit by globalization due to creation of jobs and improve-
ment in the value of new ideas and incentives to develop them. Mason also implies
that Asian countries that have participated in the global economy have successfully
reduced poverty29, whereas countries without global orientation have not30. There
has been impressive growth performance in most developing economies except
Sub-Saharan Africa, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, in terms of a decline in
share of the population in poverty, decline in infant mortality rates, improvement in
living standards and life expectancy. However, according to World Bank Staff
[141], more than 40 developing countries with 400 million people have had nega-
tive or close to zero per capita income growth over the past thirty years. Moreover,
the absolute number of poor has continued to increase in all regions except East
Asia and the Middle East. The World Bank Staff also state that while there is now
robust cross-country empirical evidence that growth is on average associated one-
for-one with higher incomes of the poor (that is when an economy grows by 1%,
the incomes of the poor also rise on an average by 1%), poverty is affected by other
factors than globalization and growth, such as initial levels of income inequality.
More recent estimates suggest that between 1970 and 1998, during a period of rap-
id globalization, there was a decline in world poverty (a decline from 16% to 5% in
the world population living on less than $1 a day, and from 44% to 19% living on
less than $2 a day), see Figure 2.4. Our model attempts to test if the competition
between countries by means of openness to international trade leads to a more par-
titioned world economy.
Critics of comparative advantage theory have said that poor or developing nations
cannot benefit from free trade in the long-term. The Prebisch-Singer hypothesis
asserts that trade between developed countries and developing countries tends to
deteriorate over the long-term as the relative prices for primary products (when
compared to manufactured goods) decline. These theories suggest that comparative
advantage may not always work in the case of developing countries as their pro-
29 For example, China, Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand.
30 For example, North Korea.
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spects for growth are diminished due to the falling value of primary products. Cy-
pher and Dietz [32] suggest that the basic Ricardian theory of comparative ad-
vantage is too static and find that for poor nations, the argument in favour of free
trade policy cannot be sustained when the long-term historical trends of the terms
of trade are taken into account. Violations to free trade are also proven beneficial to
some nations in long term dynamic settings.
Figure 2.4. Poverty rates (Source: Sala-i-Martin [114]). Notes: The vertical
axis represents the poverty rates, which are defined as the fraction of the
world’s population that live below the absolute poverty line (less than one
dollar per day). The world distribution of income for this data was found by
constructing the Gaussian kernel density functions for various years and
poverty rates were then estimated by integrating the density functions below
the poverty line.
Globalization has also been criticized for causing inequality in emerging markets.
The World Bank Staff [141] find that the gap between the richest countries and the
poorest countries has progressively widened.
As discussed above, globalization can indeed provoke negative consequences,
which are typically a result of market failures, which are compounded by inade-
quate regulation, and bad domestic policies, for example, such happened in the
Global Financial Crisis of 2007-08. Better international economic institutions as
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well as domestic policies are required. Sachs and Warner [112] believe that eco-
nomic growth and therefore economic convergence requires reasonably efficient
economic institutions.
Sachs and Warner [112] show that all developing countries that have satisfied cer-
tain unexceptional conditions31 on economic policy have experienced positive eco-
nomic growth during the decades of the 1970s and the 1980s, and in almost all cas-
es, these countries have shown a tendency to grow more rapidly than the developed
economies, and thereby to converge. In the trade model derived from D’Artigues
and Vignolo [33], it is found that an equilibrium can exist where the lagging coun-
tries trade with one another in order to increase their economic conditions (pay-
offs), while some of the leading countries choose to stay in autarky.
2.1.3 Openness to International Trade, Capital Mobility and
Growth
Endogenous growth theories can produce a positive link between trade and growth,
as shown previously. They can also produce a negative link between trade and
growth. Sachs and Warner [113] sample 111 countries and approximately 98% of
the non-communist world in 1970. They find that openness strongly supports
growth. Open economies show convergence32 to the leaders, while closed econo-
31 Sachs and Warner [112] establish appropriate policies based on property rights and openness to
international trade. Three conditions are included with regard to the property rights test, first, the
country should not have a socialist economic structure, second, the country should not have been
involved in a civil war or major external war during the period 1970-1989 and third, there should be
no extreme deprivation of civil or political rights. Three kinds of measures are included to test for
openness, first, the country must not impose excessive quotas on imports, second, the country must
not impose excessive quotas or state monopolies on exports and third, the country must maintain a
reasonably convertible currency. For more details, see Sachs and Warner [112].
32 Economic convergence is defined as the closure of the proportionate income gap between the richer
countries and the poorer countries as a result of the poor countries growing more rapidly than the
richer countries.
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mies do not show economic convergence33. Many poor countries, particularly those
in sub-Saharan Africa, not only fail to grow faster than the rich countries but also
experience negative per capita growth. So the gap between these countries and the
rich countries widens significantly. Sachs and Warner [113] also find that the open
economies show convergence in terms of declining dispersion of GDP over time.
Openness to trade and growth in terms of payoffs forms one aspect of the model
explored in this thesis.
Global capital flows34 have a profound impact on the financial market and econo-
mies of the world. Since 1990, global capital flows have grown faster than the val-
ue of trade. According to Farrell, Lund, Folster, Bick, Pierce and Atkins [43], in
2006, the annual value of global capital flows totalled $8.2 trillion, which repre-
sented an eightfold increase since 1990. On the one hand, they can seem complete-
ly uncontrolled and dangerous. They can allow countries to invest and consume
more than they can produce. Capital inflow can lead to unsustainable foreign cur-
rency debts. Increased openness to capital flows has been associated with an in-
creasing frequency of financial crises as shown by Bordo and Eichengreen [17].
Capital mobility can result in some poor countries being left out while the biggest
capital inflow is to the richest country (the US). Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan and Volo-
sovych [5] present an overview of general patterns in international capital mobility
over the period 1970-2000 and show that most capital flows to rich countries. Fig-
ure 2.5 shows direct and portfolio equity investment inflows for 23 developed and
75 developing economies for the period 1970-2000. The stark difference between
33 In fact, there is not a single country in their sample that pursued open trade policies during the en-
tire period 1970-89 and yet had per capita growth of less than 1.2% per year. Switzerland had the
lowest growth, at 1.24%. Moreover, not a single open developing country grew at less than 2% per
year, Greece at 2.38% being the lowest.
34 Flows that include FDI, cross-border lending and deposits and purchases of foreign equity and debt
securities.
33
them demonstrates the Lucas Paradox35, which states that there is a lack of interna-
tional capital flows from rich to poor countries.
Figure 2.5. Total equity inﬂows per capita to rich and poor countries, 1970-
2000 (Source: Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan and Volosovych [4]). Notes: Inflows
of total equity (FDI36 and portfolio equity investment37) divided by popula-
tion are based on the IMF, IFS data in 1996 US$. Data represents 98 coun-
tries averaged over 5 year periods. Rich countries include 23 high GDP per
capita countries that are classified as rich by the World Bank; poor countries
denote the 75 remaining ones.
35 Lucas [83] examined international capital movements from the perspective of rich and poor coun-
tries. Under the standard assumptions, such as countries producing the same goods with the same
constant returns to scale production function, the same factors of production, relating output to ho-
mogenous capital and labour inputs, and the same technology, new investment will occur only in the
poorer economy where there is free capital mobility as the marginal product of capital will be higher
in the less productive economy. And this will continue to be true until the returns to capital in every
location are equalized. Hence, Lucas argued that the fact that more capital does not ﬂow from rich
countries to poor countries constitutes a paradox.
36 FDI inflows correspond to direct investment in the domestic economy, which includes equity capi-
tal, reinvested earnings, other capital and financial derivatives associated with various intercompany
transactions between affiliated enterprises.
37 Portfolio equity inflows correspond to equity liabilities, which include shares, stocks participations
and similar documents that usually denote ownership of equity.
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As a recent example, there had been dangers associated with large investments
made in the US and European markets by Asian and oil-exporting countries. By
2006, Germany, China and oil exporting nations were exporting large amounts of
capital to the US leading the US to monopolize global excess savings, see McKin-
ley [87]. By 2008, the US government and household sector sunk deeper into debt
and the recession in the US has had adverse impact on the rest of the world. Bird-
sall, Rodrik and Subramanian [15], McKinley [87], Ricupero [109] and others sug-
gest that the share of global excess savings should be recycled to poor countries in
need of development finance. Low-income countries are also hit the hardest by
global recession as surveyed by Burke [21] and thus need extra help to recover
from the crises. On the other hand, many economists state that the flow of capital
across nations can have benefits. Farrell et al. [43] state that companies around the
world can tap larger pools of capital at better prices. Oil exporting nations are prov-
ing beneficial in injecting capital into US and European banks that are suffering
from the fallout of the US subprime mortgage crisis. Demirguc-Kunt and Maksi-
movic [36] find that firms grow faster with the help of external funds in their sam-
ple of 30 developed and developing countries. Obstfeld [95] states that global capi-
tal flows allow countries to pool various risks and achieve more effective insurance
than domestic arrangements would allow. He further states that developing coun-
tries with little capital can borrow to finance investment, thereby promoting eco-
nomic growth. Moreover, a country suffering from a minor recession or a natural
disaster can borrow abroad. Loungani and Razin [82] believe that global capital
mobility contributes to the spread of the best practices in corporate governance,
accounting rules and legal traditions, and limits the ability of governments to pur-
sue bad policies. Edwards [41] concludes that in order to fund investment projects
and adjustment programs, a country should devise strategies to attract foreign capi-
tal inflows, as it forms an important part of the country’s strategy for recovery and
growth.
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2.1.4 The Future of International Trade
Trade is growing faster than GDP as illustrated in Figure 2.6. There has been a ma-
jor shift towards financial globalization since the 1980’s, with further acceleration
in early 1990’s, see Figure 2.7. Cross-border financial integration has accelerated;
see Figure 2.9. Moreover, Integration is faster in finance than trade, and much fast-
er for industrial countries, see Figure 2.8. Over the next 50 years, the fast growing
developing economies (that are not current world leaders) can become a much
larger force in the world economy, overtaking the US, the current world leader, see
Figure 2.10. Developing economies like China and India can hence catch up with
leading economies like the US and the UK and in fact overtake them to become
world leaders due to world trade. Such a scenario where the lagging country over-
takes the leading country and assumes leadership is also obtained in the continuous
version of the trade game model considered in this thesis.
Figure 2.6. Trade (exports plus imports) as a percentage of GDP (Source:
Papaioannou and Portes [99]).
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Figure 2.7. International Financial Integration: Industrial Group and
Emerging Markets/Developing Countries Group, 1970-2004, showing the
ratio of sum of foreign assets and liabilities to GDP (Source: Lane and Mi-
lesi-Ferretti [76]).
Figure 2.8. Financial Integration versus Trade Integration: Industrial Group
and Emerging Markets/Developing Countries Group, 1970-2004, showing
the sum of external assets and liabilities as a percentage of the sum of ex-
ports and imports (Source: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti [76]).
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Figure 2.9. Bank external assets and liabilities in billion USD (Source:
Portes [103]).
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Figure 2.10. The world economy in 2050, showing a forecast of respective
shares of total world GDP (Source: Purushothaman and Wilson [104]).
2.1.5 Making Globalization Work for All
As found in our model, world economies theoretically can benefit from openness to
international trade, and a state where all the economies trade with one another can
be a strict equilibrium provided certain restrictions on the parameters hold. Stern
and Deardorff [127] examine the effects of trade liberalization on countries that do
38
not participate in it and find that excluded countries38 are more likely to lose than
gain, through improved terms of trade.
Some globalization problems are due to international externalities like tax, regula-
tory competition and environment. Summers [128] writes that one of the reasons
for globalization causing some increase in inequality is the problem of race to the
bottom39 in corporate income to entice more business and the problem of tax ha-
vens to lure wealthy citizens. The international mobility of goods and capital puts
competitive pressure on nation-states to redesign domestic market regulations, aris-
ing from either economic activities being shifted elsewhere or internal lobbying of
industries, see Holzinger, Knill and Sommerer [64]. For example, if one country
lowers its standards compared to others, then the others follow, leading the level of
regulation to move to the bottom.
These are all big issues to which there are no easy answers. For example, WTO
introduced the Doha Development Round in 2001 to lower trade barriers globally.
It includes negotiations on various issues like agriculture, services, trade facilita-
tion, market access for non-agricultural products, least-developed countries, special
and differential treatment, trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights
(TRIPS), etc.40 According to James [67], the Doha round was the best prospect the
world had for significant gains from freer trade and had enormous potential to
bring growth and development to poorer countries. Studies have also shown that
developing countries can gain from reduction or elimination of trade barriers in
agricultural markets as a result of the implementation of the Doha round multilat-
eral trade agreements, for example, Ferreira Filho and Horridge [45] analysed the
case for Brazil and found a reduction in poverty with the implementation of the
Doha round agreement. The Doha round negotiations came to a halt in 2008 large-
38 The excluded countries are defined as countries that have stayed out of preferential trade arrange-
ments and have joined WTO/GATT whilst keeping their trade barriers high, or failed to join.
39 Race to the bottom in this context is used to describe the situation where countries compete over
tax regulation and the production of goods is moved to the country with the lowest tax rates.
40 See Doha Development Agenda: Negotiations, implementation and development
(http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/dda_e.htm#dohadeclaration) for the entire list of negotia-
tions covered.
39
ly due to failure of reaching a consensus on agricultural proposals by the US and
the EU, see Cho [25], Gallagher [52] and Griller [61]. Pereira, Teixeira and
Raszap-Skorbiansky [101] study the impact of the Doha round on Brazil, China
and India, and find that while Brazil and China show a high GDP growth rate, In-
dia shows a negative GDP growth rate. Furthermore, the GDP losses observed in
the US and the EU make it difficult to reach an agreement at the Doha round. Lit-
erature on how the next Doha round could be more effective ranges from policies
mainly focussing on agriculture, to policies more generally focusing on trade and
technology. For example, agricultural policies can include developing countries
retaining the policy flexibility necessary for development, providing appropriate
incentives to their domestic agricultural sectors, increasing food security, shielding
the poor from market failures that can affect their very survival, etc. (see Polaski
[102]). Trade and technology policies can include using average tariffs to sequence
certain industries into world markets; issuing compulsory licenses under TRIPs,
requiring foreign firms to transfer technology, forming joint ventures and perform-
ing R&D in the host country (see Gallagher [52]).
Policies for Developed Countries
In this section, the enhancement of policies to be implemented by developed coun-
tries in order to help developing and least developed economies to boost economic
growth and reduce poverty worldwide is discussed.41
Global markets should open further to exports of developing countries, especially
in the areas of agriculture and textiles. As discussed above, poor countries stand to
lose the most from the remaining protectionism in rich countries. For example,
Anderson and Valenzuela [10] state that most governments restrict international
trade to some extent especially in agricultural goods, especially advanced econo-
mies, in order to protect domestic producers from import competition. However,
agricultural growth and food related aid is essential for the poorer countries to
prosper. Goyal [60] studies the impact of globalization in developed countries and
41 Note that the recommendations come from a wide range of literature on economic policies and
discussions on the world economy with economic experts at London Business School.
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lists boosting agricultural growth through diversification and development of agro-
processing as one of the future challenges for the Indian economy. Bhalla [12]
writes that the most important problem arising in global agricultural trade is large
subsidies given by developed countries to certain products, which make the exports
from developing countries non-competitive. In order to address this issue, develop-
ing countries like India should urge developed countries to reduce tariffs on all
commodities, especially on agricultural commodities, and negotiate on the easing
of market access. Von Braun [135] also states that the remaining agricultural sub-
sidies and trade-distorting policies in developed countries should be eliminated, as
the poor countries are unable to match them. Anderson and Martin [8] suggest
moving to free global merchandise trade in order to boost real net farm incomes in
sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia, thereby helping to reduce poverty. Ander-
son, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe [9] suggest rewarding developing countries’
commitment to greater trade reform with an expansion of trade-facilitating aid, to
be provided by a major expansion of the current Integrated Framework42 for less
developed countries (LDCs) (see Hoekman [63]). Bouet, Fontaigné and Jean [18]
agree that this may provide a path for developing countries to trade their way out of
poverty, and for developed countries to assist low-income nations efficiently.
Developed countries should aim at protecting workers while allowing for realloca-
tions, between sectors or within sectors between firms. Blanchard [16] agrees that a
social insurance system should protect workers, not jobs. He says that a good sys-
tem should include some employment protection such as a firm, which lays off
workers, contributing towards the benefits paid to the laid-off workers. Countries
like Denmark and the Netherlands have benefited from flexicurity43, which follows
the policy of protecting workers instead of jobs, by combining high unemployment
benefits with low job protection and high participation rate; see Ahn, Garcia and
Jimeno [2]. Lipsey and Chrystal [80] write that unemployment is a major problem
of our time and economic policies that protect workers instead of jobs are needed.
42 A process established in 1996 to support LDCs in trade capacity building and integrating trade
issues into national development strategies.
43 Flexicurity combines security for workers with labour market flexibility so that both the workers’
and the employers’ needs are taken care of.
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For example, policies can couple unemployment benefits with measures to help the
unemployed find jobs; employment protection policies can internalize social costs,
etc. Vermeylen [133] suggest that the society and the economy on the whole, in-
cluding social systems, should be involved in shaping and implementing labour
markets’ and workers’ policies such as flexicurity.
Developed countries should raise development aid44, and improve its effectiveness.
Speth [126] summarizes that poverty is increasing rapidly in developing countries
and the West must increase development aid and political investment. Minoiu and
Reddy [89] attempt to separate two components of aid, a developmental compo-
nent that consists of growth-promoting expenditures and a non-developmental
component that consists of all other expenditures. They find that developmental aid
has a positive, large and robust effect on economic growth while non-
developmental aid is mostly growth-neutral. World leaders pledged to increase de-
velopment aid in 2000 in order to reduce extreme poverty in the world by half by
201545, see Ismail [66]. However, Bulir and Hamann [20] find that the positive im-
pact of foreign aid is limited by the erratic behaviour of aid flows. Corruption is
one of the main factors that reduce the effectiveness of aid in developing countries
and Schudel [118] finds that as a result, donor countries allocate less bilateral aid to
recipient countries with high levels of corruption. The development aid funds need
to target the poor directly and the problem of corruption needs to be tackled, for
example, by adding some levels of government that are truly responsive to the pub-
lic, see Andersson et al. [57], or allocating through multilateral channels, see
Schudel [118]. In order to stimulate economic growth, developed countries need to
invest in physical, human and social capital, including creation of opportunities for
the less advantaged, see Gibson, Andersson, Ostrom and Shivakumar [57]. Imple-
mentation of key reforms and social services to the poor must be monitored, see
Thomas [132]. A better way for information sharing, planning and coordination is
44 Aid given by governments and other agencies to support the economic, social and political devel-
opment of developing countries (development aid is considered to be different from humanitarian
aid).
45 Birdsall [14] estimates $1 trillion must be unlocked for developing countries to cope with the fi-
nancial crises alone.
42
required according to Kharas [73], along with a revised approach towards the allo-
cation of aid based on the effectiveness of the development contribution, not on
politics.
Debt relief is advantageous to heavily indebted and underdeveloped countries as it
can increase the amount of financial resources available to poor countries (see
Weiss [137]). In order to cancel, or reduce, external debt payment to sustainable
levels, the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC) was formed in 1996
by the IMF and the World Bank. Of the 40 countries46 that qualified for the HIPC
initiative, 28 have reached completion point and received debt relief. The HIPC
initiative has had beneficial effects on education, see Cuaresma and Vincelette
[31]; health, see Dessy and Vencatachellum [37]; and the earning prospects of
companies operating in HIPCs, see Raddatz [106]. The Multilateral Debt Relief
Initiative (MDRI) was formed in 2005 by the IMF, the World Bank and the African
Development Fund, as an extension to the HIPC initiative, in order to reduce fur-
ther the debts of HIPCs and to help countries expand development programs fast
enough to meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Between the 1990s
and mid-2008, there have been significant reductions in public indebtedness of
low-income countries and improvements in countries’ external positions (im-
provements in balance of payments and increase in foreign exchange reserves), see
Liu, Prasad, Rowe and Zeikate [81]. Debt relief can have its largest impact if it is
accompanied by a broader package of reforms, like growth enhancing changes in
national policies (see Hornbeck [65]). Long-term response may entail changes to
the system of international aid, for example, establishment of minimum accounta-
bility requirements for governments managing aid money, see Thomas [132].
46 Countries include Benin, Bissau, Bolivia, Burkina, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic,
Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Eritrea, Ethiopia,
Faso, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Kyrgyz Republic, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mau-
ritania, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, São Tomé & Príncipe, Senegal, Somalia,
Sudan, Tanzania, The Gambia, Togo, Uganda, and Zambia. See IMF Factsheet on Debt Relief Under
HIPC Initiative (http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/pdf/hipc.pdf) for further details on coun-
tries.
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Policies for Financial Integration
In this section, it is shown how financial integration policies around the world can
have a positive impact on economies. Many studies (Arteta, Eichengreen and Wy-
plosz [11], Klein [74], Klein and Olivei [75]) have shown that capital account lib-
eralization can positively affect economic development through financial develop-
ment. However, careful sequencing of financial sector policies is extremely im-
portant especially when the issue of capital account liberalization is concerned.
Caprio and Honohan [22] suggest that mistaken sequencing for capital account lib-
eralization contributed to the speed and severity of the 1997 Asian financial crisis.
Capital account liberalization should be sequenced in an integrated manner so that
it reinforces domestic financial liberalization and allows for institutional capacity
building to manage the additional risks, see Johnston and Sundararajan [69] and
World Bank Staff [139]. Capital account liberalization should start with the liberal-
ization of FDI (as this helps in importing superior technology and management
expertise needed to implement operational reforms in financial institutions), and
closely complement the domestic development market strategy (for example, mon-
ey and exchange market development can benefit from safeguarded short-term cap-
ital flows).
Policies that strengthen financial supervision and regulation are essential as bank
failures not only affect taxpayers and financial institutions, but also the economy as
a whole. Major failures in this area were the fundamental causes of the current fi-
nancial crisis. Banks should be closely involved with financial supervision and
regulation, especially to limit systemic risks, see Geraats [56] and Quintyn,
Ramirez and Taylor [105]. In response to the financial crisis in 2009, the Leaders
of the Group of Twenty (G20) agreed on strengthening financial regulation and
supervision to minimize risk across the financial system and dampen, rather than
amplify, the financial and economic cycle. They also agreed that regulators and
supervisors must play a crucial role in avoiding adverse impact on other countries,
reducing the scope for regulatory arbitrage, protecting investors and consumers,
keeping pace with innovation in the marketplace and supporting dynamism and
competition. According to Tarullo [130], the Federal Reserve has begun to evaluate
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regulatory and supervisory changes that can help reduce the incidence and severity
of future financial crises.
Policies that oppose extreme cases of economic patriotism47 are required. Durand
[40] explains with the example of energy mergers in Spain and France48, how the
energy markets in Europe were unable to produce their desired outcome in terms of
prices, security of supply and environment sustainability due to economic patriot-
ism. Studies like Joongi [71] show that economic patriotism through protectionism
will not be a sustainable alternative to global economic integration. As a healthy
balance, liberal economic patriotism must operate within limits of supranational
and global regulation as suggested by Clift [27].
Capital controls49 can be used to alter the composition of inflows, for example,
Chile and Columbia effectively changed the composition of inflows toward less
vulnerable liability structures via such controls, see De Gregorio, Edwards and
Valdes [34] and Cardenas and Barrera [23]. Coelho and Gallagher [28] also find
that capital controls50 were instrumental in stemming asset bubbles in the case of
Colombia and Thailand. Magud and Reinhart [84] find that capital controls on in-
flow make monetary policy more independent and reduce real exchange rate pres-
sures. Empirical results by Ostry, Ghosh, Habermeier, Chamon, Qureshi, and
Reinhardt [97] find that capital controls aimed at achieving a less risky external
liability structure have helped in reducing financial fragility in the current crisis. As
explained in Chang and Grabel [24], well-designed capital controls can promote
47 This notion has emerged as a counterforce to constrain foreign ownership.
48 Gas Natural, Spain’s largest gas supplier, launched a takeover bid for Endesa, Spain’s largest elec-
tricity producer to prevent a counter-bid by German electricity and gas giant E.ON in 2006-2007.
However, Endesa now forms a subsidiary of the Italian utility company Enel. In 2006, the French
government announced the merger between Gaz de France and Suez, a French utility company, in
order to prevent a takeover of Gaz de France by Italy’s Enel.
49 Capital controls can limit a country’s ability to access foreign funds; however, well-designed capi-
tal controls on inflows and outflows can lengthen maturities and limit destabilizing flows.
50 Developing countries used unremunerated reserve requirements (URR) as a response to massive
amounts of capital inflows that their financial systems were unable to absorb. Colombia and Thailand
deployed URR in 2006-2007 with positive results.
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economic stability and prevent economic and social devastation associated with
economic crises.
Policies for institutional development
Better policies are needed that can cope better with cross-border spillovers and in-
ternational prisoners’ dilemmas. For example, Corsetti, Meier and Muller [30] ana-
lyse the international spillover effects of short-term ﬁscal stimulus and find that
coordinated short-term stimulus policies are most effective when coupled with
credible medium-term consolidation plans featuring at least some spending re-
straint. The global financial crisis that originated in 2007 affected almost all devel-
oped economies and emerging markets, some of which were mainly affected
through rapid financial spillovers. Claessens, Dell’Ariccia, Igan and Laeven [26]
suggest closer cooperation and greater coordination among regulators and supervi-
sors to forestall policy measures that have adverse spillovers, and better interna-
tional liquidity provision to both financial institutions and countries.
The international financial architecture needs to be reformed for orderly resolution
of debt crises and multilateral efforts to deal with global imbalances. According to
Akyuz [3], there is a need for an independent assessment of debt sustainability; a
dispute-settlement body placed beyond the reach of the IMF and its major share-
holders; and protection of debtors through an internationally sanctioned stay on
litigation. Tasks to be undertaken for an orderly unwinding of global imbalances
can include steps to boost national saving in the US including fiscal consolidation;
further progress on growth-enhancing reforms in Europe; further structural reforms
including fiscal consolidation in Japan; reforms to boost domestic demand in
emerging Asia, together with greater exchange rate flexibility in a number of sur-
plus countries; and increased spending consistent with absorptive capacity and
macroeconomic stability in oil producing countries, as stated in Akyuz [3]51.
51 Taken from Communiqué of the International Monetary and Financial Committee of the Board of
Governors of the International Monetary Fund, October 20, 2007.
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The international institutional framework needs to be strengthened to deal with
environment, international transmission of disease, intellectual property rights
(IPR), global competition policy issues and terrorism, with emphasis on the needs
of poor countries.
2.2 Models of International Trade
This section provides a brief background on coordination games and compares
models of international trade that have been analyzed in literary studies.
The Coordination Game Model
A coordination game is a game in which players benefit from mutual cooperation
but only by making mutually consistent decisions. A 2 2 coordination game can
be represented by the following payoff matrix:
1 2
1
2
, ,
, ,
s s
s A a C c
s B b D d
where for player 1: A B , C D and for player 2: a c , d b . In this game, 1s is
the coordinated strategy whereas 2s is the non-coordinated strategy. The strategy
profile is denoted by  1 2,x x x , where  1 2,ix s s for 1,2i  and ix represents the
strategy played by player i. Following the payoff matrix above, player 1 obtains
payoff A by playing strategy 1s , or payoff B by playing 2s , when player 2 plays
strategy 1s ; and payoff C by playing strategy 1s , or payoff D by playing 2s , when
player 2 plays strategy 2s . Player 2 obtains payoff a by playing strategy 1s , or pay-
off c by playing 2s , when player 1 plays strategy 1s ; and payoff b by playing strate-
gy 1s , or payoff d by playing 2s , when player 1 plays strategy 2s . Note that in this
game,  1 1,s s is the coordinated outcome and  2 2,s s is the non-coordinated out-
come. This game model can be extended to n players, with the strategy profile de-
fined as  1, , nx x x  , where  1 2,ix s s for 1, ,i n  and the payoff function
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defined as     1 , , nf f x f x  . This definition of the n-player model is used in
Chapter 3.
A Nash equilibrium is defined as a set of strategies such that no player can do bet-
ter by unilaterally changing its strategy. In the coordination game above,  ,A a and
 ,D d are pure strategy Nash equilibria.  ,A a is a Nash equilibrium since player
1 cannot obtain a better payoff by switching to 2s when player 2 plays 1s (since
A B ), and player 2 cannot obtain a better payoff by switching to 2s when player 1
plays 1s (since a c ).  ,D d is a Nash equilibrium since player 1 cannot obtain a
better payoff by switching to 1s when player 2 plays 2s (since C D ), and player 2
cannot obtain a better payoff by switching to 1s when player 1 plays 2s (since
d b ).52 For the n-player coordination described above, a strategy profile *x is a
Nash equilibrium if    * * *, ,i i i i i if x x f x x  , for all  1 2,ix s s and all i. Note that
here *ix represents the strategy profile of all players other than player i. If a strict
inequality holds in the above inequality, then the equilibrium is defined as a strict
Nash equilibrium.
Payoff dominance and risk dominance are defined by Harsanyi and Selten [62] as
follows. A payoff dominant outcome is an outcome that yields the highest payoffs
to all other outcomes so that when given a choice between outcomes, players
choose the payoff dominant outcome as it gives each player at least as much payoff
as other outcomes. A risk dominant outcome or the least risky outcome is an out-
come that players choose if they are unsure of other player’s strategies. In the co-
ordination game above,  ,A a payoff dominates or Pareto dominates  ,D d since
A D and a d .  ,D d risk dominates  ,A a if the product of the deviation loss-
52 Note that this game also has a mixed strategy Nash equilibria where player 1 plays 1s with proba-
bility p, and 2s with probability 1 p , where d bp a c d b
    . Player 2 plays 1s with probability q,
and 2s with probability 1 q , where D Cq A B D C
    .
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es is highest for  ,D d , i.e.      D C d b A B a c     (see Harsanyi and Sel-
ten [62]).
The Prisoners’ Dilemma game can be defined using the same payoff matrix as the
coordination game above, but with the conditions on payoffs as follows - for player
1: B A D C   , and for player 2: c a d b   . In this game, mutual cooperation
 1 1,s s yields a better payoff than mutual defection  2 2,s s since A a for player 1
and D d for player 2. However, strategy 2s is the dominant strategy for both
players since B A , D C for player 1 and c a , d b for player 2. Mutual de-
fection  2 2,s s is the only Nash equilibrium in this game.
Ricardian Model of Comparative Advantage
The standard Ricardian model of comparative advantage can be presented from
Dornbusch, Fischer and Samuelson [39] as follows53. Consider a world with two
countries 1C , 2C with one factor of production. Let 1L , 2L denote the endowments
of labour in countries 1C , 2C , respectively. Let 1w , 2w denote the wages in coun-
tries 1C , 2C , respectively. The continuum of goods can be indexed by  0,1z .
Constant returns to scale with respect to labour endowments can be defined for 1C ,
2C as  1a z ,  2a z , respectively. Goods can be ordered so that     
2
1
a zS z a z and
  0S z  . Hence 1C has comparative advantage in the low-z goods. If  p z de-
notes the price of good z in both countries under free trade, profit is maximized in
both countries when:
   1 1 0p z w a z  (in this case    1 1 0p z w a z  if z is produced in 1C ),
   2 2 0p z w a z  (in this case    2 2 0p z w a z  if z is produced in 2C ),
53 Definitions and proofs derived from [38].
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then there exists  * 0,1z  such that 1C produces all goods *z z and 2C produces
all goods *z z .54 Thus, 1C should produce the goods in which it has a comparative
advantage.
Next, let the relative wage rate be denoted by:
 1
2
ˆ: w S zw   . (2.1)
According to Dornbusch et al. [39], the equilibrium condition of this model re-
quires the production of goods to be in the country where it is cheaper to do so,
conditional on wages. Let the share of expenditure on good z be denoted by:
   0,1E z  , such that          1 2
1 1 2 2
p z c z p z c zE z w L w L  , where  1c z ,  2c z are
consumptions in countries 1C , 2C , respectively. By definition, shares of expendi-
ture satisfy:  1
0
1E z dz  . If the fraction of income spent on goods produced in 1C
is denoted by    ˆ
0
ˆ : ,
z
z B z dz   then balance of trade requires:
    2 2 1 1ˆ ˆ1z w L z w L   , where   2 2zˆ w L denotes 1C ’s exports, and
   1 1ˆ1 z w L denotes 1C ’s imports. Re-arranging the balance of trade equation
gives:
54 The proof is obtained as follows: Suppose there exists a good zˆ z such that z is produced in 1C
and zˆ is produced in 2C . Then:
   1 1ˆ ˆ 0p z w a z  ,    1 1 0p z w a z  ,
   2 2 0p z w a z  ,    2 2ˆ ˆ 0p z w a z  .
This gives:    1 1p z w a z ,    2 2ˆ ˆp z w a z ,    1 1ˆ ˆp z w a z ,    2 2p z w a z .
Hence,        1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2ˆ ˆw a z w a z w a z w a z , which can be written as   
 
 
2 2
1 1
ˆ
ˆ
a z a z
a z a z . This contradicts
the fact that   0S z  . Therefore, there exists  * 0,1z  such that 1C produces all goods *z z and
2C produces all goods *z z . 
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 
    21
ˆ :ˆ1
z L D zLz
   . (2.2)
Equilibrium for this Ricardian model can be summarized by  ˆ,z  , which is ob-
tained from (2.1) and (2.2).55
2.2.1 International Trade and Coordination
International trade and cooperation have been modelled as coordination games in
order to provide valuable insights into how countries interact with one another and
how it affects international cooperation. Snidal [124] uses models of Prisoners’
Dilemma games and Coordination games to analyse strategic interactions between
countries and finds that in comparison with the Prisoners’ Dilemma model, the Co-
ordination model better characterizes important issues surrounding variations with-
in strategic structures and international political regime characteristics. Lee, Park
and Cho [77] model international trade markets using an agent-based modeling and
evolutionary game theory approach to show that economies show more defecting
behaviours for the powerful countries (against the cooperative nations) whereas
countries with similar economic power cooperate with one another. The trade game
in this thesis (derived from the Artigues-Vignolo model) also obtains a similar re-
sult whereby it is more favourable for countries with similar payoffs to trade with
one another as opposed to all the countries including the leading countries to par-
ticipate in international trade. Friedman and Fung [51] analyze the effects of trade
between two countries (in inputs as well as outputs) and find that evolutionary
pressures do not necessarily lead to efficient outcomes. This is similar to the notion
of a country choosing less efficient strategies (in terms of absolute payoffs) in or-
der to reduce the gap between the leading country and itself in our model. Cordella
and Gabszewicz [29] find that even though there are mutual benefits to free trade
between two countries, the autarkic outcome turns out to be the unique oligopoly
equilibrium on the world market. This gives some credibility to the autarkic out-
55 Note that the curves  S z and  D z are essentially the labour supply and the labour demand
curves, respectively.
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come being the most favourable strict equilibrium in the model analysed in Chapter
3. In a stark contrast, Fisher and Vikas [47] find that comparative advantage pre-
dicts trade (that enhances economic welfare) between countries facing severe trad-
ing frictions. This thesis analyzes the trade dynamics and possible equilibria of the
trade game derived from the Artigues-Vignolo model, and extends the model in
order to incorporate intermediate strategies in order to find long run behaviour of
trade between two countries.
The D’Artigues-Vignolo model considered in Chapter 3 is derived incorporating
ideas from Kandori, Mailath and Rob [72]. The definition of payoffs to countries is
also obtained from Kandori et al. [72]. They consider two models of matching, first
– where each player is matched with each of the remaining players exactly once as
in a tournament, and second – where there are an infinite number of random
matches in time period t, so that each player’s average payoff in that period is the
expected payoff. A non-negligible number of mutations occur in their second ver-
sion of the model as independent shocks as a result of individual behaviour, which
results in a stochastic component in the dynamics. They find that the equilibrium
selected in the long run depends on the payoff structure of the underlying game
instead of the adjustment process. In this thesis, countries are matched exactly once
with each of the remaining countries in a given unit time and mutations are pre-
sented as one-shot small perturbations of equilibria (as considered in Maynard,
Smith and Price [86] and Taylor and Jonker [131]). The equilibrium selected in the
long run in this thesis also depends on the parameter values that determine the pay-
offs, including the strategy size.
The concept of payoff dominance versus risk dominance (as defined by Harsanyi
and Selten [62]56) with regards to the D’Artigues-Vignolo model is also briefly
discussed. According to Harsanyi and Selten [62], if the payoff dominance selec-
tion and the risk dominance criteria yield different outcomes for equilibrium selec-
56 A payoff dominant equilibrium is an equilibrium (based on collective rationality) which yields
every player a strictly higher payoff than all other equilibrium payoffs. A risk dominant equilibrium is
an equilibrium (based on individual rationality) which yields every player the least risky payoff, as
players are uncertain about each other’s actions.
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tion, then the payoff dominant outcome should be the first one to be considered,
making the risk dominant outcome irrelevant. Ostrom, Schmidt, Shupp and Walker
[96] also ﬁnd that players select the payoff dominant strategy more often than not.
However, changes in risk dominance signiﬁcantly affect the play of the subjects,
whereas changes in the level of payoff dominance do not. Their findings demon-
strate that players are affected by the risk-dominance characteristics of games, even
in the presence of a payoff dominant equilibrium. In the D’Artigues-Vignolo mod-
el considered in Chapter 3, the fully integrated equilibrium (where all the countries
are fully engaged in world trade) is the payoff dominant equilibrium, and this out-
come can be achieved even if gains from trade differ between the countries.
D’Artigues and Vignolo [33] find that this payoff dominant equilibrium is the long
run equilibrium if the countries are symmetric. However, in a world of asymmetric
countries, a country j chooses the autarkic strategy when all other countries are ful-
ly integrated into the world economy, provided certain restrictions hold on its pay-
off parameter values. This result captures the essence of mimetic rivalry (see
Girard [58]) which explains why country j deliberately chooses a strategy that de-
grades the payoff to the leading country. The role of envy is discussed further in
the next subsection.
2.2.2 The Role of Envy
Several empirical studies have emphasized the importance of envy as a motive for
Pareto-optimality57 rejection (see Elster [42]; Kim and Smith [123]; Schoeck
[117]). The destructive envy behaviour is Pareto-damaging as it results in players
lowering both their own payoffs and others’ payoffs (see Frank [49]; Schimmel
[116]). This negative emotion is incorporated into the framework of the
D’Artigues-Vignolo model by constructing a psychological game in the sense of
Geanakoplos, Pearce and Stacchetti [55]. The strategy changes involve the coun-
tries’ own payoff and their relative payoff so that the envious country suffers if the
57 Pareto optimality, a measure of the efficiency of a game, is defined as the outcome where no player
can obtain a better payoff without reducing at least one other player’s payoff (note that this is a mini-
mal notion of efficiency and does not always result in the socially desired outcomes).
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opponent obtains a higher payoff and this results in the non-Pareto optimal out-
come. Vignolo [134] finds that this happens as a result of the deviating player ob-
taining a higher status relative to his opponent in the non-coordinated outcome than
in the Pareto-optimal equilibrium. Thus, envious behaviour causes the dynamics to
move away from the payoff dominant equilibrium. According to Wobker and Ken-
ning [138], frustration is one of the factors that influences the destructive envy be-
haviour. The D’Artigues-Vignolo model also presents terrorism as a result of com-
petition between countries, when the desire of imitating the leading country is frus-
trated by the impossibility of doing so. These results of envious behaviour can be
incorporated into the model in the following chapters to lend plausibility to the fact
that the all-in-autarky state is a more favourable strict equilibrium than the other
states (the fully integrated state and the heterogeneous states).
The next chapter defines the D’Artigues-Vignolo model and analyses the n-country
scenario in order to obtain conditions required to hold true for strict equilibria and
strictly stable equilibria.
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Chapter 3
The Trade Game with Pure Strategies
Integration into the world economy and economic competitiveness are generally
viewed as ways to generate positive gains58 for all countries participating in inter-
national trade. However, even if global integration is a Pareto-dominant state59, it
can lead to rivalrous behaviour60, where countries deliberately try to degrade the
position of the leading country, when the desire to imitate the leading country is
frustrated by the impossibility of doing so. This chapter introduces an evolutionary
trade game model, as considered in D’Artigues and Vignolo [33], where countries
choose between two strategies: integrating into the world economy, or not, that is
staying in autarky; and describes the long-run behaviour of n countries.
Section 3.1 defines the D’Artigues-Vignolo trade model with n countries, playing a
2 2 coordination game, and defines the payoff to countries using a simple behav-
ioural rule. The trade dynamics using a simple 2-country and a 3-country model are
then derived, highlighting the strict equilibria and strictly stable states. The 4-
country model is also briefly discussed. Section 3.2 defines the n-country trade
model, formalizing the behavioural rule using new notation. The selection and mu-
tation mechanisms are then defined and the conditions required for the homogene-
ous and heterogeneous states to be strict equilibria are analysed. Section 3.3 is an
58 Gains can be thought of as economic and social benefits arising from cross-country trade.
59 Pareto-dominant state is the payoff dominant state, where given a choice, all the countries play
strategies that give them the maximum possible payoff, as defined in Harsanyi and Selten [62].
60 Using the theory of mimetic rivalry (see Girard [58]), competition between countries can lead to
negative behaviour in the form of terrorism.
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appendix containing the conditions required for strategy changes in the 3-country
model.
3.1 The D’Artigues-Vignolo Trade Model
Consider a population of asymmetric61 countries denoted by C. The players (coun-
tries) are boundedly rational62 agents using past experience and a simple behav-
ioural rule of trying to reduce the gap between the maximal payoff and their own
payoff. Time is measured discretely (indexed by 1,2,3,t  ) and in each time pe-
riod63, countries are matched exactly once with one another to play the game and
adjust their behaviour over time. The model is summarized by a 2 2 coordination
game in which each country chooses between two strategies E – engaging in world
trade and A – staying in autarky, and plays the same strategy in a given time peri-
od, where 1 time period = 1 unit time.
In each unit time, with a small fixed probability, a country receives an opportunity
to update its strategy. So the length of the time period does not matter, just the se-
quence in which the countries are chosen and the path of the trade dynamics lead-
ing to a steady state. In this chapter, it is assumed that only one country is given an
opportunity to update its strategy in a unit time.
International trade between countries i and j is summarized by the following
asymmetric coordination game:
61 Asymmetries (the ia ’s and the i ’s are different as well as the gains from trade) between countries
can be due to country size, factor endowments (amounts of natural resources, land, labour, capital,
etc. possessed by countries) and technology used. Asymmetries in this model are captured by the
gains to a country as a result of world trade.
62 Bounded rationality asserts that individuals are goal-oriented and adaptive, but the human cognitive
framework and complex environments limit their decision-making process; see Jones [70] and Simon
[121].
63 It would be realistic to assume a unit time as a year when countries form trade policies and decide
the extent of international trade with other countries.
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where 0 i ia  i C    , ia is the payoff to country i for complete integration into
the world economy and i the payoff for remaining in complete autarky.64 Assume
1 2 na a a   , so that country 1 is the natural leader. The fully integrated state
 ,E E and the all-in-autarky state  ,A A are two strict Nash equilibria65 in this
coordination game66.
The evolutionary dynamics that describe the long run behaviour of the countries
are driven by the selection mechanism67. The selection mechanism in this model
defines the way the countries choose their strategies using a variation of the satis-
ficing dynamics68 defined by Smallwood and Conlisk [122]. In this model, it is as-
64 Integration and economic competition generate positive gains for all participants of international
trade. Countries gain if they trade with one another as they can produce goods they are more efficient
at producing and import the rest. However, if a country is willing to trade with another country i, and
invests in resources towards production of goods for international trade, and country j chooses to not
trade, then country i loses out on its investment while country j receives its autarkic payoff, whereby
it utilizes its resources to become a self-sufficient economy. Note that the autarkic payoff is not the
optimal payoff for country j as it can obtain higher payoff by engaging in trade with country i and
sharing resources. This interaction between the countries is classified by a coordination game, as
defined previously in Section 2.2.
65 The fully integrated Nash equilibrium Pareto-dominates the all-in-autarky Nash equilibrium, so the
payoff dominant outcome can be reached even if the gains from world trade differs between the coun-
tries.
66 Note that a country’s optimal strategy depends on its expectation of what the other country may do.
67 Note that D’Artigues and Vignolo [33] derive the model from Kandori et al. [72], and they both
consider long run behaviour of the countries driven by the selection mechanism and the mutation
mechanism. Mutations in this chapter are only considered for testing stability.
68 Smallwood and Conlisk [122] consider a market scenario where consumers buy a certain product,
from a given number of brands. If they are satisfied with a particular brand in one time period, they
continue to use the same brand over consequent periods. However, if the product breaks down (or if
they are dissatisfied with a brand they are currently using), then they choose another brand in the next
period. They find that the adaptive consumer behaviour can lead to a wide diversity of possible out-
comes, for both the weakly dissatisfied consumer and the strongly dissatisfied consumer. Outcomes
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sumed that the countries are myopic and adaptive, so that they do not form expec-
tations about the future course of the play and simply take into account the deci-
sions made in the past. The mutation mechanism takes into account a small proba-
bility with which each country plays a non-optimal strategy69, so that the selection
mechanism is perturbed70.
In each time period t, a country plays a pure strategy  ,s E A . Let tx be the num-
ber of countries playing strategy E at time t. The average payoff of country i play-
ing strategy s, denoted by  i s , is given by (see D’Artigues and Vignolo [33]):
  11ti i
xE an
 
71, (3.1)
  11 1t ti i i i
x n xA n n   
    
72. (3.2)
Note that if a country i C plays strategy A, then its payoff is i , so the autarkic
payoff is independent of the population distribution, where as if it chooses strategy
include equilibria in which only best brands survive, equilibria in which an inferior brand with suffi-
cient popularity captures the entire market and equilibria in which most brands survive though the
poorest brands eventually die out.
69 A mutation can be viewed as a deliberate experimentation of a new strategy by a country or exit of
a country replaced with a new one knowing less or nothing about the game and so choosing a strategy
at random.
70 The mutation phenomenon can be viewed as a residual capturing of whatever has been excluded
when modelling selection, see Samuelson [115].
71 Note that in the n-country scenario, when country i plays strategy E against country j, it receives a
payoff of ia if j plays E and a payoff of 0 if j plays A. If there are tx countries playing strategy E in-
cluding country i, then it receives  1t ix a against  1tx  countries playing E, and 0 against
  1tn x  countries playing A. Therefore, the average payoff to country i is: 11t ix an  .
72 Note that when country i plays strategy A against country j, it receives a payoff of i regardless of
what j plays. If there are tx countries playing strategy E, then it receives t ix  against tx countries
playing E, and  1t in x   against  1tn x  countries playing A (excluding country i). Therefore,
the average payoff to country i is: 11 1
t t
i i
x n x
n n 
   .
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E, then its payoff depends on tx , the number of countries participating in world
trade. Note that two models of matching can generate the above payoffs – each
country matched with each of the remaining countries exactly once, or an infinite
number of random matches within period t so that each country’s average payoff in
that period is equal to the expected payoff, see Kandori et al. [72]. Each country’s
actions are assumed to be fixed within a period.
3.1.1 The Selection Mechanism
Let  ,s E A denote the current strategy of country i. Each country is assumed to
observe  - the maximal payoff73 over all countries that is attained by one or sev-
eral countries in a given unit time. It then compares the maximal payoff to its aver-
age payoff earned from its current strategy s and chooses the strategy that reduces
the gap between the maximal payoff and its own payoff74. This behavioural rule75
is formally expressed as:
 
  
,
argmin is E As s   , (3.3)
where s denotes the strategy played in the next period and  i s denotes the
payoff obtained if country i plays s when other countries play the strategies from
the current period.
Evolutionary game theory considers that countries do not simultaneously adjust
their strategies following the behavioural rule (3.3) at each period. Rather, there is
some inertia76 in this model so that countries do not update their strategies fre-
quently. So the strategies that prove to be effective for a country, at a given time
73 This will be defined more formally in terms of the n-country model in section 3.2.
74 Note that the payoff from engaging in world trade can be the same as the autarkic payoff for coun-
try i -    i iE A  , when    1 1t i ix a n    , where x is the number of countries playing strate-
gy E in a n-country scenario. However, it is later assumed that the behavioural rule gives a unique
best reply and the parameters are chosen such that the degenerate cases are omitted.
75 This rule defines the selection mechanism for this model.
76 See Kandori et al. [72].
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period, are likely to remain effective in the subsequent time periods. In this model,
countries switch to a different strategy in a period if the payoff realized by doing so
is strictly greater than the payoff obtained from the strategy from the previous peri-
od. Otherwise, they continue to play their strategies from the previous period. A set
of strategies constitutes an equilibrium if no country can do better under (3.3) by
unilaterally changing its current strategy and a strict equilibrium if each country
does explicitly worse by changing its strategy. Here strict refers to strict inequality
in the equilibrium conditions so that each country is playing a strategy that is a
unique best reply under (3.3).
For the analysis of the 2-country, 3-country and 4-country models, the following
definition of states is used.
Definition 3.1. A state (or strategy profile) in the n-country scenario is defined as
 1 2, , , ns s s , where  ,is E A and is is the strategy played by country i, for
1, ,i n  (at a given unit time).77
Definition 3.2. A state  1 2, , , nQ s s s  , where either is E for all i or is A for
all i is defined as a homogeneous state78 in the n-country scenario. The rest of the
states are defined as heterogeneous states79.
Definition 3.3. A strategy profile  1 2, , , ns s s is an equilibrium when no country
has any incentive to update its strategy when given an opportunity to do so.
Definition 3.4. A strategy profile  1 2, , , ns s s is a strict equilibrium when it is an
equilibrium and each country does explicitly worse by changing its strategy.
The simple 2-country scenario, consisting of four states is analysed in Section
3.1.2. The 3-country scenario, consisting of eight states is analysed in Section
77 Note that there are 2n states for the n-country model.
78 Note that there are two homogeneous states in the n-country scenario: the fully integrated state
 , ,E E and the all-in-autarky state  , ,A A .
79 Note that there are 2 2n  heterogeneous states in the n-country scenario.
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3.1.3. As each country chooses between the pure strategies – full integration (E)
and complete autarky (A) in each scenario, the trade dynamics are obtained and
presented graphically. The 4-country scenario is briefly examined in Section 3.1.4
and the heterogeneous states that cannot be strict equilibria are highlighted. The
homogeneous states and the rest of the heterogeneous states in the 4-country sce-
nario are left to be explored via numerical computations in the next chapter.
Note that one-shot mutations (non-optimal strategies in the sense of the behaviour-
al rule (3.3)) are introduced in this model once it reaches a strict equilibrium, in
order to measure stability. A mutant country playing strategy E or A switches to
strategy A or E, respectively, while all other countries continue playing their origi-
nal strategies. A strict equilibrium is stable with respect to such mutations if the
mutant country is playing with a strictly worse strategy after the mutation, while
the other countries have no better strategies and stick with their original strategies.
Definition 3.5. Let  1 2, , , nQ s s s  be an equilibrium strategy profile and  kQ be
a mutant strategy profile such that country k switches its strategy from ks . Then, Q
is a stable equilibrium if each country apart from k has no incentive to update its
strategy when given an opportunity to do so, and country k updates its strategy to
its original non-mutant strategy, and this must be true for each k.
Definition 3.6. Let  1 2, , , nQ s s s  be a stable equilibrium. Then, Q is strictly
stable if each country apart from the mutant country does explicitly worse by
changing its strategy while the mutant country does explicitly better by changing
back to its non-mutant strategy.
The 2-country model, the 3-country model and the 4-country model is analysed in
the following subsections.
3.1.2 The 2-Country Model
In this model, there are 4 states:        , , , , , , ,E E  E A  A E  A A , each of which is
analysed below.
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Consider the fully integrated state  ,E E . If country 1 is given the opportunity to
update its strategy (in the next period), then it assumes that country 2 will continue
to play strategy E and calculates its own payoff for strategies E and A. It then com-
pares  1 E and  1 A with the maximal payoff realized, and chooses the strategy
that reduces the difference between the maximal payoff realized and its own pay-
off. The payoffs are calculated as:  1 1,E a   2 2 ,E a  1a  , so country 1
continues to play E as it yields the maximal payoff. This dynamic is represented by
a circular arrow around state  ,E E in Figure 3.1, as country 1 has no incentive to
update its strategy. On the other hand, if country 2 is given an opportunity to up-
date its strategy, it calculates  2 E ,  2 A (which is 2a , 2 , respectively) and the
maximal payoff in each case (which is 1a , 2 , respectively). The maximal payoff
realised when country 2 plays E is     1 2max ,E E    1 2 1max ,a a a  ; and
when it plays A:       1 2 2 2max , max 0,E A       . Hence, country 2 real-
izes the maximal payoff by switching to strategy A.80 This dynamic is represented
by an arrow from state  ,E E to state  ,E A in Figure 3.1, as country 2 updates its
strategy to A when given an opportunity to do so.
Consider the all-in-autarky state  ,A A . If country 1 is given the opportunity to
update its strategy (in the next period), then it assumes that country 2 will continue
to play strategy A (obtaining 2 as its payoff) and calculates its own payoff for
strategies E and A as  1 0E  and  1 1 A  , respectively. The behavioural rule
(3.3) then implies that country 1 will continue to play A ( 2  when it plays E,
and  1 2max ,   when it plays A, and  2 1 2 10 max ,      ). Similarly,
when country 2 is given the opportunity to update its strategy, it calculates its pay-
offs for strategies E and A as 0 and 2 , respectively, and continues to play A using
(3.3). These dynamics are represented by two circular arrows around state  ,A A
80 Note that the payoff difference is  2 1 2E a a    when country 2 plays strategy E, and the
payoff difference is  2 2 2 0A       when it plays strategy A. So it chooses strategy A follow-
ing the behavioural rule (3.3).
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in Figure 3.1, as neither country has incentive to switch from strategy A to E when
the other country continues to play A. Hence, the all-in-autarky state  ,A A is a
strict equilibrium with respect to the behavioural rule (3.3).
Next, consider the heterogeneous state  ,E A . If country 1 is given the opportunity
to update its strategy, then it switches to strategy A under the behavioural rule (3.3)
, as continuing to play E (when country 2 plays A, obtaining a constant payoff of
2 ) yields a payoff of 0, whereas switching to strategy A yields a payoff of 1 . This
dynamic is represented by an arrow from state  ,E A to state  ,A A in Figure 3.1.
On the other hand, if country 2 is given the opportunity to update its strategy, then
continuing to play strategy A yields the maximum payoff of 2 while country 1
receives 0, and switching to strategy E yields a payoff of 2a while country 1 re-
ceives 1a . Therefore, country 2 continues to play strategy A as it yields the maxi-
mum payoff in that round. This dynamic is represented by a circular arrow around
state  ,E A in Figure 3.1.
Finally, consider the heterogeneous state  ,A E . If country 1 is given the oppor-
tunity to update its strategy, then it switches to strategy E as it yields the maximum
payoff of 1a whereas continuing to play A would only yield a payoff of 1 . This
dynamic is represented by an arrow from state  ,A E to state  ,E E in Figure 3.1.
If country 2 is given the opportunity to update its strategy, then it switches to strat-
egy A under the behavioural rule (3.3) as  2 2A  and  2 0E  , while country
1 receives a constant payoff of 1 by playing strategy A. This dynamic is represent-
ed by an arrow from state  ,A E to state  ,A A in Figure 3.1 as it is beneficial for
country 2 to switch to strategy A when country 1 plays A.
The only strict equilibrium from the above analysis is the all-in-autarky state
 ,A A in the sense that neither country 1 nor country 2 can do better by switching
(unilaterally) to strategy E.
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Consider a single mutation away from the all-in-autarky state  ,A A to the hetero-
geneous state  ,E A . Then, the trade dynamics either remain at  ,E A (as country
2 sticks with strategy E) or move back to  ,A A (as country 1 updates to strategy
A). Similarly, a single mutation from  ,A A to  ,A E leads the trade dynamics
back to  ,A A if country 2 is given the opportunity to update its strategy, otherwise
the dynamic        , , , ,A E E E E A A A   follows a full circle back to the
all-in-autarky state. Thus,  ,A A is also strictly stable with respect to single muta-
tions81 in the long run in the sense that a random deviation one state away from the
all-in-autarky equilibrium will eventually lead the dynamics back to the strict equi-
librium  ,A A under the behavioural rule (3.3). Therefore, the all-in-autarky state
is the long-run strict equilibrium for the 2-country model.
Figure 3.1. Trade dynamics of the 2-country model.
81 In this case mutations refer to countries randomly updating their strategies, which can be thought of
as experimentation in order to achieve better payoffs so that the gap is reduced, or exit of one of the
countries from the trade game, replaced by a new country with less or no knowledge about the game
and thus choosing a strategy at random. These mutations occur after the completion of the learning
adjustment by the selection mechanism (3.3), so that countries are already playing strategies that min-
imize the gap between the maximal payoff and their own payoffs when mutations occur.
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Figure 3.2. Tree diagram representing a complete set of possible dynamics
from each of the eight states of the 2-country model as countries 1 and 2
update their strategies, where  1 ,Q A A ,  2 ,Q E E ,  3 ,Q E A and
 4 ,Q A E .
3.1.3 The 3-Country Model
In this model, there are 8 states:  1 , ,Q E E E ,  2 , ,Q A E E ,  3 , ,Q A A E ,
 4 , ,Q E A E ,  5 , ,Q E A A ,  6 , ,Q E E A ,  7 , ,Q A E A ,  8 , ,Q A A A 82, each
of which is analysed below.
The term switches to refers to the strict inequality conditions and continues to play
refers to the non-strict inequality conditions, as countries update their strategies
only if they obtain a strictly greater payoff than obtained from the strategies from
the previous period.
First, consider the fully integrated state  1 , ,Q E E E .
Country 1 will not update its strategy when given the opportunity to do so, as it
receives the maximal payoff of 1a by playing E.
Country 2 when given an opportunity to update its strategy, will calculate the pay-
offs using (3.1) and (3.2) to be  2 2E a  , 1a  when it plays E, and
 2 2A  , 1 2max ,2
a     
83 when it plays A. It will only continue playing E if:
82 In each state, the first entry represents country 1’s strategy, the second entry represents country 2’s
strategy and the third entry represents country 3’s strategy.
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1
1 2 2 2max ,2
aa a        , (3.4)
using the behavioural rule (3.3). If 1 22
a  , then (3.4) cannot be satisfied as 1 2a a
and country 2 will switch to strategy A as it will yield the maximal payoff. So
1
22
a  is a necessary condition for country 2 to continue playing E. Condition
(3.4) then simplifies to 12 2 2
aa   .
Country 3 will continue playing E if:
1
1 3 3 3max ,2
aa a        .
84 (3.5)
If 1 32
a  , then country 3 will switch to strategy A as it will yield the maximal pay-
off. So 1 32
a  is a necessary condition for country 3 to continue playing E. Condi-
tion (3.5) then simplifies to 13 3 2
aa   . Hence, the fully integrated state 1Q is a
strict equilibrium when the following conditions hold:
1 1
2 2 2 3 3 3,2 2
a aa  a         . (3.6)
Next, consider the heterogeneous state  2 , ,Q A E E .
If country 1 receives the opportunity to update its strategy, then it switches to E as
it obtains the maximal payoff of 1a using (3.1). So 1Q is not a strict equilibrium and
83 1 3 1
2 2max , , max ,2 2 2
a a a             as 1 3a a .
84 Condition obtained using the behavioural rule (3.3) and the payoffs calculated using (3.1) and (3.2)
as follows:      1 1 2 2 3 3 1, , ,E a  E a  E a  a       when country 3 plays E and
     1 2 11 2 3 3 3, , , max ,2 2 2
a a aA  E  A             when country 3 plays A.
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the trade dynamics move from 2Q to  1 , ,Q E E E . The conditions required for
countries 2 and 3 to continue playing strategy E are listed in Table 3.1.
Next, consider the heterogeneous state  3 , ,Q A A E .
When country 3 receives the opportunity to update its strategy, it assumes countries
1 and 2 will continue to play A and calculates the difference between the maximal
payoff and its own payoff for strategies E and A. The maximal payoff is realized if
it plays strategy E is  1 2max ,  and its own payoff is  3 0E  . The maximal
payoff realized if it plays strategy A is  1 2 3max , ,   and its own payoff is
 3 3A  . Since    1 2 3 3 1 2max , , max , 0        85, country 3 will uncondi-
tionally update its strategy from E to A.
Similarly, if the heterogeneous state  7 , ,Q A E A is considered, country 2 will
update its strategy from E to A when given an opportunity to do so86.
Moreover, if state  5 , ,Q E A A is considered, then country 1 will update its strat-
egy from E to A when given an opportunity to do so87. These dynamics ( 3 8Q Q ,
7 8Q Q , 5 8Q Q ) are represented by double-arrows in Figure 3.5 as no extra
conditions are required for countries 1, 2, 3 to switch to A when in states 3Q , 5Q ,
7Q , respectively.
85 If  1 2 3 3max , ,    , then country 3 realizes maximal payoff by switching to strategy A. If
 3 1 2max ,   , then the maximal payoff is  1 2max ,   and country 3 reduces the gap by
switching to strategy A as 3 0     (playing strategy E yields 0 as payoff).
86 If country 2 plays E, then        1 1 2 3 3 1 3, 0, , max ,A  E  A           . If country 2 plays
A, then        1 1 2 2 3 3 1 2 3, , , max , ,A  A  E             . Since
   1 3 1 2 3 2max , 0 max , ,        , the behavioural rule (3.3) implies that country 2 updates it
strategy from E to A.
87 If country 1 plays E, then        1 2 2 3 3 2 30, , , max ,E  A  A           . If country 1 plays
A, then        1 1 2 2 3 3 1 2 3, , , max , ,A  A  A             . Since
   2 3 1 2 3 1max , 0 max , ,        , the behavioural rule (3.3) implies that country 1 updates it
strategy from E to A.
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Next, consider the heterogeneous state  4 , ,Q E A E .
For 4Q to be a strict equilibrium, countries 1, 2, 3 are required to stick to strategies
E, A, E, respectively, when given opportunities to update their strategies.
Country 1 will continue playing E if:
 1 12 1 2 1max , max ,2 2
a a         .
88 (3.7)
If 1 2  , then country 1 switches to A as it yields the maximal payoff. So 1 2 
is a necessary condition for (3.7) to hold. If 1 22
a  , then (3.7) holds. If 1 22
a  ,
then for (3.7) to hold, the following conditions need to hold: 1 2  and 1 12
a    .
Hence, in order to satisfy (3.7), one of these two conditions need to hold:
1 1
1 2 1 22 2
a a or       .
Country 2 will continue playing A if:
1
1 2 2 2max ,2
aa a        .
89 (3.8)
If 1 22
a  , then country 2 receives the maximal payoff by playing A. If 1 22
a  ,
then for (3.8) to hold, the following condition needs to hold: 12 2 2
aa   .
88 Condition obtained using the behavioural rule (3.3) and the payoffs calculated using (3.1) and (3.2)
as follows:      1 3 11 2 2 3 2, , , max ,2 2 2
a a aE  A  E             when country 1 plays E and
       1 1 2 2 3 1 2, , 0, max ,A  A  E           when country 1 plays A.
89 Condition obtained using the behavioural rule (3.3) and the payoffs calculated using (3.1) and (3.2)
as follows:      1 1 2 2 3 3 1, , ,E a  E a  E a  a       when country 2 plays E, and
     1 3 11 2 2 3 2, , , max ,2 2 2
a a aE  A  E             when country 2 plays A.
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Country 3 will continue playing E if:
 1 32 2 3 3max , max ,2 2
a a         .
90 (3.9)
If 2 3  , then country 3 realizes the maximal payoff by switching to strategy A.
Thus, 2 3  and (3.9) can be simplified to 3 13 2 2max ,2 2
a a        . If
1
22
a  ,
then (3.9) simplifies to 3 32
a  . If 1 22
a  , then (3.9) simplifies to 3 13 22 2
a a    .
State 4Q is a strict equilibrium if the following conditions hold:
1 1 1 1 1
1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 or ,   or ,  ,2 2 2 2 2
a a a a aa                                           
1 3 1 1 3
2 3 3 2 3 2 2 3,  ,   or ,2 2 2 2 2
a a a a a                          .
91 (3.10)
The conditions in (3.10) can be re-written as:
1 1
3 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 3 3,  ,  ,  2 2  or2 2
a aa a a                
1 3
3 2 1 2 3, ,2 2
a a           . (3.11)
Hence if either of the conditions in (3.11) hold, then once the trade dynamics are in
state 4Q , countries 1, 2, 3 will have no incentive to change from strategies E, A, E,
respectively, making 4Q a strict equilibrium.
Next, consider the heterogeneous state  6 , ,Q E E A .
90 Condition obtained using the behavioural rule (3.3) and the payoffs calculated using (3.1) and (3.2)
as follows:      1 3 11 2 2 3 2, , , max ,2 2 2
a a aE  A  E             when country 3 plays E, and
       1 2 2 3 3 2 30, , , max ,E  A  A           when country 3 plays A.
91 Three conditions need to hold, each represented by  , and either sub-condition needs to hold
within each condition  .
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For 6Q to be a strict equilibrium, countries 1, 2, 3 are required to stick to strategies
E, E, A, respectively, when given opportunities to update their strategies.
Country 1 will continue playing E if:
 1 13 1 3 1max , max ,2 2
a a         .
92 (3.12)
If 1 3  , then country 1 will realize its maximal payoff by switching to strategy
A. Hence 1 3  , which gives  1 3 3max ,   . So (3.12) can be simplified as
1 1
3 3 1max ,2 2
a a        . If
1
32
a  , then (3.12) is satisfied as 1 3  .
If 1 32
a  , then (3.12) holds if 1 13 3 1 12 2
a a        . Hence, (3.12) is satisfied
if one of these two conditions hold: 1 11 3 1 32 2
a a or       .
Country 2 will continue playing E if:
 1 23 2 3 2max , max ,2 2
a a         .
93 (3.13)
If 2 3  , then country 2 will realize the maximal payoff by switching to strategy
A. Hence 2 3  and this simplifies (3.13) to 1 23 3 2max ,2 2
a a        .  If
1
32
a  , then (3.13) further simplifies to 1 23 22 2
a a    .  If 1 32
a  , then (3.13)
92 Condition obtained using the behavioural rule (3.3) and the payoffs calculated using (3.1) and (3.2)
as follows:      1 2 11 2 3 3 3, , , max ,2 2 2
a a aE  E  A             when country 1 plays E, and
       1 1 2 3 3 1 3, 0, , max ,A  E  A           when country 1 plays A.
93 Condition obtained using the behavioural rule (3.3) and the payoffs calculated using (3.1) and (3.2)
as follows:      1 2 11 2 3 3 3, , , max ,2 2 2
a a aE  E  A             when country 2 plays E, and
       1 2 2 3 3 2 30, , , max ,E  A  A           when country 2 plays A.
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can be simplified to 2 22
a  . Hence, (3.13) is satisfied if one of these two condi-
tions hold:
1 1 2
3 2 3 2,2 2 2
a a a           or
1 1
2 3 3 2, ,2 2
a a         .
Country 3 will continue playing A if:
1
1 3 3 3max ,2
aa a        .
94 (3.14)
If 1 32
a  , then country 3 realizes the maximal payoff if it continues to play A.  If
1
32
a  , then (3.14) simplifies to 1 3 32
a a   . State 6Q is stable if the following
conditions hold:
1 1 1 1 2
3 1 3 3 2 3 2 3 2 or ,   or ,  ,  ,2 2 2 2 2
a a a a a                                             
1 1 1
3 3 3 3 or ,  .2 2 2
a a aa                 
95 (3.15)
Conditions in (3.15) can be re-written as:
1 1 1 2
3 2 3 3 1 3 2 3 2,   or ,  ,2 2 2 2
a a a aa                        or
1
1 3 2 3, 2
a         . (3.16)
94 Condition obtained using the behavioural rule (3.3) and the payoffs calculated using (3.1) and (3.2)
as follows:      1 1 2 2 3 3 1, , ,E a  E a  E a  a       when country 3 plays E, and
     1 2 11 2 3 3 3, , , max ,2 2 2
a a aE  E  A             when country 3 plays A.
95 Three conditions need to hold, each represented by  , and either sub-condition needs to hold
within each condition  .
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Hence if either of the conditions hold in (3.6), (3.11), (3.16), then once the trade
dynamics are in state 6Q , countries 1, 2, 3 will have no incentive to change from
strategies E, E, A, respectively, making 6Q a strict equilibrium.
Next, consider the all-in-autarky state  8 , ,Q A A A .
If country 1 receives the opportunity to update its strategy, then switching to E
yields a payoff of 0, while a payoff of 1 is realized if it continues to play A. If
 1 2 3 1max , ,      , then 1 is the maximal payoff, and it continues to play A.
However, if the maximal payoff  2 3max ,   , then (3.3) implies strategy A is
favourable over strategy E. Similarly, if countries 2 and 3 receive opportunities to
update their strategies at different time periods, then they continue to play A as it
either yields the maximal payoff in the given time period, or it minimizes the dif-
ference between the maximal payoff and their own payoff. Thus, the trade dynam-
ics move from states 3Q , 7Q , 5Q to 8Q as countries 3, 2, 1, respectively, switch to
strategy A when they receive an opportunity to do so. As neither of the countries
have an incentive to switch to E once in state  , ,A A A , 8Q is a strict equilibrium.
Table 3.1 lists the conditions required for the countries to continue playing the
same strategies, which essentially form conditions for the states to be strict equilib-
ria. A quick glance at this table shows that states 2 3 7 5, , ,Q  Q  Q  Q cannot be strict
equilibria as countries 1, 3, 2, 1 update their strategies when in these states, respec-
tively. This recaptures the analysis obtained in Subsection 3.1.3. The conditions
required for countries to update their strategies are essentially the reverse condi-
tions of those listed in Table 3.1. These conditions are used as a basis for construct-
ing the tree diagram in Figure 3.3, which shows the dynamics moving from one
state to another when a country is given an opportunity to update its strategy.
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States Country (receiving the opportunity to update strategy)
1C 2C 3C
1 ( , , )Q E E E Continue to play E Continue to play E if
1
2 2 22
aa    
Continue to play E if
1
3 3 32
aa    
2 ( , , )Q A E E Switch to E Continue to play E if
2
2 1 1 2,2
a           
Continue to play E if
3
3 1 1 3,2
a           
3 ( , , )Q A A E Continue to play A if
1
1 2 1 2,2
a           
or  1 2 
Continue to play A if
2
2 1 1 2,2
a           
or  1 2 
Switch to A
4 ( , , )Q E A E Continue to play E if
1
1 2 1 2,2
a           
Continue to play A if
2 2 1a a   
Continue to play E if
3
3 22
a     
5 ( , , )Q E A A Switch to A Continue to play A if
2
2 3 2 3,2
a           
or  2 3 
Continue to play A if
3
3 2 2 3,2
a           
or  2 3 
6 ( , , )Q E E A Continue to play E if
1
1 3 1 3,2
a           
Continue to play E if
2
2 3 2 3,2
a           
Continue to play A if
3 3 1a a   
7 ( , , )Q A E A Continue to play A if
1
1 3 1 3,2
a           
or  1 3 
Switch to A Continue to play A if
3
3 1 1 3,2
a           
or  1 3 
8 ( , , )Q A A A Continue to play A Continue to play A Continue to play A
where, 1 2 12 1 3max , , max , , max ,2 2 2
a a a                      
Table 3.1. Conditions required for countries in the 3-country model to stick with
their strategies (if it is advantageous), causing the dynamics to remain in the states
given in the left column. (Note that countries update their strategies if the reverse
strict inequalities exist above. Countries are said to stick with their current strate-
gies in case of equality however these cases are not considered due to degeneracy.)
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Figure 3.3. Tree diagram representing a complete set of possible dynam-
ics from each of the eight states of the 3-country model, when the fully
integrated state and the all-in-autarky states are equilibria of the trade
game.96
Lemma 3.1. In the 3-country model, the all-in-autarky state is always a strict equi-
librium, and there can exist at most one other strict equilibrium.
Proof. The analysis above shows that states 2 3 7 5, , ,Q  Q  Q  Q cannot be strict equi-
libria. It has also been shown previously in this subsection that the all-in-autarky
state is a strict equilibrium. The rest of the states: 1 4 6, ,Q  Q  Q are strict equilibria if
the strict inequality conditions in (3.6), (3.11), (3.16) hold, respectively.97 Note that
states 4Q and 6Q cannot both be strict equilibria simultaneously as a necessary
condition for state 4Q to be a strict equilibrium is 2 3  while a necessary condi-
tion for state 6Q to be an equilibrium is 2 3  . Furthermore, when 1Q is a strict
equilibrium, both the conditions in (3.6) hold. Then, 4Q cannot be a strict equilibri-
um as neither of the following strict inequality conditions from (3.11) hold:
96 Consider the game to be in state 2Q . If country 1 is given an opportunity to update its strategy, then
referring to Table 3.1, it switches to E, and this dynamic is represented by 12 1CQ Q . The condition
required for country 2 to switch to A needs to hold in Table 3.1 for the dynamic represented by
22 3
CQ Q . Similarly, the condition required for country 3 to switch to A needs to hold for the dy-
namic represented by 32 7CQ Q . The rest of the dynamics are obtained in a similar way.
97 Note that for a given state to be a strict equilibrium, strict inequality needs to hold for the condi-
tions listed for that state.
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1 1
2 2 2,2 2
a aa     . Similarly, 6Q cannot be a strict equilibrium as neither of the
strict inequality conditions from (3.16) hold: 13 3 2
aa   , 1 32
a  . Hence, there are
two strict equilibria at most, one of which is always the all-in-autarky state. 
Lemma 3.2. In the 3-country model, based on topology, no two neighbouring
states (that are connected by an edge) can be strict equilibria in the same unit
time.98
Proof. It has already been shown previously in this subsection that 3Q , 7Q , 5Q can-
not be strict equilibria. For topological consideration, see Figure 3.5 - 8Q is con-
nected via edges to states 3Q , 7Q , 5Q . And since 8Q is a strict equilibrium, the
trade dynamics move from states 3Q , 7Q , 5Q to 8Q and so 3Q , 7Q , 5Q cannot be
strict equilibria. Similarly, for all the other vertices that represent the states, no two
vertices can be strict equilibria at the same time. 
Consider the case where 1Q and 8Q are the strict equilibria in the trade game.
The conditions required for both countries 2 and 3 to continue playing strategy E
when in state 1Q are obtained from Table 3.1 as: 12 2 22
aa     , 13 3 32
aa     .
This means that country 2 switches to strategy E when the game is in state 4Q , and
country 3 switches to strategy E when the game is in state 6Q , see strategy changes
in Table 3.1. This gives the following trade dynamics: 4 1Q Q , 6 1Q Q . These
dynamics are represented by single arrows99 in Figure 3.5. If a further assumption
of 1 2 3    is made, so that the natural leader (country 1) is also relatively more
self-sufficient than country 2 and 3, then the reverse conditions from Table 3.1 give
the following dynamics from states 6Q and 4Q (the country given an opportunity to
update its strategy is denoted above the arrows for each dynamic): 16 7CQ Q ,
98 Note that this lemma can be extended to the general n-country model.
99 Single arrows are used for these dynamics to differentiate them from the ones that hold true for all
the ia ’s and the i ’s – represented by double arrows.
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26 5
CQ Q , 36 1CQ Q (as obtained previously in this subsection), 14 3CQ Q ,
24 1
CQ Q (as obtained previously in this subsection), 34 5CQ Q if
3 1
3 22 2
a a    .
Next, consider state 2Q . It has already been obtained from previous analysis that
country 1 switches to strategy E, moving the trade dynamics to state 1Q . The condi-
tion required to hold for country 2 to update its strategy to A, that can potentially
move the trade dynamics to state 3Q , is obtained using the reverse conditions from
Table 3.1 as follows: 2 22 1 1max ,2 2
a a        . If
2
1 2
a  , then this condition
simplifies to 2 22
a  which is not true. So 21 2
a  becomes a necessary condition
for country 2 to update its strategy to A. However, this gives 1 2  which is again
not true (by the assumption above). So country 2 continues playing E. A similar
analysis is worked out for country 3 and conditions required in order to update to
strategy A are obtained. The dynamics from state 2Q are obtained as follows:
12 1
CQ Q (as previously obtained in this subsection) and 32 7CQ Q if 21 2
a  ,
3 2
3 12 2
a a    .
Next, consider state 3Q . Country 1 does not update its strategy to E, as 1 2  (by
the assumption above). From Table 3.1, country 2 updates its strategy from A to E
if 2 22 1 1max ,2 2
a a        and this is easily satisfied for both
2
1 2
a  and
2
1 2
a  . Country 3 updates its strategy to A and this is already obtained in previous
analysis. The dynamics from state 3Q are obtained as follows: 23 2CQ Q ,
33 8
CQ Q .
Next, consider state 5Q . Country 1 switches to A when given an opportunity to up-
date its strategy, as obtained from previous analysis. Country 2 does not switch to
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E as 2 3  (by the assumption above). Country 3 updates its strategy to E if the
following condition holds from Table 3.1: 3 13 2 2max ,2 2
a a        . The dynam-
ics from state 5Q are obtained as follows: 15 8CQ Q , 35 4CQ Q if
3 1
3 22 2
a a    .
Finally, consider state 7Q . Country 1 does not update its strategy to E as 1 3  (by
the assumption above). Country 2 switches to strategy A as already obtained from
previous analysis. Country 3 switches to strategy E if the following condition holds
from Table 3.1: 3 23 1 1max ,2 2
a a        . The dynamics from state 7Q are ob-
tained as follows: 27 8CQ Q , 37 2CQ Q if 21 2
a    or
3 2
3 12 2
a a       .
These dynamics are summarized by means of a tree diagram in Figure 3.4.
Figure 3.4. Tree diagram for trade dynamics converging to 1Q and 8Q .
The circular arrows around states 1Q and 8Q denote that no country can
improve their position by changing their strategy from these states,  hence
the trade dynamics do not move away from these states, where as for all
other (non-equilibrium) states, an arrow from state jQ to kQ indicates
movement away from state jQ when country i receives the opportunity to
update its strategy.
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In this figure, there are two arrows leading away from state 2Q , to states 2Q and 6Q ,
denoted by 1C and 3C , respectively. This means that when in state 1Q , country 1
updates its strategy leading the trade dynamics to move to 2Q if given the oppor-
tunity, and country 3 updates its strategy leading the trade dynamics to move to 8Q
if given the opportunity, and hence 1Q is not an equilibrium as well as not a strict
equilibrium. Note that for this figure, the conditions required for 1Q to be an
equilibrium need to hold as well as other conditions listed in the paragraph
above.
Figure 3.5. Trade dynamics of the 3-country model when states 2Q and 5Q
are strict equilibria, with the assumption of 1 2 3    . Double arrows indi-
cate unconditional transitions while single arrows are subject to conditions
on the ia ’s and i ’s, here 1 2 3a a a  and 1 2 3    . In the case of the
edge 8 4Q Q , there are two arrows as country 3 can update its strategy at
both states (leading to the other)100. In the cases of the edges where a single
arrow is drawn, a country changes its strategy leading to another state, as by
doing so, it obtains a better payoff in terms of rule (3.3).
100 Note that only one dynamic can hold for 2 7Q Q and 4 5Q Q , as mentioned previously. A
simplified version of this figure is shown in the next figure.
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Figure 3.6. Trade dynamics of the 3-country model converging to states 1Q
and 8Q .101 Note that the edges 4 5Q Q and 2 7Q Q now have one arrow
each, as the following conditions hold: 3 23 1 1max ,2 2
a a        and
3 2
3 1 1max ,2 2
a a        .
One-shot mutations are now considered, in order to define the notion of strict sta-
bility of the equilibria102. A country randomly updates its strategy once the equilib-
rium has been reached, and then the trade dynamics are allowed to proceed in their
usual way under the behavioural rule (3.3). These mutations can be viewed either
as a way of countries choosing a strategy at random as a result of experimentation,
or as the exit of an existing country from the trade game followed by the entry of a
new country with little knowledge of the game.
Let 1Q and 8Q be strict equilibria as per Figure 3.6. Consider a single mutation
away from 1Q to 2Q . Then, the trade dynamics lead back to 1Q as country 1 up-
dates its strategy. However if country 2 mutates away from 1Q to 4Q , then the
trade dynamics can either lead back to 1Q via paths 4 1Q Q or
101 Note that this is just one possible version of the trade dynamics converging to the fully integrated
and all-in-autarky states, other versions can be obtained with different assumptions on autarkic pay-
offs i s and further assumptions on dynamics 2 7Q Q and 4 5Q Q .
102 Note that a more formal definition follows in the n-country model discussed in Section 3.2.
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4 3 2 1Q Q Q Q   , or lead to 8Q via path 4 3 8Q Q Q  . Similarly a mutation
away from 1Q to 6Q can either lead the trade dynamics back to 1Q via paths
6 7 2 1Q Q Q Q   or 6 1Q Q , or lead to 8Q via path 6 7 8Q Q Q  . Therefore,
depending on the order of the countries given the opportunity to update their strat-
egy after a mutation occurs, the fully integrated state is a strictly stable equilibrium
or an interchangeably stable103 equilibrium. A similar analysis for state 8Q gives
the following: a mutation away from 8Q to 3Q leads the trade dynamics back to 8Q
via path 3 8Q Q , or to 1Q via path 3 2 1Q Q Q  ; a mutation away from 8Q to 7Q
leads the trade dynamics back to 8Q via path 7 8Q Q , or to 1Q via path
7 2 1Q Q Q  ; a mutation away from 8Q to 5Q leads the trade dynamics back to
8Q via paths 5 4 3 8Q Q Q Q   or 5 8Q Q , or to 1Q via paths 5 4 1Q Q Q  or
5 4 3 2 1Q Q Q Q Q    . Again, depending on the order of the countries given
the opportunity to update their strategy after a mutation occurs, the all-in-autarky
state is a strictly stable equilibrium or an interchangeably stable equilibrium. A
quick glance at the paths followed by single mutations away from states 1Q and 8Q
shows that 1Q is a strictly stable equilibrium104 with a higher probability105 than 8Q .
The 3-country trade dynamics converging to the all-in-autarky state and a hetero-
geneous state, either 4Q or 6Q , are obtained in Figure 3.7 and Figure 3.8. Note that
the double arrows  actually narrow down to single arrows once a set of condi-
tions surrounding the ia s and i s are fulfilled in Table 3.1 (similar to the previous
analysis of 12Q , 7Q and 4Q , 5Q , when the trade dynamics converge to either the ful-
ly integrated equilibria or the all-in-autarky equilibria).
103 Interchangeable stability refers to the dynamics converging to either of the two given equilibria in
the presence of single mutations, but each mutation leading away from one equilibria and converging
to the other. For example, a single mutation from 5Q to 6Q or 4Q leads the trade dynamics (following
the behavioural rule) to converge to the strict equilibrium 1Q instead of 8Q .
104 Note that the conditions required for 1Q to be a strict equilibrium need to hold, as per Figure 3.6.
105 Note that out of three possible mutations from state 1Q to states 1Q , 4Q , 6Q , the mutation to 2Q
leads the dynamics to converge to 1Q . Whereas all possible mutations from state 8Q can lead the dy-
namics to converge to state 1Q .
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Figure 3.7. The 3-country trade dynamics converging to states 8Q and 4Q ,
when either set of the following conditions holds:
31
3 2 1 2 3, ,2 2
aa           or
1 1
3 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 3 3, , , 2 22 2
a a  a  a a                 .
Figure 3.8. The 3-country trade dynamics converging to states 8Q and 6Q
if either set of the following conditions holds:
1 2
1 3 2 3 2, ,2 2
a a           or
1 1
3 2 3 3,2 2
a a a         or
1
1 3 2 3, 2
a         .
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3.1.4 The 4-Country Model
In this model, there are 16 states:  , , ,E E E E ,  , , ,E E E A ,  , , ,E E A A ,
 , , ,E A A A ,  , , ,E A E A ,  , , ,E A A E ,  , , ,E A E E ,  , , ,E E A E ,  , , ,A E E E ,
 , , ,A A E E ,  , , ,A A A E ,  , , ,A E A E ,  , , ,A E A A ,  , , ,A E E A ,  , , ,A A E A ,
 , , ,A A A A , some of which are analysed below.
First, consider the heterogeneous state  , , ,E A A A . Country 1 receives a payoff of
0 while countries 2, 3, 4 receive payoffs 2 , 3 , 4 , respectively. The maximal
payoff  in this case is  2 3 4max , ,   and country 1 reduces the behavioural gap
by switching to strategy A as it yields payoff 1 , thereby reducing the gap, as
1    (where  2 3 4max , ,    ). Therefore, the heterogeneous state
 , , ,E A A A can never be a strict equilibrium. Similarly, heterogeneous states
 , , ,A A A E ,  , , ,A E A A ,  , , ,A A E A cannot be strict equilibria as countries 4, 2, 3
switch their strategies from E to A, respectively, when given an opportunity to do
so.
Next, consider the heterogeneous state  , , ,A E E E . Country 1 updates its strategy
to E when given an opportunity, as it yields the maximal payoff of 1a . Therefore,
this heterogeneous state can never be a strict equilibrium.
The rest of the states are analysed via numerical computations in the next chapter.
3.2 The n-Country Trade Model
Revisit the n-country scenario: There are 2n  countries 1, , nC C , which poten-
tially participate in the world economy. In any unit time of the n-player trade game,
each country plays one of two strategies: E – engage in world economy or A – re-
main in autarky. The payoffs in this n-player game are defined below.
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Consider a strategy vector106  1, , nz z z  , where 1iz  if iC plays E, and 0iz  if
iC plays A.
Definition 3.7. 1
n
iiz z is defined as the number of countries that are integrat-
ed into the world economy; i.e. that play E.
Definition 3.8. The payoff to country i is:
     1i i i i iz z z a z     , (3.17)
where 0 i ia  , and  m is the function defined on the non-negative integers
by:
  1max 0, , 01
mm  for m nn
      . (3.18)
Thus, if iC plays E, then its payoff is   iz a , which depends on the number of
other countries engaged in the world economy. If iC plays A, then its payoff is i ,
which is independent of what other countries do. Note that if all other countries
play E, then it is better for iC to play E, giving payoff ia , than it is to remain in
autarky (play A) giving payoff i . At the other extreme, if no other countries play
E, then it is better for iC to remain in autarky giving payoff i , than it is to open up
to world trade giving payoff 0. This is because such a country would have no trade
partners: formally,  1 0  . Thus, this game has two pure, strict Nash equilibria –
either all countries play E or all countries play A107.
Subsection 3.2.1 defines the behavioural rule and strategy changes using new nota-
tion. Subsection 3.2.2 formalizes the conditions required for any state to be a strict
equilibrium. Subsection 3.2.3 formalizes the conditions required for a strict equilib-
106 This has previously been referred to as a state, and from here on will be interchangeably used as a
state or strategy profile.
107 Note that this corresponds to the previous definition of Nash equilibrium used for the 2 2 coor-
dination game in Section 3.1.
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rium to be stable with respect to single mutations. Subsection 3.2.4 analyses the
all-in-autarky state and lays the conditions for its strict stability. Subsection 3.2.5
analyses the fully integrated state and lays the conditions for its strict stability.
Subsection 3.2.6 investigates the existence of any heterogeneous state strictly sta-
ble equilibria.
3.2.1 Strategy Changes
At any given time period, a country is chosen at random and given the opportunity
to change its current strategy. When it does this, it tries to minimize the difference
between the payoff it gets and the maximum payoff to any country in that time pe-
riod. Let the current strategy profile be  1, , nz z z  and let country i be chosen at
random so that it has an opportunity to change its strategy.
Let iz denote the 1n  vector of strategies used by countries other than country i,
let  i is z  denote the payoff to iC from using strategy s, determined by (3.17),
when other countries use iz .
Definition 3.9. The maximum payoff  is defined as the highest payoff realized by
one or several countries and is formally expressed as:
      1, ,: max jj nz z   .
When iC uses strategy s and iz represents the strategy profile for all other coun-
tries, iC calculates the maximal payoff as:
      1, ,maxi j ij ns z s z    .
Definition 3.10. The strategy change is defined as  i i iz z B z  , where:
 
      0,1argmini i i isB z s z s z    . (3.19)
Again, assume 1 2 na a a   , so that country 1 is the natural leader.
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First, consider the special case 0iz  . Then, iz is a vector of zeroes, so that eve-
ry other country is currently in autarky and country i will always choose to remain
in autarky as per the lemma below.
Lemma 3.3. The all-in-autarky state is a strict equilibrium.
Proof. The all-in-autarky state is  0, ,0z   , which gives: 0iz  as iz is a vec-
tor of zeroes. Thus,  1 0i iz   and    *1 : maxi i jj iz      if iC plays E, and
on the other hand,  0i i iz   and    *0 : maxi jjz     if iC plays A. Now
if *i i  , then * *i   and     *1 1i i iz z     ,
    *0 0i i i iz z       . Since * *i    , it follows from the rule (3.19)
that iC will update its strategy to 0iz  . If *i i  , then * i  and
    *1 1i i i iz z      ,    0 0 0i i iz z    . Since * 0i  , it follows from
the rule (3.19) that iC will update its strategy to 0iz  . Thus, if 0iz  , country i
will always choose to remain in autarky. 
Now consider the general case, 0 1iz n   . Then,    1 1i i i iz z a    and
 0i i iz   . In order to compute  1 iz  and  0 iz  , the following notation is
introduced:
 
 
: argmin 1 ,
: ,
: max (1 ) ,
i
i jj i
i j
i j jj i
j z
a a
z 


 



 
 

 
 
 
: min , ,
: ,
: max ,
i
i i
i j
i i i
j i j
a a
  

 
 


 
 


 .108 (3.20)
108 The term ij gives the lowest country index that plays strategy E excluding country i, while ij
includes the country index of iC . The maximal integrated payoff excluding country i is given as ia ,
while ia includes the integrated payoff to country i. The maximal autarkic payoff is given as *i ,
while *i includes the autarkic payoff to country i.
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The maximal payoff when iC plays strategies A ( 0iz  ) and E ( 1iz  ), respective-
ly, can now be re-defined as follows:
         * * * *0 max , , 1 max 1 ,i i i i i i i iz z a  z z a               . (3.21)
It follows that iC should update its strategy to 1iz  if:
       * * * *max 1 , 1 max ,i i i i i i i i iz a z a z a                .
Moreover, it should update its strategy to 0iz  if this strict inequality is reversed.
If equality holds in this relation, then iC is indifferent between playing E or A.
However, the parameters are chosen such that this case does not arise. Thus, the
condition for iC to engage in the world economy (play E) is:
       * * * *max 1 , max , 1i i i i i i i i iz a z a z a                . (3.22)
For example, if 0iz  , so that every other country is in autarky, then (3.22) re-
duces to * *i i i     . It is clear that the reverse of this strict inequality is always
satisfied, and hence iC should always go into autarky. This reclaims the previously
obtained special case of autarky as per the lemma below.
Lemma 3.4. The conditions required for iC to engage in the world economy (play
E) can be summarized as:
1 2
1 1
1 1.2
1 1 1.2 1i i i
n a  for in
n a  and a a  for in n

 
          
Proof. Suppose that every other country is already engaged in the world economy.
From (3.18):    21, , 1 11i i inz n  z  zn        . Further, from (3.20):
* 0i  and *i i   . Thus, (3.22) reduces to:
* *2max ,1i i i i i
na a an   
      . (3.23)
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Clearly, a necessary condition for this to be possible is:
*1
2i i
n an 
  , (3.24)
in which case (3.23) reduces to:
* *2
1i i i i
na a an  
   . (3.25)
If (3.24) does not hold, then the right hand side of (3.23) is 0, and hence either the
strict inequality is reversed - in which case iC will go into autarky, or equality
holds - in which case iC is indifferent. However, equality is not considered in this
thesis to avoid complexity in equations.
Given (3.24), there are two cases.
First, 1i  . Then, from (3.20), * 1ia a  and * 2ia a  . Thus, (3.23) holds if and only
if: 1 212
n an
  .
Second, 1i  . Then, * * 1i ia a a   , and (3.23) holds if and only if: 112i
n an
  and
1
1
1 i ia an   . 
The conditions obtained in Lemma 3.4 recapture the reverse result of Proposition 2
of D’Artigues and Vignolo [122], which states that a country j chooses strategy A
from the equilibrium in which all the countries are engaged in world trade if:
1j ja n
   .
3.2.2 Equilibria
The following notation is introduced in order to define strict equilibria using the n-
country model:
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      max , 1i i i i i iz z a z a          , (3.26)
    max 1 ,i i i i iz z a         . (3.27)
Then, condition (3.22) for the strategy change 1iz  is    i iz z  , and the
condition for a strategy change 0iz  is    i iz z  . For z to be a strict equi-
librium of the trade game under the updating rule (3.19), no country should have an
incentive to change its strategy when given the opportunity to do so. Thus, if 1iz  ,
then    i iz z  is required, and if 0iz  , then    i iz z  is required.
Definition 3.11. A strategy profile *z is an equilibrium when no country has any
incentive to update its strategy when given an opportunity to do so. This can be
formally expressed as:  * * ,i iz B z  for all i ; i.e. *z is a fixed point of the map
   : 0,1 0,1n nB  .109
Definition 3.12. A strategy profile *z is a strict equilibrium if  * *i iz B z , for all i,
and each country i does explicitly worse by changing its strategy from *iz .
A necessary and sufficient condition for *z to be a strict equilibrium of the dynam-
ic trade game (as defined above) can be formally expressed in terms of  and 
as:
      * * *2 1 0i i iz z z    , (3.28)
for all i. Consider the all-in-autarky state:  0, ,0z   , so that every country is in
autarky, then   *i iz   and   *i i iz     . It is clear that    i iz z  for
all i, and hence that (3.28) holds. Thus, it is shown that  0, ,0z   is an equilibri-
um, as obtained previously in Lemma 3.3.
109 Note that by this definition, each country does explicitly worse by changing its strategy when giv-
en an opportunity to do so.
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A quick look at the n-country model from a topological point of view shows that
the all-in-autarky state is connected via n edges to n vertices, where each vertex
represents a state z with the property: 1z  , in the n-dimensional space.
Lemma 3.5. Two neighbouring states in the n-country model cannot be strict equi-
libria.
Proof. The n-country model has 2n vertices that represent the states and 12n n edg-
es that represent possible change from one state to another as one country updates
its strategy from either E to A or from A to E. If one vertex is a strict equilibria,
then all the edges connected to it have trade dynamics moving towards it, and away
from the neighbouring n connected vertices. Therefore, the neighbouring n vertices
cannot be strict equilibria in the same unit time. 
Note that Lemma 3.5 holds for equilibria in general as well.
Lemma 3.6. The total number of equilibria cannot exceed 2 1n n  for the n-
country model.
Proof. In the n-country model, there are 2n states represented by 2n vertices and
there are n vertices connected via n edges to the all-in-autarky state. Since the all-
in-autarky state  0, ,0z   is an equilibrium, the neighbouring n vertices cannot
be strict equilibria as the trade dynamics move towards the all-in-autarky state.
Furthermore, the state  0,1, ,1 also cannot be a strict equilibrium since switching
from strategy A to strategy E leads country 1 to obtain the maximal payoff 1a as all
other countries are playing strategy E. Hence, a total of 1n  states cannot be strict
equilibria, which means the total number of equilibria cannot exceed 2 1n n  in
the n-country scenario. 
3.2.3 Strict Stability
Suppose z is an equilibrium strategy profile. Consider a single mutation away from
z which changes the strategy of country k while leaving all other strategies un-
89
changed. Denote the mutant strategy by  kz . Thus,  ki iz z for i k and
  1kk kz z  . For z to be stable with respect to such single mutations, the behav-
ioural rule (3.19) should always provide an incentive to return to the equilibrium
strategy: kz z . This is the case if and only if, when in state  kz , countries i k
will not change their strategies when given the opportunity, but country k will
change. In the notation (3.26) and (3.27), these requirements can be formally ex-
pressed as follows.
Definition 3.13. Let z be an equilibrium strategy profile and  kz be a mutant strat-
egy profile. Then, z is a stable equilibrium if each country apart from k has no in-
centive to update its strategy when given an opportunity to do so, and country k
updates its strategy from  kkz back to kz , and this must be true for each k. This can
be formally expressed as:      ,k ki iz B z  for i k  and     k kk k kz z B z  , for all
i and all k.110
Definition 3.14. Let z be an equilibrium strategy profile and  kz be a mutant strat-
egy profile. Then, z is a strictly stable equilibrium if      ,k ki iz B z  for i k  and
    k kk k kz z B z  , and each country i k does explicitly worse by changing its
strategy from iz , while country k does explicitly better by changing its strategy
from  kkz to kz .
A necessary and sufficient condition for z to be a strictly stable equilibrium of the
dynamic trade game (as defined above) can be formally expressed in terms of 
and  as:
      ( ) ( )2 1 0k ki i iz z z    , (3.29)
for all i and all k. Note that for a given k, (3.29) must hold for all i, including i k .
This must be true for each k.
110 Note that by this definition, each country apart from k does explicitly worse by changing its strate-
gy when given an opportunity to do so.
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If the convention  0z z , so that no country mutates, then (3.29) includes (3.28).
Thus, (3.29) specifies the conditions for  0z to be a strictly stable equilibrium.
In the following subsections, explicit conditions for equilibria and their stability are
derived for the all-in-autarky state, the fully integrated state and the heterogeneous
states.
3.2.4 The All-In-Autarky State
In this subsection, explicit conditions for the stability of the all-in-autarky equilib-
rium are derived.
The all-in-autarky equilibrium is 0z  , when all countries play A. The requirement
(3.29) for strict stability is      k ki iz z   for 1 k n  (this has already been
shown for 0k  : that 0z  actually is a strict equilibrium).
For i k , (3.26) and (3.27) give:    *kk kz   and    *kk k kz     .
Clearly,      k kk kz z   , as required for strict stability.
For i k , if follows from (3.20) that *i ka a  , * i ia a  and
    * 1max , , , , , ,i i k n         , where   indicates that this term has been
removed.
Thus, from (3.26) and (3.27):
    * 2ki i iz a    and      *max 2 ,ki i i iz a     .
The strict stability criterion (3.29) is:
    * *2 max 2 ,i i i i ia a        , for all i k .
Clearly, this holds if and only if   * *2 i i i ia       , i.e.
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     11 min ,max , , , , , ,1 i i i k nan         , (3.30)
for all 1 i k n   .
For i k , it follows from (3.20) that * *i i ka a a   , with *i as above. Thus, from
(3.26) and (3.27):
    * 2ki i iz a    and      *max 2 ,ki k i iz a     .
If *i i  , then *i i   , and hence      k ki iz z   if and only if:
    *2 max 2 ,i k ia a   , which is always true since i ka a .
On the other hand, if *i i  , then * *i i   . Thus, if   * *max 2 ,k i ia    , then
the following needs to hold:  2 i ia  . If     *max 2 , 2k i ka a    , then the
following needs to hold:     *2 2i k i ia a      . A sufficient condition for this
to hold is again  2 i ia  .
Thus, the strict stability criterion will hold if:
    
     
1
1
max , , , , , , ,
1 min ,max , , , , , , ,1
i k i n
i i i k n
Either:
Or: an
    
    


  
  
(3.31)
for 1 k i n   .
For example, conditions (3.30) and (3.31) hold if:
 11 min1 iian  . (3.32)
The trade game can be pulled out from the all-in-autarky equilibrium if two coun-
tries decide to open up to trade, one of which is the leading country (with fully in-
tegrated payoff of 1a ), such that the average payoff to the leading country is greater
than the autarkic payoffs to all the countries remaining in autarky. Therefore, the
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gains to the leading country from trading with merely a single country will make
the all-in-autarky equilibrium unstable.
3.2.5 The Fully Integrated State
In this subsection, explicit conditions for the existence of the fully integrated equi-
librium and its stability are derived.
The fully integrated state is attained when every country plays E, and is defined by
the strategy profile  1,1, ,1z e   . Then, 1iz n   , and from (3.20), * 1ia a  ,
*
1 2a a  and * 1ia a  for 1i  . Also, * 0i  and *i i   .
From (3.28), the criterion for z e to be a strict equilibrium is    i iz z  , for
all i.
From (3.26) and (3.27):
    1 2 1max 1 , iz n a a     ,     1max 1 , 1i i iz n a +a  for i     ,
  1i iz a    .
For 1i  , clearly,    1 1z z  if and only if:  1 21n a   .
For 1i  ,    1 1z z  if and only if:   11i n a   and 11 1i ia an   .
These are conditions already found in Lemma 3.4.
Given that z e is a strict equilibrium, the condition (3.29) for its strict stability is:
     k ki iz z  , for 1 k n  .
For i k , 1iz n   , and from (3.20):
* 0i  and *i i   .
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Strict stability for i k holds if      k kk kz z   . This holds if and only if:
* *2max ,1i i i i i
na a an   
      .
This is already obtained in (3.23). Hence, the condition for strict stability for i k
is condition (3.23).
For i k and i k , 2iz n   , and from (3.20):
*
i k   and  * max ,i i k    .
Strict stability for i k and i k holds if      k ki iz z   . This holds if and
only if:
       * *max 2 , , 1 max 1 ,i i k i i k in a n a n a             . (3.33)
If   *max 2 , ,i i k in a     , then for strict stability the following condition
needs to hold:     *1 max 1 ,i i kn a n a     . This is impossible as
    *1 1i in a n a     . So a necessary condition for (3.33) to hold is:
  *min 2 ,i i kn a    . (3.34)
Given (3.34), condition (3.33) can be simplified to:
       * *max 2 , 1 max 1 ,i k i i k in a n a n a            . (3.35)
Conditions (3.34) and (3.35) are necessary and sufficient for strict stability of the
fully integrated equilibrium for i k and i k .
3.2.6 Biheterogeneous States
In this subsection, explicit conditions for the existence of heterogeneous equilibria
and their stability are derived for the special cases of biheterogeneous states, where
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the rich countries find it more beneficial to trade amongst themselves while the
lagging countries choose to remain in autarky.
Definition 3.15. A biheterogeneous state is a state z where 1iz  for 1 i m  and
0iz  for 1m i n   . If 1m  , there is at least one country playing strategy E,
and if m n , then there is at least one country in autarky.
Consider a potential biheterogeneous strict equilibrium z as per Definition 3.15.
Consider  kz .
If 1 k m  , then  kz has 1m  ones111 and 1n m  zeroes112.
If k m , then  kz has 1m  ones and 1n m  zeroes.
Case I: 0k .
It needs to be shown that the strict equilibrium conditions in (3.28) hold.
Suppose 1i  . Then, 1iz m   , and from (3.20):
*
1 2a a  and *1 1a a  .
Also:  *1 1ˆ : max , ,m n       and  *1 1 ˆmax ,    .
Condition (3.28) for 1i  is:    1 1z z  , which gives:
       1 1 2 1 1ˆ ˆmax , max 1 , ,m a m a m a          . (3.36)
If 1m  , this holds only if  1 1ˆ ˆmax ,     , which is clearly impossible. So a
necessary condition for (3.36) to hold is 2m  .
Suppose 1 i m  . Then, 1iz m   and from (3.20):
* *
1i ia a a   .
111 Representing countries playing E.
112 Representing countries playing A.
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Condition (3.28) for 1 i m  is:    i iz z  , which gives:
       1 1ˆ ˆmax , max 1 , ,i i im a m a m a          . (3.37)
Again, a necessary condition for this to hold is 2m  .
Suppose i m . Then, iz m  and from (3.20):
* *
1i ia a a   .
On the other hand,   * 1ˆ max , , , ,i i m i n          and * ˆi   .
Condition (3.28) for i m is:    i iz z   , which gives:
       1 1ˆ ˆmax , 1 max 1 ,i i im a m a m a          . (3.38)
The strict equilibrium conditions in (3.28) obtained for the three cases: 1i  ,
1 i m  , i m above give the following result: Conditions (3.36), (3.37), (3.38)
are necessary and sufficient conditions for a biheterogeneous state z to be a strict
equilibrium.
Case II:  1 k m .
In this case, the mutant country k, assumed to be playing strategy E mutates to
strategy A. Hence 1 k m  and for strict stability, it needs to be shown that the
conditions in (3.28) hold for 1 k m  .
Suppose conditions (3.36), (3.37), (3.38) hold so that the heterogeneous state z is a
strict equilibrium.
For i k , 1iz m   , and from (3.20):
*
1ia a  for all i,
*
1 2a a  and * 1ia a  for 1i  .
Also, * ˆi   and  * ˆmax ,i i    .
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For strict stability when 1i k  , the following must hold:      1 11 1z z   .
This inequality holds if and only if:
       2 1 1 1 1ˆ ˆ1 , , max ,max m a m a m a          . (3.39)
If 1m  , then condition (3.39) holds if and only if  1 1ˆ ˆmax ,     , which is
clearly impossible. So a necessary condition for (3.39) to hold is 2m  .
When 1i k  , the following condition needs to hold:      k kk kz z   .
This holds if and only if:
       1 1ˆ ˆ1 , , max ,k k kmax m a m a m a          . (3.40)
Again, a necessary condition for this to hold is 2m  .
For i k , 2iz m   , and from (3.20):
* *
3i ia a a   for 1i  , 2k  ,
*
2ia a  , * 1ia a  for 1, 2i  k  , and,
* *
1i ia a a   for 1i  .
Also,  * ˆmax ,i k    and  * ˆmax , ,i i k     .
For strict stability when 1i  , 2k  , the following needs to hold:
     2 21 1z z   .
This holds if and only if:
   3 1 2 1 3 2 1ˆ ˆmax ( 2) , , , ( 1) max ( 1) , ,m a m a m a              . (3.41)
Strict stability for 1i  , 2k  holds if and only if:
   2 1 1 1 1ˆ ˆmax ( 2) , , , ( 1) max ( 1) , ,k km a m a m a              . (3.42)
Strict stability for 1i  holds if and only if:
97
   1 1ˆ ˆmax ( 2) , , , ( 1) max ( 1) , ,i k i k im a m a m a              . (3.43)
A necessary condition for (3.41)-(3.43) to hold is 3m  .
For k i m  , 2iz m   , and from (3.20):
*
3ia a  , * 2ia a  for 1k  , 2i  ,
* *
2i ia a a   for 1k  , 2i  and,
* *
1i ia a a   for 1k  .
Also,  * ˆmax ,i k    and  * ˆmax , ,i k i     .
For strict stability when 1i  , 2k  , the following needs to hold:
     1 12 1z z   . This holds if and only if:
   3 1 2 2 2 1 2ˆ ˆ2 , , , ( 1) max ( 1) , ,max (m )a m a m a              . (3.44)
Strict stability for 1k  , 2i  holds if and only if:
   2 1 2 1ˆ ˆ2 , , , ( 1) max ( 1) , ,i i imax (m )a m a m a              . (3.45)
Strict stability for 2k  holds if and only if:
   1 1ˆ ˆ2 , , , ( 1) max ( 1) , ,k i i k imax (m )a m a m a              .
This has already been obtained in (3.43). Hence (3.43) is also the condition for
strict stability when 2 k i m   .
Again, a necessary condition for (3.44) and (3.45) to hold is 3m  .
For i k and i k , 1iz m   , and from (3.20):
*
1 2a a  and * 1ia a  if 1k  .
* *
i ia a  .
Also,  * ˆmax ,i k i    and  * ˆmax ,i k    .
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For strict stability when 1k  , the following needs to hold:      1 1i iz z   .
This holds if and only if:
   2 1 2 1ˆ ˆ1 , , ( ) max ( ) , ,i i imax (m )a m a m a           . (3.46)
Note that a necessary condition for this to hold is 2m  .
Strict stability for 1k  holds if and only if:
   1 1ˆ ˆ1 , , ( ) max ( ) , ,k i k i imax (m )a m a m a           . (3.47)
A necessary condition for this to hold is 2m  as 2k  .
Case III:  m k n.
In this case, the mutant country k, assumed to be playing strategy A, mutates to
strategy E. Hence m k n  and for strict stability, it needs to be shown that the
conditions in (3.28) hold for m k n  .
Again assume that conditions (3.36), (3.37), (3.38) already hold so that the hetero-
geneous state z is a strict equilibrium.
For i k , iz m  , and from (3.20):
* *
1i ia a a   .
Also, * ˆi i   and * ˆi   .
For strict stability when i k , the following must hold:      k ki iz z   .
This inequality holds if and only if:
   1 1ˆ ˆ, ( 1) max ( 1) ,i i imax (m )a m a m a          . (3.48)
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For m i k  , iz m  , and from (3.20):
* *
1i ia a a   .
Also,     * 1ˆ: max , , , , , ,i ik m i k n            and * ˆi k   .
Strict stability holds if and only if:
   1 1ˆ ˆ( 1) , ( 2) max ( 2) ,k i ik imax m a m a m a            . (3.49)
For i k and i m , iz m  , and from (3.20):
*
2ia a  , * 1ia a  for 1i  , and,
* *
1i ia a a   for 1i  .
Also, * ˆi k   and  * ˆmax ,i i k    .
For strict stability when 1i  the following needs to hold:      1 1k kz z   . This
holds if and only if:
   2 1 1 1 1ˆ ˆ( ) , , ( 1) max ( 1) ,k kmax m a m a m a            . (3.50)
For strict stability when 1i  the following needs to hold:
   1 1ˆ ˆ( ) , , ( 1) max ( 1) ,i k i k imax m a m a m a            . (3.51)
For i k , 1iz m   , and from (3.20):
* *
1i ia a a   .
Also, * ˆi ki   and * ˆi k   .
For strict stability when i k the following needs to hold:
   1 1ˆ ˆ( 1) , ( 2) max ( 2) ,k i ki imax m a m a m a            .
This is already obtained in (3.49). Hence (3.49) is also the condition for strict sta-
bility when i k .
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Theorem 3.1. The following conditions are necessary and sufficient for z to be a
strictly stable equilibrium: (3.39), (3.41), (3.42), (3.43), (3.44), (3.45), (3.46),
(3.47), (3.48), (3.49), (3.50), (3.51).
As these conditions cannot be simplified further, numerical computations are run
and results tabulated in the next chapter, in order to understand these conditions
better and make conclusions on the trade dynamics.
3.3 Conclusions
Based on the analysis in the previous sections in this chapter, the following conclu-
sions are obtained for the trade game with pure strategies:
The 2-country model has only one strict equilibrium – the all-in-autarky state
 ,A A , where both countries choose to not trade with one another. It is also strictly
stable with respect to single mutations and hence is the long-run equilibrium for the
2-country model.
In the 3-country model, 4 states can be strict equilibria – the all-in-autarky state
 , ,A A A , the fully integrated state  , ,E E E , and the heterogeneous states
 , ,E A E and  , ,E E A . However, there can only exist a maximum of 2 strict equi-
libria for a given set of parameter constraints (at any given time), one of which is
always the all-in-autarky state.
The 4-country model is more complex to analyse and while the heterogeneous
states that cannot be strict equilibria are briefly discussed, the other states are left to
be analysed via numerical computations in the next chapter.
The conditions for the existence of the fully integrated equilibrium and the all-in-
autarky equilibrium are obtained for the n-country model. The complex conditions
for the heterogeneous equilibria are also obtained. However, the analysis of these
conditions is difficult due to parameter constraints. Hence, the states are analysed
via numerical computations in the next chapter.
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Chapter 4
Numerical Computations
In this chapter, the model introduced for n countries in the previous chapter is pro-
grammed in Mathematica and using the definitions of strict equilibria and strict
stability defined in Chapter 3, the statistical likelihood of the existence of fully in-
tegrated strict equilibria, heterogeneous strict equilibria and strictly stable all-in-
autarky equilibria is analysed for up to 200 countries113.
In a similar analysis, Gardner and Ashby [53] examine critical values of stability
for linear systems and suggest that all large complex dynamic systems can show
stability up to a critical level of connectance114, and can suddenly go unstable as
connectance increases beyond this critical point. May [85] looks at the likelihood
of socially stable equilibria for random interaction matrices in ecological networks,
and finds that for sufficiently large complex networks, the probability of persisting
is close to zero. For a more recent analysis, Allesina and Tang [6] derive stability
criteria for unstructured networks in which species interact at random in competi-
tive pairs and find that weak interactions115 are destabilizing for competitive net-
works. The analysis in this chapter is in the spirit of these papers.
113 There are 206 countries around the world at present (16 of whose sovereignty is disputed).
114 The linear system is defined by a vector of random n random variables:  1, , nx x x  and changes
in time by: x Ax . It comprises of n variables of the form ix , and two variables ix , jx are connected
if the entry jia is non-zero, and not-connected if jia is 0.
115 Species effects are defined as weak when the addition or removal of a species does not cause a
statistically discernible mean change in the abundance of target species (see Berlow [13]).
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An exponential distribution is used to generate the values of ia ’s 116, which denote
the fully integrated payoffs for the countries117. The rate parameter of this exponen-
tial distribution is denoted by  and an upper bound 1 1U a  , where 1a is the
payoff to country 1 – the natural leader. The i ’s are uniformly distributed pseu-
dorandom118 real numbers in the range of 1 and the corresponding ia ’s119, which
denote the autarkic payoffs for the countries. The values of the i ’s are  generated
using the Random[] function in Mathematica. The notation introduced for the n-
country model in Chapter 3 (Subsection 3.2.1) is re-defined using Mathematica
functions. The strict equilibria conditions and the strict stability conditions are then
simulated for the n-country model, using two different Mathematica programs and
a single state (fully integrated state, autarkic state, or any heterogeneous state) is
analysed for its equilibrium property and strict stability, respectively. Each pro-
gram independently gives the model output on any given state per 100,000 runs, so
that the result when divided by the number of runs gives the fraction of that partic-
ular state being a strict equilibrium or a strictly stable equilibrium.
Note that strict stability of equilibria is only considered for the all-in-autarky cases
for all the n-country scenarios simulated, as it has already been shown in Chapter 3
that it is always a strict equilibrium, regardless of parameter values. The numerical
computations for strict stability of the fully integrated state and the heterogeneous
states were found to be negligible over a varied range of parameter values, yielding
116 The exponential distribution is used to generate the values of ia ’s as the gains from trade is as-
sumed to be significantly higher for richer countries than for poorer countries (as stated by dependen-
cy theorists, for more on dependency theory see Ferraro [44] or Namkoong [94]. Furthermore, among
the developing nations, the advanced Asian economies gain significantly from international trade
while the poorer African economies do not gain much; see Page and Davenport [98]). Also in terms
of GDP, the number of middle-income countries and poor countries is relatively higher than the num-
ber of rich countries (see World Bank [140]).
117 See Subsection 4.4.1 for a derivation of the exponential distribution used.
118 A set of statistically random numbers, derived from a known starting point.
119 The uniform distribution is used to generate the values of i ’s as the autarkic payoffs for countries
are assumed to be more randomly distributed, having an amount of uncertainty associated with them,
so the distribution is justified in the sense that it makes fewer assumptions than other distributions.
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zero for all scenarios, so the model output for these was not presented graphically.
Note that May [85] and Allesina and Tang [6] do not consider the question of equi-
librium existence. The study of stability conditional on existence of a strict equilib-
rium given a certain set of parameters can be a topic of further research.
Section 4.1 lists the pseudocode for the Mathematica programs by defining the var-
iables, the for-loops and the functions used. Section 4.2 contains a graphical
presentation for the 3-country and 4-country models, and lists the results for the
more general n-country model. Section 4.3 forms conclusions based on the results
obtained. Section 4.4 is an appendix that lists the exponential distribution deriva-
tion, discusses the scaling of payoff values and provides an insight into the Math-
ematica programs built to evaluate the likelihood of a state being a strict equilibri-
um and the likelihood of an equilibrium being strictly stable. It also contains tabu-
lated the model output for reference purposes (for up to a maximum of 200 coun-
tries) with varying levels of 1a and  .
4.1 Description of Mathematica Program
This section lays out the pseudocode for the Mathematica program listed in Section
4.4.
4.1.1 The Strict Equilibrium Numerical Computations
The input variables are defined as:
n: the number of countries playing the trade game120.
1a : the payoff to the leading country121.
 : the rate parameter of the exponential distribution generating the values of ia ’s,
such that 1 1 10.2 0.5 0.8 or  orU U U  , where U is the upper bound for the expo-
nential distribution, defined below. (Note that decreasing the rate parameter 
120 The minimum number of countries considered is 3, while the maximum is 200.
121 The values of 1a used in the numerical computations are 10, 100, 1000, 2000, 4000, 6000, 10000.
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leads to a more even spread of the values of ia ’s so that the gains from trade for
countries is not too varied and the difference between the ia ’s is relatively low.)
Next, other variables for calculations are defined:
listofz: the strategy vector or the state122  1, , nz z z  , where 1iz  if country i
plays E and 0iz  if country i plays A.
noofstates: a variable that keeps the count of z being a strict equilibrium.
U : the upper bound for the exponential distribution that generates ia s, such that
1 1U a  .
K : a variable used for generating the values of ia ’s, such that 1 UK e 

  .
Next, the functions required in order to calculate the payoffs (as previously defined
in Chapter 3) are defined:
countz: a function that counts the number of countries playing strategy E, such that
1
n
i
i
countz z z

  .
sigmafn: a function defined on non-negative integers to calculate payoffs, such that
  1max 0, 1
msigmafn m n
     , for 0 m n  .
jminusistar:  * argmin 1i jj ij z   .
jplusistar:  * *min ,i ij i j  .
aminusistar: ** ii ja a   .
aplusistar: ** ii ja a   .
lminusistar:   * max 1i j jj i z    .
lplusistar:  * *max ,i i i    .
122 A random heterogeneous state  1, , nz z z  is generated using the command:
Table[Random[Integer],{n}] while the fully integrated state and the all-in-autarky state are obtained
using the commands: Table[1,{n}] and Table[0,{n}], respectively.
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The for-loop counter, with 100000 iterations counts the number of times z is a
strict equilibrium as follows:
First, the values of 2 , , na a , using the exponential distribution and
variables defined above are generated.
Next, the values of 1, , n  , using the uniform distribution (and the for-loop
j) are generated.
The value true is assigned to the variable boolean (this remains true if the
strict equilibrium condition is satisfied by all countries).
The for-loop i (within the for-loop counter), with n iterations checks the strict equi-
librium condition for each country i as follows:
First, the function phifn is defined:
      max , 1i i i i i iz z a z a          .
Next, the function psifn is defined:     max 1 ,i i i i iz z a         .
Next, the equilibrium condition is checked:       2 1 0i i iz z z   
and if this condition holds, the value true is assigned to boolean, false oth-
erwise.
Outside of the for-loop i, noofstates keeps a count of the equilibrium/strictly stable
states (based on the value returned by boolean).
Outside of the for-loop counter, listofz - the state (or the strategy vector) under
consideration, along with noofstates - the number (out of 100000) of strict equilib-
ria, for given values of n, 1a ,  is printed.
4.1.2 The Strict Stability Numerical Computations
Following the pseudocode above, a for-loop: k is introduced before the for-loop i.
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The for-loop k, with n iterations defines the mutant strategy  kz played by country
k as follows:
The entry k in listofz is replaced to reflect the mutant strategy  kz , defined in
Chapter 3 as  ki iz z for i k , and   1kk kz z  .
The for-loop i (within the for-loop k), with n iterations checks the strict stability
condition for each country i as follows:
First, the functions phifn and psifn are defined as above.
Next, the condition required to hold for strict stability is checked:
        2 1 0k ki i iz z z    and if this condition holds, assign the val-
ue true to boolean, false otherwise.
Outside of the for-loop i, listofz is restored to its original value so that another
country can play the mutant strategy.
Outside of the for-loop k, noofstates keeps a count of the strictly stable states
(based on the value returned by boolean).
Outside of the for-loop counter, listofz - the state (or the strategy vector) under
consideration, along with noofstates - the number (out of 100000) of strictly stable
equilibria, for given values of n, 1a ,  is printed.
The Mathematica programs for the strict equilibrium calculations and the strict sta-
bility calculations are listed in the Appendix section of this chapter.
4.2 Results
In this section, the results of the model output obtained using the Mathematica pro-
grams are depicted graphically for the 3-country model, the 4-country model and
the more general n-country model. Note that the scaling of the ia ’s and the i ’s by
a common (positive) factor yields exactly the same results via numerical computa-
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tions (see Subsection 4.4.2), however when these parameter values are not scaled
by the same common factor, varied results are obtained (see Subsection 4.2.3).
4.2.1 The 3-Country Model
The 3-country model was analysed in Chapter 3 and it was shown that there exist
two strict equilibria at most, one of which is always the all-in-autarky state. Hence
the number of times (out of 100000) the following states individually are strict
equilibria is obtained via the first Mathematica program: the fully integrated state
 1,1,1 , and the heterogeneous states  1,0,1 and  1,1,0 (see Subsection 4.4.3). The
number of times (out of 100000) the all-in-autarky state  0,0,0 is a strictly stable
equilibrium is obtained via the second Mathematica program (see Subsection
4.4.4). In the figures to follow, 1 10.2A  , 2
1
0.5A  and 3
1
0.5A  .
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(a) Fully integrated state  1,1,1 . (b) Heterogeneous state  1,0,1 .
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 a1
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000

1
2
3
(c) Heterogeneous state  1,1,0 .
Figure 4.1. The model output for the 3-country model - strict equilibria. The
horizontal axes represent the values of 1a (payoff to the leading country) and
the vertical axes represent the number of times out of 100000 that the given
state in the 3-country model is a strict equilibrium (for three different  val-
ues). It can be deduced from Figures (a), (b) and (c) that the heterogeneous
state  1,0,1 is more likely to be a strict equilibrium than the fully integrated
state  1,1,1 or the heterogeneous state  1,1,0 .
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Figure 4.2. The model output for the 3-country model all-in-autarky equilib-
rium - strict stability.123 The vertical axis represents the number of times out
of 100000 that the all-in-autarky state  0,0,0 is a strictly stable equilibrium
(for three different  values). The low values imply that though  0,0,0 is
always a strict equilibrium, it is unlikely to be a strictly stable equilibrium.
Based on the graphs presented in Figure 4.1, the heterogeneous state  1,0,1 is sig-
nificantly more likely to be an equilibrium than the fully integrated state and the
other heterogeneous state -  1,1,0 . This shows that country 2 prefers to not trade
when country 1 engages in world trade, possibly as a deliberate attempt to reduce
the leading country’s payoff thereby improving its own position in the world econ-
omy. In addition, the number of times each state is a strict equilibrium increases
with decreasing i ( 1,2,3i  ), as gains from trade is more uniform for countries
with decreasing i (since the spread of ia ’s is lower) and hence countries are more
likely to trade with one another. In general, the number of times each state is a
strict equilibrium as shown in Figure 4.1 is quite low124. This is in contrast with the
all-in-autarky state, which is always a strict equilibrium. Based on the graph pre-
sented in Figure 4.2, it can only be deduced that the probability of the all-in-
autarky equilibrium being a strictly stable is extremely low. This shows that coun-
123 Note that the all-in-autarky state is the only state considered for testing stability via numerical
computations as mentioned previously in this chapter.
124 The number of strictly stable equilibria for each of these states is negligible, hence the data for the
all-in-autarky state as a strictly stable equilibrium is the only one shown with regards to strict stabil-
ity.
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tries are unlikely to trade with one another (since the all-in-autarky state is always
a strict equilibrium unlike the fully integrated state and the heterogeneous states)
and even if they do, country 2 is more likely to stay in autarky while countries 1
and 3 open up to world trade.
4.2.2 The 4-Country Model
The 4-country model was briefly analysed in Chapter 3 and it was shown that the
heterogeneous states  0,1,1,1 ,  1,0,0,0 ,  0,1,0,0 ,  0,0,1,0 and  0,0,0,1 can
never be strict equilibria. The model output is obtained for the rest of the states in
this chapter. The number (out of 100000) of the fully integrated equilibria  1,1,1,1 ,
and the number of heterogeneous equilibria for the following states -  1,1,0,0 ,
 1,0,1,0 ,  1,0,0,1 ,  0,1,1,0 ,  0,1,0,1 ,  0,0,1,1 is obtained via the first Mathe-
matica program (see Subsection 4.4.3). The number (out of 100000) of strictly sta-
ble all-in-autarky equilibria  0,0,0,0 is obtained via the second Mathematica pro-
gram (see Subsection 4.4.4).
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(a) Fully integrated state  1,1,1,1 . (b) Heterogeneous state  1,1,0,0 .
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(c) Heterogeneous state  1,0,1,0 . (d) Heterogeneous state  1,0,0,1 .
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(g) Heterogeneous state  0,0,1,1 . (h) Heterogeneous state  1,1,1,0 .
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(i) Heterogeneous state  1,1,0,1 . (j) Heterogeneous state  1,0,1,1 .
Figure 4.3. The model output for the 4-country model - strict equilibria. The
horizontal axes represent the values of 1a (payoff to the leading country) and
the vertical axes represent the number of times out of 100000 that the given
state in the 4-country model is a strict equilibrium (for three different  val-
ues). It can be deduced from Figures (a) - (j) that the heterogeneous states
 1,0,1,0 and  1,0,1,1 are more likely to be strict equilibria than the fully in-
tegrated state  1,1,1,1 or other heterogeneous states.
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Figure 4.4. The model output for the 4-country model all-in-autarky equilib-
rium – strict stability.125 The horizontal axis represents the values of 1a (pay-
off to the leading country) and the vertical axis represents the number of
times out of 100000 that the all-in-autarky state  0,0,0,0 is a strictly stable
equilibrium (for three different  values).
Based on the graphs presented in Figure 4.3, the heterogeneous states  1,0,1,0 and
 1,0,1,1 are more likely to be strict equilibria than the fully integrated state and the
other heterogeneous states. This suggests that country 2 prefers to remain in autar-
ky, when country 1 (and other countries) engage in world trade, as a deliberate at-
tempt to reduce the leading country’s payoff. Based on the graph presented in Fig-
ure 4.4, the likelihood of the all-in-autarky equilibrium being strictly stable is sig-
nificantly higher for the 4-country model when compared to the 3-country model.
It appears that in this model, countries find it more advantageous to remain in au-
tarky than to trade with one another. A possible explanation for this behaviour is
the lagging countries not wanting to participate in world trade in order to degrade
the situation of the leading country (which inevitably obtains the maximal payoff
of 1a by engaging in world trade). However, the leading country opts out of world
trade in the long run, thereby increasing its own payoff from 0 to 1 , as it views the
reluctance of other countries to engage in world trade.
125 Note that the all-in-autarky state is the only state considered for testing stability via numerical
computations as mentioned previously in this chapter.
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4.2.3 The n-Country Model
The n-country model was analysed in Chapter 3 and the all-in-autarky state is al-
ways a strict equilibrium. Conditions were laid out for the fully integrated state and
heterogeneous states to be strict equilibria. Conditions for strict stability of all
states were also obtained. The number (out of 100000) of fully integrated strict
equilibria is now obtained for up to 200 countries (see Subsection 4.4.7); along
with the number (out of 100000) of strictly stable all-in-autarky equilibria for up to
200 countries (see Subsection 4.4.8).
In the plots below, the x-axis represents the values of 1a , varying between 10 and
100000; the y-axis represents the values of  , where 1 represents 1 10.2U  , 2 rep-
resents 2 10.5U  and 3 represents 3
1
0.8U  ; the z-axis represents # - the number
(out of 100000) of strict equilibria (in Figure 4.5) or the number of strictly stable
equilibria (in Figure 4.6).
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Figure 4.5. The model output for the n-country model fully integrated state -
strict equilibria. The two horizontal axes represent the values of 1a (payoff to
the leading country) and  (1, 2, 3 represent 1 , 2 , 3 , respectively) and the
vertical axis represents the number of times out of 100000 that the fully inte-
grated state in the n-country model is a strict equilibrium, where n varies
from 3 to 200.
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Figure 4.6. The model output for the n-country model all-in-autarky equilib-
rium - strict stability.126 The two horizontal axes represent the values of 1a
(payoff to the leading country) and  (1, 2, 3 represent 1 , 2 , 3 , respective-
ly) and the vertical axis represents the number of times out of 100000 that
the all-in-autarky equilibrium in the n-country model is strictly stable.
126 Note that the all-in-autarky state is the only state considered for testing stability via numerical
computations as mentioned previously in this chapter.
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Based on the numerical computations output (see Section 4.4), the following re-
sults and general trends are noted for the n-country model:
Result 4.1. The probability of the fully integrated state  1, ,1 being a strict equi-
librium over a varied range of parameter values:
(i) Is extremely low.127
(ii) Increases with decreasing  for a given number of countries.128
(iii) Decreases with increasing number of countries (4-country model and high-
er)129.
(iv) Tends to 0 for 10.2U  for 50 countries and higher.
(v) Tends to 0 for all  for 200 countries.
Result 4.2. The probability of the all-in-autarky equilibrium  0, ,0 being strictly
stable over a varied range of parameter values:
(i) Increases with decreasing  for a given number of countries.130
(ii) Decreases with increasing number of countries.131
127 Reaching up to a maximum of ~ 0.006 .
128 For example, consider the 5-country model: the probabilities of the fully integrated state  1,1,1,1,1
being a strict equilibrium for 1 10a  and  values of 1 / 0.2U , 1 / 0.5U , 1 / 0.8U are 0.00001 ,
0.00148 , 0.00305 , respectively.
129 For example, for 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 countries, with 1 / 0.5U  and 1 10000a  , the probabilities of
the fully integrated state being a strict equilibrium are 0.00283, 0.00208, 0.00171, 0.00164, 0.00119,
0.00111, respectively.
130 For example, consider the 6-country model: for 1 6000a  and  values of 1 / 0.2U , 1 / 0.5U ,
1 / 0.8U , the probabilities of the strict equilibrium  0,0,0,0,0,0 being strictly stable are 0.05940,
0.17260, 0.20477, respectively.
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(iii) Tends to 1 as 1a tends to n (see Subsection 4.4.8).
Result 4.3. For the heterogeneous state, two cases were evaluated over a varied
range of parameter values:
(i) 6 countries: The probability of the heterogeneous state  1,0,1,1,1,1 being a
strict equilibrium is higher than that of other states like  1,1,0,1,0,1 and
 1,1,0,1,1,1 .
(ii) 10 countries: The probability of the heterogeneous states
 1,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,1 and  1,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,1,0 being strict equilibria is 0. The
probability of the existence of heterogeneous equilibria  1,0,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1 is
higher than that of other heterogeneous equilibria like  1,1,1,1,1,1,0,1,0,1
and  1,0,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,1 .
4.3 Conclusions
Based on the results obtained in this chapter, the following conclusions are ob-
tained for the n-country model:
It is rather surprising to find that countries individually find it more advantageous
to remain in autarky when given an option to choose between complete autarky and
full integration into the world economy, especially when the number of countries
participating in the world trade increases. A way to view this behaviour would be
that a weaker country chooses not to participate in world trade (even though doing
so may help it to obtain a higher payoff in absolute terms) just so that the leading
countries are not able to substantially benefit from world trade, thereby making the
abstaining country’s own relative position stronger. In addition, when all the other
countries are fully integrated in international trade, a non-leading country finds it
advantageous to choose the autarkic strategy over the fully integrated strategy even
131 The 200-country model has highest probability of the all-in-autarky equilibrium being strictly
stable.
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though the former yields a greater payoff, as by doing so it can reduce the leading
country’s payoff thereby reducing the behavioural gap (as defined in the previous
chapter)132. This recaptures the main theory of terrorism or negative behaviour in
that the position of the leading countries is deliberately reduced.
However, complete autarkies do not exist today and countries limit their growth
potential if they choose to not open up to international trade133. International trade
and investment are major factors contributing towards economic growth134 and re-
alistically speaking, the level with which countries engage in world trade varies
from country to country, whereby each country chooses an intermediate strategy as
opposed to a fully integrated or completely autarkic strategy. Hence, this trade
game model is extended to a continuous version in the next chapter, where coun-
tries can update their strategies by a small strategy size 0  , allowing them to
integrate into the world economy by different amounts.
4.4 Appendix
This section contains the derivation of the exponential distribution used for gener-
ating the values of the ia ’s, the Mathematica programs used to evaluate the number
of strict equilibria and strictly stable equilibria and tabulated the model output ob-
tained for the 3-country model, the 4-country model and the n-country model.
4.4.1 Exponential Distribution
In this appendix subsection, the derivation of the exponential distribution used for
generating the values of the ia ’s (for 1i  ) is shown. Note that the value of 1a is
fixed before generating the list of the ia ’s.
132 This is a direct result of competition and envious behaviour as obtained in other literary papers
discussed in Chapter 2.
133 For example, the incomes of the least globalized countries like Iran, North Korea, and Pakistan
have declined or remained static over the last few decades, see Manzella [98].
134 For example, developing countries with open economies grew by 5% in the 1970s and the 1980s
while those with closed economies grew by less than 1%, see Manzella [98].
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Let X be an exponential variable (which represents the value of ia ) with parameter
 . Then, by definition:
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Thus, re-arranging: 11 ln 1 yx K
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Lemma 4.1. The probability density function is
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Proof. Let U be the upper bound for the distribution, such that 1 1U a  (since the
values of ia ’s generated should be strictly less than 1a ). Then,
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Thus, 1 UK e 

  .
This gives the probability density function as
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The list of the ia ’s is obtained using a tabulated form of 11 ln 1 yK


     , where
 1 11 aK e 

   and y is a uniformly distributed real number in the range 0 to 1.
4.4.2 Scaling payoff values
In this appendix subsection, it is shown that the results are independent of the scal-
ing of the ia ’s and the i ’s by a common (positive) factor.
From Chapter 3, the condition required for a state or strategy profile *z to be a
strict equilibrium is:
      * * *2 1 0i i iz z z    , for all i.
This is also the condition used in the Mathematica program to test (within a single
for-loop i) if a given state is a strict equilibrium.
The strict equilibrium condition above can be expressed using the ia ’s and the i ’s
for all i as follows:
           *2 1 max , 1 max 1 ,
0
i i i i i i i i i iz z a z a z a                     

(4.1)
It needs to be shown that scaling the ia ’s and the i ’s by a common (positive) fac-
tor does not change the above inequality for all i. Let i iA a and i iL  for all i,
where 0  . The strict equilibrium criteria for a strategy profile with payoffs iA s
and iL s can be written as:
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           *2 1 max , 1 max 1 ,
0.
i i i a i i i i i i iz z A L z A z A L L                  

Using the notation introduced in Chapter 3, the above inequality can be simplified
as follows:
          

*2 1 max , 1 max 1 ,
0.
i i i a i i i i i i
i
z z a z a z a       

   
          
  
This inequality can be simplified as:
           *2 1 max , 1 max 1 ,
0.
i i i a i i i i i i iz z a z a z a                      

As 0  , this inequality is essentially the same as (4.1). Thus, scaling of payoff
values  ( ia ’s and i ’s) does not make a difference to the number of times a given
strategy profile is a strict equilibrium when the program is run.
From Chapter 3, the condition required for a state or strategy profile to be a strictly
stable equilibrium is:
       ( ) ( )2 1 0i k k ki iz z z    , for all i and all k. (4.2)
Now,          ( ) max , 1i ik kki i a i iz z a z a         and
      ( ) max 1 ,ikki i i iz z a         . Note that the expressions for both
 ( )ki z and  ( )ki z can be simplified to the form i iAa B , where , 0A B  . If
the ia ’s and the i ’s are scaled by 0  , then the above expressions for  ( )ki z
and  ( )ki z can be simplified to the form      i i i iA a B Aa B      . The
strict stability criteria (4.2) can be written for the scaled values as follows:
123
       ( ) ( )2 1 0i k k ki iz z z    , for all i and all k.
This is satisfied if the original criteria (4.2) is satisfied as 0  . Thus, scaling of
payoff values (the ia ’s and the i ’s) does not make a difference to the number of
times a given strategy profile is a strictly stable equilibrium when the program is
run.
4.4.3 Mathematica Program for a Strict Equilibrium
The n-country model for evaluating the number of times (out of 100000) a random
heterogeneous state is a strict equilibrium (defined by the variable listofz) is pro-
grammed using Mathematica as follows:
(* MATHEMATICA PROGRAM FOR EVALUATING THE NUMBER TIMES (OUT
OF 100000) A GIVEN HETEROGENEOUS STATE IS A STRICT EQUILIBRIA
FOR THE n-COUNTRY MODEL *)
ClearAll[n,listofz,U,eta,a1,K,countz,x,sigmafn,m,
jminusistar,z,i,j,k,jplusistar,aminusistar,aplusistar,lminusi
star,lplusistar,counter,boolean,data,datasorted,lsitofa,listo
fl,noofstates,phifn,psifn];
Off[General::spell1]
(* Input data needed for the n-country model:
n - number of countries
a1 - leading country's payoff when it plays strategy  E
against an opponent playing E
u - rate parameter of the exponential distribution
generating the values of a's *)
n=3;
a1=10;
eta=1/(0.2 U);
(* Other variables needed for calculations:
noofstates - counts the number of strictly stable
autarky states
listofz - strategy vector, to be tested for strict
stability [z=(Subscript[z,
1],...,Subscript[z, n])]
U - upper bound used for exponential
distribution
K - variable (equal to u/(1-e^-u A)) used in
generating values of a's *)
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noofstates=0;
listofz=Table[Random[Integer],{n}];
U=a1-1;
K=eta/(1-Exp[-eta U]);
(* Function countz to count the number of countries playing
strategy E(1):
|z|=Sum(i=1,n)zi *)
countz[x_]:=Count[x,1];
(* Function sigmafn to determine the fraction of countries
playing strategy E:
(m)=max{0,(m-1)/(n-1)} for 0<=m<=n *)
sigmafn[m_]:=Max[0,(m-1)/(n-1)];
(* Functions required to define the variables needed for
calculating payoffs: define *)
jminusistar[z_,i_]:=If[Count[z,1]==0,0,If[i==Min[Position[z,1
]],If[Delete[Position[z,1],1]=={},0,Min[Delete[Position[z,1],
1]]],Min[Position[z, 1]]]];
jplusistar[z_,i_]:=Min[i,jminusistar[z,i]];
aminusistar[z_,i_]:=If[jminusistar[z,
i]==0,0,listofa[[jminusistar[z, i]]]];
aplusistar[z_,i_]:=If[jminusistar[z,i]==0,0,listofa[[jplusist
ar[z,i]]]];
lminusistar[z_,i_]:=Max[Delete[(1-z)listofl,i]];
lplusistar[z_,i_]:=Max[listofl[[i]],minusistar[z,i]];
For[counter=1,counter<=100000,counter++,boolean=True;
(* Generating random values of a's using exponential
distribution *)
data=Table[y=Random[];1-(1/eta)Log[1-eta y/K],{n-1}];
datasorted=Sort[data,#1>#2&];
listofa=Prepend[datasorted,a1];
(* generating random values of 's using uniform
distribution *)
listofl={};
(* The i-loop defines the functions phifn and psifn and
checks the equilibrium criterion *)
For[j=1,j<=n,j++,listofl=Append[listofl,Random[Real,{1,
listofa[[j]]}]]]
For[i=1,i<=n,i++,
(* define phifn *)
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phifn[z_,i_]:=Max[sigmafn[countz[Delete[z,i]]]
aminusistar[z,i],lplusistar[z,i]]+sigmafn[countz[D
elete[z,i]]+1] listofa[[i]];
(* define phifn *)
psifn[z_,i_]:=Max[sigmafn[countz[Delete[z,i]]+1]
aplusistar[z,i],lminusistar[z,i]]+listofl[[i]];
(* checking the equilibrium condition: define *)
boolean=boolean && ((2(listofz[[i]])-1)
(phifn[listofz,i]-psifn[listofz,i])>0);
If[boolean==False,Break[]];
];
If[boolean==True,noofstates++];
];
(* Printing a state and the number of times (out of 100000)
it is strict equilibrium *)
Print[listofz,noofstates]
4.4.4 Mathematica Program for a Strictly Stable Equilibrium
The n-country model for evaluating the number (out of 100000) a random hetero-
geneous equilibria is strictly stable (defined by the variable listofz) is programmed
using Mathematica as follows:
(* MATHEMATICA PROGRAM FOR EVALUATING THE NUMBER OF TIMES
(OUT OF 100000) A GIVEN STATE IS A STRICTLY STABLE
EQUILIBRIUM FOR THE n-COUNTRY MODEL, BUILDING UP ON THE
PROGRAM ABOVE BY DEFINING A MUTANT STRATEGY AND CONDITIONS
REQUIRED TO HOLD FOR STRICY STABILITY *)
ClearAll[n,listofz,U,eta,a1,K,countz,x,sigmafn,m,
jminusistar,z,i,j,k,jplusistar,aminusistar,aplusistar,lminusi
star,lplusistar,counter,boolean,data,datasorted,lsitofa,listo
fl,noofstates,phifn,psifn];
Off[General::spell1]
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n=3;
a1=10;
eta=1/(0.2 U);
noofstates=0;
listofz=Table[Random[Integer],{n}];
U=a1-1;
K=eta/(1-Exp[-eta U]);
countz[x_]:=Count[x,1];
sigmafn[m_]:=Max[0,(m-1)/(n-1)];
jminusistar[z_,i_]:=If[Count[z,1]==0,0,If[i==Min[Position[z,1
]],If[Delete[Position[z,1],1]=={},0,Min[Delete[Position[z,1],
1]]],Min[Position[z, 1]]]];
jplusistar[z_,i_]:=Min[i,jminusistar[z,i]];
aminusistar[z_,i_]:=If[jminusistar[z,
i]==0,0,listofa[[jminusistar[z, i]]]];
aplusistar[z_,i_]:=If[jminusistar[z,i]==0,0,listofa[[jplusist
ar[z,i]]]];
lminusistar[z_,i_]:=Max[Delete[(1-z)listofl,i]];
lplusistar[z_,i_]:=Max[listof[[i]],lminusistar[z,i]];
For[counter=1,counter<=100000,counter++,boolean=True;
data=Table[y=Random[];1-(1/eta)Log[1-eta y/K],{n-1}];
datasorted=Sort[data,#1>#2&];
listofa=Prepend[datasorted,a1];
listof={};
For[j=1,j<=n,j++,listofl=Append[listofl,Random[Real,{1,
listofa[[j]]}]]]
(* The k-loop defines the mutant strategy z^(k), where
k denotes the country deviating away from strategy z *)
For[k=1,k<=n,k++,listofz[[k]]=1-listofz[[k]];
For[i=1,i<=n,i++,
phifn[z_,i_]:=Max[sigmafn[countz[Delete[z,i]]]
aminusistar[z,i],lplusistar[z,i]]+sigmafn[countz[
Delete[z,i]]+1] listofa[[i]];
psifn[z_,i_]:=Max[sigmafn[countz[Delete[z,i]]+1]
aplusistar[z,i],lminusistar[z,i]]+listofl[[i]];
(* checking the strict stability condition:
(2Subscript[z, i]-1)(Subscript[,i](z^(k))-
Subscript[,i](z^(k)))>0 for all i and all k *)
If[i==k,boolean=boolean && ((2(listofz[[i]])-
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1)(phifn[listofz,i]-
psifn[listofz,i])<0),boolean=boolean &&
((2(listofz[[i]])-1)(phifn[listofz,i]-
psifn[listofz, i]) > 0)];
If[boolean==False,Break[]];
];
listofz[[k]]=1-listofz[[k]];
If[boolean==False,Break[]];
];
If[boolean==True,noofstates++];
];
(* Printing a state and the number of times (out of 100000)
it is a strictly stable equilibrium *)
Print[listofz,noofstates]
4.4.5 Data for the 3-country Model
All the model output given in this subsection is per 100000 runs.
The number of fully integrated  1,1,1 equilibria:
1a
 10 100 1000 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
1/0.2U 2 6 9 12 10 11 11 9
1/0.5U 98 237 229 210 229 212 224 250
1/0.8U 214 380 435 440 382 418 429 387
The number of heterogeneous state  1,0,1 equilibria:
1a
 10 100 1000 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
1/0.2U 378 896 1053 1010 1029 1057 1065 999
1/0.5U 2194 3744 4156 4188 4102 4214 4304 4184
1/0.8U 3004 5186 5513 5578 5501 5633 5542 5736
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The number of heterogeneous state  1,1,0 equilibria:
1a
 10 100 1000 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
1/0.2U 120 142 129 121 135 137 147 149
1/0.5U 1206 1180 1241 1234 1184 1249 1224 1268
1/0.8U 1722 1940 1972 1963 1972 1985 1980 1898
The number of strictly stable all-in-autarky  0,0,0 equilibria:
1a
 10 100 1000 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
1/0.2U 36 19 20 14 25 12 11 11
1/0.5U 473 247 272 222 243 244 228 268
1/0.8U 947 516 514 520 476 473 436 480
4.4.6 The model output for the 4-country Model
All the model output given in this subsection is per 100000 runs.
The number of fully integrated  1,1,1,1 equilibria:
1a
 10 100 1000 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
1/0.2U 4 5 5 7 6 7 4 11
1/0.5U 134 259 250 284 282 255 279 253
1/0.8U 321 549 540 550 576 566 563 532
The number of heterogeneous state  1,1,0,0 equilibria:
1a
 10 100 1000 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
1/0.2U 337 543 560 585 543 528 585 549
1/0.5U 1732 2415 2503 2500 2566 2471 2569 2550
1/0.8U 2284 3211 3268 3349 3210 3188 3285 3270
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The number of heterogeneous state  1,0,1,0 equilibria:
1a
 10 100 1000 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
1/0.2U 294 1637 1818 1860 1867 1838 1814 1854
1/0.5U 1306 3733 3904 4017 3946 4069 4021 4025
1/0.8U 1754 4117 4378 4340 4356 4371 4490 4446
The number of heterogeneous state  1,0,0,1 equilibria:
1a
 10 100 1000 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
1/0.2U 40 913 1451 1525 1556 1609 1564 1503
1/0.5U 261 2347 3134 3257 3306 3318 3364 3452
1/0.8U 356 2730 3437 3494 3598 3562 3615 3648
The number of heterogeneous state  0,1,1,0 equilibria:
1a
 10 100 1000 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
1/0.2U 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1/0.5U 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
1/0.8U 3 3 3 0 3 4 4 2
The number of heterogeneous state  0,1,0,1 equilibria:
1a
 10 100 1000 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
1/0.2U 0 1 3 2 1 0 2 1
1/0.5U 8 16 32 23 29 20 32 33
1/0.8U 19 44 47 65 55 45 53 45
The number of heterogeneous state  0,0,1,1 equilibria:
1a
 10 100 1000 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
1/0.2U 1 27 38 17 44 59 39 47
1/0.5U 13 181 236 242 263 259 245 248
1/0.8U 50 243 333 359 389 315 357 326
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The number of heterogeneous state  1,1,1,0 equilibria:
1a
 10 100 1000 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
1/0.2U 3 11 12 15 8 10 9 8
1/0.5U 137 210 222 214 203 187 187 219
1/0.8U 299 419 445 468 447 387 416 443
The number of heterogeneous state  1,1,0,1 equilibria:
1a
 10 100 1000 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
1/0.2U 9 21 30 19 19 22 19 16
1/0.5U 365 422 480 478 486 449 451 463
1/0.8U 719 877 894 916 889 950 886 896
The number of heterogeneous state  1,0,1,1 equilibria:
1a
 10 100 1000 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
1/0.2U 162 384 442 470 458 449 453 483
1/0.5U 1331 2460 2630 2743 2713 2612 2618 2655
1/0.8U 1984 3311 3607 3747 3579 3659 3658 3704
The number of strictly stable all-in-autarky  0,0,0,0 equilibria:
1a
 10 100 1000 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
1/0.2U 1672 463 369 385 356 361 382 376
1/0.5U 9408 3728 3208 3252 3066 3099 3037 3122
1/0.8U 12842 5548 4901 4882 4851 4771 4748 4854
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4.4.7 The Fully Integrated State – Strict Equilibrium Model out-
put
5 countries:
1a
 10 100 1000 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
1/0.2U 1 5 7 6 5 5 9 5
1/0.5U 148 234 263 248 228 248 226 283
1/0.8U 305 547 512 582 539 556 495 526
6 countries:
1a
 10 100 1000 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
1/0.2U 1 2 0 7 2 2 5 5
1/0.5U 116 178 221 225 206 218 201 208
1/0.8U 318 468 524 520 496 497 519 500
7 countries:
1a
 10 100 1000 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
1/0.2U 2 1 2 4 0 2 2 1
1/0.5U 108 166 167 183 176 188 174 171
1/0.8U 294 459 456 521 463 473 455 501
8 countries:
1a
 10 100 1000 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
1/0.2U 1 0 4 2 2 1 4 2
1/0.5U 101 160 137 151 153 154 158 164
1/0.8U 264 399 431 407 435 442 443 436
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9 countries:
1a
 10 100 1000 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
1/0.2U 0 0 0 3 1 0 2 0
1/0.5U 71 114 141 155 152 158 127 119
1/0.8U 229 381 406 411 392 395 385 386
10 countries:
1a
 10 100 1000 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
1/0.2U 1 1 3 1 0 0 1 0
1/0.5U 75 131 110 117 116 118 114 111
1/0.8U 234 337 371 340 360 348 374 366
25 countries:
1a
 10 100 1000 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
1/0.2U 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1/0.5U 14 11 29 24 21 26 26 21
1/0.8U 43 47 93 103 125 123 108 127
50 countries:
1a
 10 100 1000 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
1/0.2U 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1/0.5U 2 7 8 6 7 6 8 8
1/0.8U 22 38 51 51 39 49 54 46
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100 countries:
1a
 10 100 1000 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
1/0.2U 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1/0.5U 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 4
1/0.8U 7 14 22 15 7 19 18 24
200 countries:
1a
 10 100 1000 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
1/0.2U 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1/0.5U 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
1/0.8U 2 5 8 6 7 6 9 3
4.4.8 The All-In-Autarky State – Strict Stability Model output
From the analysis of the n-country model in Chapter 3, it is already shown that the
all-in-autarky state is a strict equilibrium. The strict stability of this equilibrium
remains to be explored. The Mathematica program is run in order to find the num-
ber (out of 100000) of strictly stable all-in-autarky equilibria for a maximum of
200 countries.
5 countries:
1a
 10 100 1000 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
1/0.2U 12759 2969 2197 2193 2092 2147 2026 2668
1/0.5U 35245 12362 9874 9847 9803 9840 9624 9495
1/0.8U 41668 15839 13073 13077 12752 12706 12772 12826
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6 countries:
1a
 10 100 1000 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
1/0.2U 40013 9303 6324 5999 5971 5940 5957 5814
1/0.5U 65671 23459 18029 17724 17541 17260 17330 17416
1/0.8U 68683 26621 21014 20690 20384 20477 20469 20318
7 countries:
1a
 10 100 1000 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
1/0.2U 71621 19161 12437 11845 11675 11521 11337 11388
1/0.5U 84462 33276 24620 23967 23646 23657 23558 23149
1/0.8U 84361 34998 26508 26154 25718 25590 25750 25500
8 countries:
1a
 10 100 1000 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
1/0.2U 90495 30942 19452 18374 17991 17550 17334 17473
1/0.5U 92540 40790 29094 27924 27724 27532 27302 27747
1/0.8U 91806 40174 30462 29159 28546 28627 28488 28362
9 countries:
1a
 10 100 1000 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
1/0.2U 96758 42569 25472 24401 23498 23140 22917 22811
1/0.5U 96175 45904 32014 30655 30149 29715 29749 29540
1/0.8U 95700 43753 31986 30759 30478 30159 30167 30204
10 countries:
1a
 10 100 1000 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
1/0.2U 98754 51762 30801 28585 27767 27413 26905 27029
1/0.5U 98528 49034 33408 32234 31547 31070 31018 30737
1/0.8U 98412 46622 33010 31833 31383 31157 31033 30948
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15 countries:
1a
 10 100 1000 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
1/0.2U 100000 72954 40970 34781 35360 34642 34445 34048
1/0.5U 100000 59576 37610 25306 34282 34087 33318 33769
1/0.8U 100000 56044 36637 35005 34190 33825 33551 33429
20 countries:
1a
 10 100 1000 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
1/0.2U 100000 81209 44810 40063 37381 36703 35827 35539
1/0.5U 100000 67629 39624 37204 35771 35347 34916 34963
1/0.8U 100000 63840 38756 36503 36369 39493 34586 34801
50 countries:
1a
 10 100 1000 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
1/0.2U 100000 97223 57332 49213 43015 40493 40311 39304
1/0.5U 100000 91476 48667 43496 39778 38317 38299 37392
1/0.8U 100000 88420 46083 42051 38841 37958 37761 37030
100 countries:
1a
 10 100 1000 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
1/0.2U 100000 99987 70672 58665 49671 46558 44221 42804
1/0.5U 100000 99983 57936 49782 44139 41793 40143 39953
1/0.8U 100000 99976 55223 47049 42563 40361 40556 39224
200 countries:
1a
 10 100 1000 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
1/0.2U 100000 100000 80791 72991 59781 55397 54783 45602
1/0.5U 100000 100000 63965 51426 53368 49605 42154 40925
1/0.8U 100000 100000 63289 50453 52256 43741 40976 39641
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Note from the tables above that the number of times the all-in-autarky state is a
strictly stable equilibrium reaches 100000 as the value of 1a tends to the number of
countries n. Hence the probability of the all-in-autarky state being a strictly stable
equilibrium 1 as 1a n from above. Note that condition (3.32) required for the
all-in-autarky equilibrium to be strictly stable is summarized in Chapter 3 as:
 11 min1 iian  . As 1a n , the condition essentially requires the smallest i to
be greater than 1, which is always the case. Hence as 1a n , the numerical com-
putations give 100000 strictly stable all-in-autarky equilibria per 100000 runs. Also
note that as 1a increases over the value of n, the number of all-in-autarky equilibria
per 100000 runs decreases as the smallest i needs to be significantly larger than 1
for condition (3.32) to hold. Generally speaking, increasing n increases stability as
condition (3.32) is easily satisfied for larger n.
4.4.9 Heterogeneous States – Strict Equilibrium Model output
6 countries – Heterogeneous state  1,1,0,1,0,1 :
1a
 10 100 1000 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
1/0.2U 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1/0.5U 1 1 2 1 0 2 2 2
1/0.8U 0 3 6 5 5 3 5 8
6 countries – Heterogeneous state  1,0,1,1,1,1 :
1a
 10 100 1000 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
1/0.2U 1 3 3 1 0 2 1 3
1/0.5U 35 52 51 56 55 58 72 68
1/0.8U 63 128 153 139 132 130 135 154
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6 countries – Heterogeneous state  1,1,0,1,1,1 :
1a
 10 100 1000 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
1/0.2U 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1/0.5U 11 17 29 23 25 27 32 22
1/0.8U 23 80 65 78 66 65 69 66
10 countries – Heterogeneous state  1,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,1 :
1a
 10 100 1000 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
1/0.2U 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1/0.5U 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1/0.8U 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
10 countries – Heterogeneous state  1,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,1,0 :
1a
 10 100 1000 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
1/0.2U 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1/0.5U 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1/0.8U 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
10 countries – Heterogeneous state  1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,1 :
1a
 10 100 1000 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
1/0.2U 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1/0.5U 8 18 24 25 22 22 22 21
1/0.8U 31 79 71 81 82 70 76 67
10 countries – Heterogeneous state  1,1,1,1,1,1,0,1,0,1 :
1a
 10 100 1000 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
1/0.2U 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1/0.5U 0 4 7 2 2 1 10 3
1/0.8U 3 14 15 11 5 8 11 16
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10 countries – Heterogeneous state  1,0,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1 :
1a
 10 100 1000 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
1/0.2U 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
1/0.5U 15 2 34 34 28 39 43 49
1/0.8U 57 83 107 114 111 84 99 99
10 countries – Heterogeneous state  1,0,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,1 :
1a
 10 100 1000 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
1/0.2U 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1/0.5U 0 7 3 3 2 8 4 6
1/0.8U 2 14 17 24 15 16 14 10
10 countries – Heterogeneous state  1,0,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1 :
1a
 10 100 1000 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
1/0.2U 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
1/0.5U 15 2 34 34 28 39 43 49
1/0.8U 57 83 107 114 111 84 99 99
Note from the tables above that the number of times the heterogeneous states of the
form  1,0,1,1, ,1 are strict equilibria is greater than for the other heterogeneous
states for 2 , 3 . This implies that even though it is more advantageous for country
2 to play E (in terms of obtaining a higher fully integrated payoff as opposed to the
autarkic payoff) when all other countries are fully integrated into the world econo-
my,  the competition between countries (modelled by the behavioural rule in the
previous chapter) results in envious behaviour leading to country 2 choosing strat-
egy A over strategy E, in order to reduce the leading country’s payoff (so that the
gap in payoffs is reduced). These particular heterogeneous states were chosen to
highlight this envious behaviour.
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Chapter 5
The Trade Game with Strategy Size 
In this chapter, an extension to the trade game model of the previous chapters is
formulated, in order to model the trade dynamics when countries can only change
their strategy by a small strategy size as opposed to switching between the pure
strategies (engaging in world trade or remaining in autarky).
Section 5.1 presents the continuous strategy trade game model, defining the payoff
to countries in terms of their level of engagement with the world economy. Section
5.2 defines the strategy changes that enable the countries to reach their aspiration
level.  Sections 5.3 and 5.4 state the conditions for a state to be a strict equilibrium
and a strictly stable equilibrium, respectively. These conditions are then simplified
for the all-in-autarky and fully integrated states. Specializations to the 2-country
and 3-country scenarios are briefly discussed.
5.1 The  -Model
Definition 5.1. A strategy for a country i is a level of engagement with the world
economy,  0 1, , ,i Kz I      , where 0 10 1k K           , and in
particular, 1k k    , where 1/ K  , and is called the strategy size.135
The strategy iz for country i is also allowed to vary continuously between 0 and 1
in the following chapter. The strategy size can be thought of as a measure by which
a country can adjust its economic policy in a given unit time, in order to benefit
135 Note that 1/ K  is defined as the smallest increment in investment in international trade.
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from cross-border trade as well as trade at home. In this chapter,  is considered to
be of the form 1/ K , where 1K  and K . Note that 1  gives us the original
model from Chapter 3, hence only 1/ 2  is considered in this chapter.
Definition 5.2. A strategy profile, or simply a state for n countries is a vector
 1, , nnz z z I  .
Definition 5.3. The trade weights matrix is a matrix of probability weights
 ijW w , with 0 1ijw  and 1ij
j
w  for each country i, where ijw measures the
relative degree of openness country i has to trade with country j, when country i is
fully engaged in world trade (i.e. when 1iz  ).
The weights ijw can be thought of as defining barriers to trade in the sense that they
measure the relative degree of openness a country has to trade with other countries.
So 0ijw  means that country i does not trade with country j at all, i.e. it remains in
autarky relative to country j, and ij ikw w means that country i is more open to
trade with country j than it is with country k. These barriers may relate to geogra-
phy, for example through transport costs, or to the fact that country i gains more or
less benefit from trading with country j because of more or less complementarities
between their economies, or the greater or lesser size of the economy of country j.
These barriers can also relate to language and culture, or deliberate impediments to
commercial intercourse. Goodfriend and McDermott [59] define the notion of fa-
miliarities to account for asymmetries between countries and attribute unfamiliarity
of a country to barriers towards cultural or commercial interaction. Trade barriers
discourage the general expansion of trade between the countries. On the timescale
of strategy changes, the trade weights ijw (for all i and all j) are assumed to be con-
stant.
Definition 5.4. Given a strategy profile z , the payoff to country i is:
   1i i i ij j i i
j
z a z w z z    . (5.1)
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Here, i is the payoff received when country i is in autarky ( 0iz  ), and ia is the
(maximum) payoff that country i can receive, realised when all countries are fully
engaged in world trade ( 1jz  for all j). It is assumed that i ia  for all i, so that
countries obtain a greater payoff by integrating into the world economy than by
remaining in complete autarky.  For 0 1iz  , country i’s payoff is a weighted sum
of these two effects, and depends on the levels of integration of the other countries
through the factor:
 
1
n
i ij j
j
W z w z

 . (5.2)
Note that, if 0iiw  , then there is a gain to internal trade yielding a payoff 2i ii ia w z .
This can be thought of as a result of stimulation to growth of internal markets ei-
ther as a country’s primary objective or as a secondary effect of international trade.
For example, the secondary effect can be R&D spillovers from international trade
that boost domestic markets (see Lichtenberg and Van Pottlesberghe [79]).
The previous versions of this trade game that have been considered in Chapter 3
use the weights: 0iiw  and 1 1ijw n  for all i j . This means there is no second-
ary stimulation of the internal economy due to world trade, and the contribution of
any other country to country i’s per capita GDP depends only on its own degree of
openness, and hence is the same for any country with the same degree of openness,
so there are no exogenous restrictions to trade.
At the other extreme is the theoretical possibility that 1iiw  and 0ijw  for i j .
In this case, the stimulation of the domestic economy is the primary objective of
the country. Country i can then achieve its maximum payoff by taking 1iz  with-
out any direct contribution from any other country. However, this is not the same
as country i being in autarky ( 0iz  with payoff i ), since generally country i con-
tributes to the gains other countries receive from engagement in world trade (if
0jiw  for some j). In the very extreme case 1iiw  for all i, every country is in a
maximal payoff autarky. This can be thought of as a situation in which enlightened
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economic policies by governments (i.e. 1iz  ) lead to maximum extraction of eco-
nomic value from the country’s internal economy. The reduced payoff i from true
autarky can then be regarded as the payoff obtained not just from lack of openness
to world trade, but from poor economic policies at home (i.e. 0iz  ).
Note that when 1iiw  , country i can obtain its maximum possible payoff ia by
choosing to play 1iz  , regardless of other countries’ strategies. However, when
0 1iiw  , country i can only obtain its maximal payoff of ia by playing 1iz 
when all other countries j choose to play 1jz  .
For most countries (with the exception of a small number of Asian Tigers), even
when (apparently) completely open to world trade, cross-border trade accounts for
a relatively small proportion of per capita GDP. Hence, it is not unreasonable to
suppose that iiw is often large. Nevertheless, it is generally not considered to take
the value 1iiw  , as countries do not solely depend on domestic trade and enlight-
ened trade policies at home to boost economic growth. International trade is essen-
tial for economic development and economic survival of countries today. With
1iiw  , there are some additional gains from cross-border trade that are not availa-
ble just from enlightened economic policies at home. For example Murshid [93]
states that cross-border trade is used as a vehicle to promote increased regional in-
tegration and as a way to prepare for a much more liberal and open trading regime
in the CLTV136 neighbourhood, which is one of the fastest growing sub-regions in
the world. The more advanced economies of Thailand and Vietnam obtain greater
benefits from opening up to cross-border trade as they have clear, well-focussed
policies (for example, Thailand entered into bilateral free trade agreements with
various countries including Japan, USA, China, India and is directed towards crea-
tion of new market clusters for its exports of processed goods. Vietnam successful-
ly developed a border trade zone with China at Mong Cai, and also entered into a
bilateral free trade agreement with USA in 2001 to boost exports. Economic liber-
alization generated its rapid growth and helped reduce poverty).
136 Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam.
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Note that countries observe the maximal payoff obtained in a given time period and
seek to minimize the difference between the maximal payoff and their own payoff.
It is assumed that degeneracies do not occur in this model, so that countries have a
unique best reply that minimizes the payoff difference. The non-generic cases are
therefore not considered in this model.
5.2 Strategy Change Rules
Definition 5.5. Given a current strategy profile  1, , nz z z  , the strategy profile
of the countries other than i is defined as the 1n  vector:
  1: , , , ,i i nz z z z    .137
The countries participating in international trade compete with one another and
have the common desire of imitating the country with the maximum payoff.
Definition 5.6. The maximum payoff  is defined as the highest payoff realized by
one or several countries and is formally expressed as:
      1, ,: max jj nz z   .
When iC uses strategy s and iz represents the strategy profile for all other coun-
tries, then it calculates the maximum payoff as:
      1, ,maxi i j ij ns z s z    .
Given an opportunity to adjust its current strategy (economic policy), country i
changes its level of commitment to engagement in world trade from iz to
 i iz B z  , where:
        : argminii i i is zB z s z s z     , (5.3)
137 The brackets around iz means that it is omitted.
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and    ,r r r I      , for r I , and 0  a fixed constant. Thus, country i
can only adjust its level of integration in the world economy by a maximum
amount  in any one move. Note that the optimal strategy  iB z is always unique
as degeneracies do not occur.138
 iB z determines a strategy s that attempts to minimize the difference between
country i’s current economic state prowess and the quantity  is z  that repre-
sents an aspiration held by country i, which itself depends on country i’s strategy as
well as the strategies of all the remaining countries. This aspiration can be mod-
elled in one of (at least) three possible ways:
(i)  is z  is the payoff to the leading country given the modified strategy
profile, that is  is z  is the payoff when country i chooses  is z
 ,i is z  139.
(ii)  is z  is the average payoff of those countries that are currently doing
better (achieving a higher payoff) than country i.
(iii)  is z  is the payoff of the country whose payoff is currently closest to, but
better than, country i’s.
In all these cases, the leading country (the country with the highest payoff) always
seeks to maximize its payoff. Case (i) is the case that has been considered so far,
but the other two cases are also worth some attention.
138 One interpretation of this assumption could be – country i sticks with its current strategy s if more
than one strategy minimizes the behavioural gap (5.3).
139 Note that for each country i, the difference between  is z  and its own current state prowess
 i is z  is unique so that country i has a unique best strategy  is z when the other countries
play iz .
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5.3 Strict Equilibria for the n-Country Model
A strict equilibrium in this model means no country can improve its payoff by ad-
justing its strategy by size  .
Definition 5.7. A state *z is an equilibrium of the trade game under the updating
rule (5.3), if no country has an incentive to change its strategy when given the op-
portunity to do so. This can be formally expressed as:  * *i iz B z .
Definition 5.8. A state *z is a strict equilibrium140 or a equilibrium  of the trade
game if  * *i iz B z and each country i does explicitly worse by changing its strat-
egy from *iz .
Based on the aspiration rule (5.3), for a state z to be a strict equilibrium, the fol-
lowing condition is required to hold: For each i,
when 0 1iz  141:
       i i i i i i i i i iz z z z z z z z             , (5.4)
when 0iz  :
       0 0i i i i i iz z z z           , (5.5)
when 1iz  :
       1 1 1 1i i i i i iz z z z             . (5.6)
140 Note that the equilibrium is classified as a strict equilibrium as the inequality required to hold is a
strict inequality.
141 Note that when 1iz  , country i can only update its strategy to 1  when given an opportunity to
do so and when 0iz  , an updated strategy can only be of the form iz  , hence separate conditions
are required for these cases.
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The conditions in (5.4) can be rearranged to obtain the strict equilibrium condition
for 0 1iz  as:
       i i i i i i i i i iz z z z z z z z             for all i.
The right hand side of the inequality can be simplified as:
   
        
     
   
1
1
1
i i i i i i
i i ij j ii i i i i i i
j i
i i i ij j ii i i i i i i
j
i i ij j i i i ij j i ii i i ii i i i i
j j
i ij j i i ii
j
z z z z
a z w z w z z z z
a z a w z w z z z
a z w z z a w z a w z a w z z
a w z a w z
  
    
    
    
 
 




 
          
        
               
   


 


  .i    
Similarly, the conditions in (5.5) can be rearranged to obtain the equilibrium condi-
tion for 0iz  as:        0 0i i i i i iz z z z           , and the right hand
side of this inequality can be simplified to:  i i iia w    (using the simplified
form of the expression    i i i i i iz z z z     obtained above).
The conditions in (5.6) can also be rearranged to obtain the equilibrium condition
for 1iz  as:        1 1 1 1i i i i i iz z z z             , and the right hand
side of this inequality can be simplified to:   1i i i iia a w      (again using
the simplified form of the expression    i i i i i iz z z z     obtained above).
A necessary and sufficient condition for z to be a strict equilibrium142 of the con-
tinuous strategy trade game (as defined above in condition (5.4)) can be formally
expressed as:
142 Note that 0 1iz  in this case.
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     i i i i i ij j i i ii i
j
z z z z a w z a w z                 , for all i. (5.7)
5.3.1 The All-In-Autarky State for the n-Country Model
For the all-in-autarky state, 0iz  , for all i. So when given the opportunity, country
i can either stick to strategy 0iz  or update its strategy to iz  . Then,
  *0 iz   and     2 *max 1 ,i i ii i iz a w         , where  * max jj 
and  * maxi ji j   .
The equilibrium condition (5.5) for the all-in-autarky state can now be written as:
    2 * *max 1 ,i ii i i i ii ia w a w            143, for all i. (5.8)
The left hand side of condition (5.8) can be simplified to either of the four follow-
ing expressions when * is re-written as  *max ,i i  :
(i)  2 1i ii i ia w       144: This expression simplifies to  i ii ia w   and
hence (5.8) cannot hold.
(ii)  2 *1i ii i ia w       145: This expression simplifies to
  *i ii i i ia w       , but *i i  in this case (see footnote 145 below).
Hence (5.8) cannot hold.
143 The simplified expression on the right hand side of this inequality has been derived previously in
Section 5.3.
144 This expression is obtained when     2 * 2max 1 , 1i ii i i i ii ia w a w           and
 *max ,i i i    .
145 This expression is obtained when     2 * 2max 1 , 1i ii i i i ii ia w a w           and
 * *max ,i i i    .
148
(iii) *i i   146: This expression is less than 0 since *i i  (see footnote 146 be-
low). A necessary and sufficient condition required for (5.8) becomes:
 * 0i i i ii ia w         . This can be simplified to:  
*
2
1i i
ii
i
w a
  

   .
Since 0iiw  ,  
*
2
1 0i i
ia
  

    gives
*
i i
i
  
 . Moreover, since
*
i i  , the equilibrium condition can be satisfied for a range of  -values:
* 10,1 , 1i K
i
I K KK


            
 .
(iv) * *i i   147: This expression simplifies to 0 and so a necessary and sufficient
condition required for (5.8) to hold becomes: 0i ii ia w    . This can be
simplified to: iii
i
w a

 , for all i.
5.3.2 The Fully Integrated State for the n-Country Model
For the fully integrated state, 1iz  , for all i. Therefore, when given the opportuni-
ty, country i can either stick to strategy 1iz  or update its strategy to 1iz   .
Country 1 has no incentive to change its strategy by  as it obtains the maximal
payoff of 1a when it plays 1 1z  . This result is true for all n and stated as Lemma
5.1. In this case,   11 iz a   and       *1 max 1 ,i i i iz z         , where
    * max 1j jij i a w    148.
146 This expression is obtained when   2 * *max 1 ,i ii i i ia w         and  *max ,i i i    .
147 This expression is obtained when   2 * *max 1 ,i ii i i ia w         and  * *max ,i i i    .
148 When country i switches to strategy 1  , country j receives a payoff of:
 1j j jk k j j
k
a z w z z   , where 1jz  for j i and 1iz   .  This can be simplified as:
 1j jk j ji
k i
a w a w

  j j jia a w   .
149
Lemma 5.1. In the n-country model, when the game is in the fully integrated state,
country 1 does not update its strategy from 1 1z  as it yields the maximal payoff of
1a .
Proof. Consider the n-country model. In the fully integrated state, 1iz  for all
 1, ,i n  . And the payoffs to countries 1, ,n is 1, , na a , respectively. Since
1 na a  , the maximal payoff obtained is 1a and hence country 1 has no incen-
tive to update its strategy when given an opportunity to do so. 
The equilibrium condition (5.6) for the fully integrated state can now be re-written
as:
      * 21max 1 ,i i i ii i i i iiz a a w a a w            149, for 1i  . (5.9)
If    1 1i i iz z       , then country i obtains the maximal payoff by switch-
ing to strategy 1iz   . Therefore, the fully integrated state cannot be a strict
equilibrium. Hence, it is required that:
   *1 iz     , (5.10)
so that (5.9) can be re-written as:
   * 2 1i ii i i i iia w a a w a         , for 1i  . (5.11)
Condition (5.10) holds if and only if:
   * 1i iz      .
Now    21i i i ii i i i ii iz a w a a w a          150. So (5.10) can be simplified
as:
149 The simplified expression on the right hand side of this inequality has been derived previously in
Section 5.3.
150
   * 2i ii i i i ii ia w a a w a         . (5.12)
A quick comparison of conditions (5.11) and (5.12) implies that condition (5.11) is
necessary and sufficient for the fully integrated state to be a strict equilibrium (i.e.
(5.11)(5.12)), since 1 ia a for 1i  .
The right hand side of condition (5.11) (which is the only inequality required to
address since (5.11)(5.12)) can be analysed as a quadratic function of  (provid-
ed 0iiw  151), in order to find the parameter ranges for which the fully integrated
state is a strict equilibrium.
Let    2 1i i ii i i i iif a w a a w a        . Then,
   2i i ii i i i iif a w a a w       and   2 0i i iif a w   . Thus,  if  has a mini-
mum point at min 2
i i ii i
i ii
a a w
a w
   152, and    
2
min 1 4
i i ii i
i
i ii
a a wf a a w
    153.
150 This payoff is obtained using (5.1) as follows:
       
 
  
 2
1 1 1 1 1
1
1 1
.
i i i ij j ii i
j i
i ij ii i
j i
i ii i
i ii i i i ii i
z a w z w
a w w
a w
a w a a w a
     
  
  
  



          
      
   
    


151 Note that the right hand side of (5.11) is linear if 0iiw  .
152 The  value at the minimum point is obtained as follows:    2 0i i ii i i i iif a w a a w        .
Hence, min 2
i i ii i
i ii
a a w
a w
   .
151
If min is re-arranged as 12 2
i i
i ii
a
a w
  , then min 12  (since i ia  ).
Note that min 1  if and only if i i i iia a w  , which gives 1 iii
i
w a
  .
The conditions required for the fully integrated state to be a strict equilibrium for
the 2-country model and the 3-country model are obtained below. The 2-country
model is further explored in the next chapter, linking together results from this
chapter in the context of trade dynamics.
5.3.3 Specialisations to 2,3n
The 2-Country Model
In the 2-country model, country 1 obtains the maximal payoff of 1a by playing
1 1z  , hence it does not update its strategy. The conditions required for country 2
to not change its strategy by  (to 1  ) and thus allowing    1 2, 1,1z z  to be a
strict equilibrium is obtained below.
In this case,    22 2 22 2 2 2 22 1f a w a a w a        .
The minimum point of the quadratic curve  2f  is obtained as: 2 2min
2 22
1
2 2
a
a w
  
and    
2
2 2 22 2
2 min 1
2 224
a a wf a a w
    .
153 The function value at the minimum point is obtained as follows:
   
    
   
 
2
min 1
2
1
2 2
1
2
1
2 2
4 2
2
4
.4
i i ii i i i ii i
i ii i i i ii
i ii i ii
i i ii i i i ii i i i ii i
i ii i ii
i i ii i i i ii i
i ii
i i ii i
i ii
a a w a a wf a w a a w aa w a w
a a w a a w a a w aa w a w
a a w a a w aa w
a a wa a w
  
  
 

                
       
     
  
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The values of the quadratic curve  2f  at 0  , 1  and 1/ 2  are obtained
as:  2 10f a ,  2 1 2 21f a a    and  1 2 2 2 222 4 212 4
a a a wf        , respec-
tively.154
Note that 2 2 0a   and 1 2 22a a w (since 1 2a a and 220 1w  ), so 2 1 02f
     .
The maximum payoff obtained by the opponent country (country 1) is calculated
as:       *2 2 1 122max 1 1j jj a w a w       .
Condition (5.11) -    * 2i f   is necessary and sufficient for the fully integrat-
ed state to be a strict equilibrium, as obtained above and for the 2-country model,
this can be written as:
   21 12 2 22 2 2 2 22 11a w a w a a w a         ,
which gives:
 2 22 2 2 2 22 1 12 0a w a a w a w          .
Therefore, a necessary and sufficient condition required for  1,1z  to be a strict
equilibrium is:
2 2 22 1 12 2
2 22
a a w a w
a w
    . (5.13)
The curves for  2f  and  *  are now obtained to analyse condition (5.11) fur-
ther for all values of  in the range 10, 2
    .
 * 10 a  and  * 1 1 121 0a a w    .
154 Note that either  2 21 12f f
     or  2 2
1 12f f
     .
153
If  2 min 0f   , then the curves obtained for  2f  and  *  are as shown in
Figure 5.1 (a) and (b), and if  2 min 0f   , then the curves obtained are as shown in
Figure 5.1 (c). In order for country 2 to not update its strategy by  , it is required
that    * 2f   .
(a) min 1  ,  2 min 0f   . (b) min 1  ,  2 min 0f   .
(c) min 1  ,  2 min 0f   .155
Figure 5.1. Graphical representation of  2f  and  *  for the 2-country
model. Note that condition (5.11) holds if * 21 12 2f
         .
155 Note that min cannot be greater than 1 when  2 min 0f   as  2 1 0f  .
154
From Figure 5.1, a necessary condition for (5.11) to hold for 10 2  is obtained
as: * 21 12 2f
         .
This can be simplified as:
 
 
1 12
1 2 22 2 2 1
1 12 2 22 2 2
1 1
2 4 2
1 .2
a wa a w a a
a w a w a


     
     
Thus, a necessary condition for (5.11) to hold for 10 2  is:
1 12 2 22 2 2
1
2a w a w a    . (5.14)
Condition (5.14) states that for the fully integrated state to be a strict equilibrium
for the 2-country model, the difference between the fully integrated payoff and the
autarkic payoff for country 2 should strictly offset the difference between the gains
from trade with country 1 (that is open to trade) and half the self-generating capaci-
ty of country 2. Note that for 1  , Condition (5.14) reduces to 1 12 2 2a w a   ,
which means that for the fully integrated state to be a strict equilibrium for the 2-
country model (where countries either play strategy 0 or strategy 1), the difference
in the fully integrated payoff and the autarkic payoff for country 2 should be strict-
ly greater than the gains from trade with country 1. The 2-country model is ana-
lysed further in the next chapter in the context of trade dynamics.
The 3-Country Model
In the 3-country model, country 1 does not update its strategy from 1 1z  as it
yields the maximal payoff of 1a . The conditions required for country 2 and country
3 to not update their strategies by  , meaning    1 2 3, , 1,1,1z z z  is a strict equilib-
rium, are obtained below.
155
First, consider country 2.
   22 2 22 2 2 2 22 1f a w a a w a        .
The expressions for min ,  2 minf  ,  2 0f ,  2 1f , 2 12f
    are the same as obtained
for the 2-country model above. The expression for  *  for  0,1  can be writ-
ten as:
    
    
*
22
1 12 3 32
max 1
max 1 , 1 .
j jj
a w
a w a w
  
 

 
  
The curve for  *  can be evaluated at 0  and 1  as:
 * 10 a  , * 12 321 31 max 1 , 12 2 2
w wa a                      .
The curve for  *  is thus either linear or piecewise linear as shown in Figure
5.2.
 *  is linear. (b)  *  is piecewise linear.
Figure 5.2. Graphical representation of  *  for the 3-country model. Un-
like the 2-country model, the maximal payoff function here can be linear or
piecewise linear.
156
In Figure 5.2 (b), * 1 3
1 12 3 32
a a
a w a w
 
156.
If 12 321 31 12 2
w wa a            , then  
*  is linear157 and    * 1 121a w    .
Otherwise  *  is piecewise linear158 and     
*
1 12*
*
3 32
1
1
a w  if
a w  if
      
     
.
If  *  is linear, then the curves for  *  and  2f  are obtained as in Figure
5.1 previously. So (5.14) is a necessary condition for country 2 to stick with its cur-
rent strategy 2 1z  .
If  *  is piecewise linear, then the curves for  *  and  2f  are obtained as
in Figure 5.3.
156 At *  ,    1 12 3 321 1a w a w    , hence * 1 3
1 12 3 32
a a
a w a w
  .
157 In this case, either * 0  or * 12  .
158 In this case * 10 2  , which requires 3 32 1 12a w a w (since
* 0  ) and  1 3 1 12 3 322 a a a w a w  
(since * 12  ).
157
(a) min 1  ,  2 min 0f   . (b) min 1  ,  2 min 0f   .
(c) min 1  ,  2 min 0f   .159
Figure 5.3. Graphical representation of  2f  and  *  for the 3-country
model. Note that in all the cases, condition (5.11) holds if * 21 12 2f
         .
From Figure 5.3, the necessary condition required for (5.11) to hold is obtained for
*  and *  , for piecewise linear  *  as: * 21 12 2f
         .
160
159 Note that min cannot be greater than 1 when  2 min 0f   as  2 1 0f  .
160 Note that for 1  , this condition reduces to:  3 32 2 2 11a w a a     .
158
This can be simplified as:
 
   
32
3 2 22 2 2 1
1 3 2 22 3 32 2 2
1 11 2 4 2
12 .2
wa a w a a
a a a w a w a


        
     
Hence, a necessary and sufficient condition required for country 2 to stick with its
fully integrated strategy when the maximal payoff function is piecewise linear is:
   1 3 2 2 2 22 3 3212 2a a a a w a w     . (5.15)
Conditions for country 3 can be analysed by simply swapping the indices 2 and 3
from the analysis of country 2 above. Condition (5.14) for linear  *  and (5.15)
for piecewise linear  *  can be re-written for country 3 as:
1 13 3 33 3 3
1
2a w a w a    , (5.16)
   1 2 3 3 3 33 2 2312 2a a a a w a w     . (5.17)
The conditions necessary and sufficient for country 2 to stick with strategy 2 1z 
can now be consolidated as: (5.10) and (5.14) if  *  is linear, otherwise (5.10)
and (5.15) for piecewise linear  *  . The necessary and sufficient conditions for
country 3 to stick with strategy 3 1z  can now be consolidated as: (5.10) and (5.16)
if  *  is linear, otherwise (5.10) and (5.17) for piecewise linear  *  .
The fully integrated state  1,1,1 is a strict equilibrium if the necessary and suffi-
cient conditions consolidated above for countries 2 and 3 to stick with their strate-
gies 2 1z  and 3 1z  , respectively, hold true.
159
5.4 Strict Stability for n countries
Suppose z is a strict equilibrium strategy. Suppose that country k randomly decides
to upgrade its strategy by a small amount  . Then, a mutant strategy is a strategy
profile where country k upgrades its strategy by  while all the remaining countries
continue playing their original strategies. Now consider a mutant strategy denoted
by  kz , such that  ki iz z for i k , and  kk kz z   . Then, for z to be stable with
respect to such single mutations, it would be required for country k to find it advan-
tageous to revert back to its original strategy, while all other countries continue
playing their original strategies.
Definition 5.9. An equilibrium strategy z is said to be a stable equilibrium with
respect to single mutations  kz , if  kz z under the updating rule (5.3), so that
each country apart from k has no incentive to update its strategy when given an
opportunity to do so, and country k updates its strategy from  kkz back to kz (so that
k kz z  ), and this must be true for each k. This can be expressed formally as:
     ,k ki iz B z  for i k  and   kk kz B z , for all i and all k.
Definition 5.10. An equilibrium strategy z is said to be a strictly stable equilibri-
um or a stable quilibrium  with respect to single mutations  kz , if
    k ki iz B z , for i k and   kk kz B z , for all i and all k, and each country
i k does explicitly worse by changing its strategy from iz while country k does
explicitly better by changing its strategy from  kkz to kz .
This definition of strict stability requires the following conditions to hold for all k:
           k k k ki i i i i i i i i iz z z z z z z z             for all i k ,
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                   k k k k k k k kk k i k k k k i k kz z z z z z z z            161.
Since  kk kz z   ,          k k k kk k i k kz z z z   can be re-written as
     k kk k k k kz z z z       and          k k k kk k i k kz z z z      can be re-
written as      k kk k k k kz z z z   .
Hence, a necessary and sufficient condition for z to be a strictly stable equilibrium
of the dynamic trade game (as defined above) can be formally expressed as:
           k k k ki i i i i i i i i iz z z z z z z z             , for all i and all k. (5.18)
If condition (5.18) is re-arranged as:
           k k k ki i i i i i i i i iz z z z z z z z             ,
for all i and all k, then the inequality is hard to analyse in general because of the
complex nature of the maximal payoffs that appear on the left-hand side.
In the next chapter, only the 2-country model is analysed in full detail and results
are deduced based on this model.
5.5 Conclusions
Based on the analysis in the previous sections of this chapter, the following conclu-
sions are obtained for the trade game with strategy size  :
In the 2-country model, the fully integrated state is a strict equilibrium if the differ-
ence in the fully integrated and autarkic payoffs for the subordinate country (coun-
try 2) is strictly greater than the self-generating capacity of the leading country
(country 1).
161 Note that  kk kz z   , so  kkz  leads the mutant strategy back to the more advantageous strate-
gy kz for country k.
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In the 3-country model, a range of parameter constraints are required to hold for
the fully integrated state to be an equilibrium.
For the general n-country model, the parameter constraints required for the all-in-
autarky state are obtained. Strict stability is difficult to test in this case due to the
complex analysis of the maximal payoffs in the inequality for the strictly stable
states. Hence, the 2-country model with strategy size  is analysed in detail in the
next chapter, obtaining several equilibria and strictly stable equilibria.
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Chapter 6
The 2-Country Model with strategy size 
This chapter discusses the 2-country model with strategy size  in detail, first us-
ing the maximal payoff functions and the payoff functions for countries 1 and 2 as
obtained in the previous chapter, and then analysing strategies of the countries in-
dividually where the leading country always seeks to maximize its payoff function.
Parameter regimes are obtained for the values of the strategy size for which the all-
in-autarky and fully integrated states can be strict equilibria. The trade dynamics
are then found along with any additional equilibria, including any heterogeneous
states.
The best response dynamics of the trade game indicate that there exist leadership
cycles162 between the countries in the case of the 2-country scenario, in which the
countries overtake each other and become the leaders alternately. In this case, it is
easier for the country with the intrinsically bigger economy to overtake the lagging
country in case the lagging country assumes the role of leadership, than vice versa.
Additional strict equilibria with respect to the small strategy size are also obtained.
The strategy profile for a world with two countries 1C and 2C is  1 2,z z z . The
all-in-autarky state and the fully integrated state are first analysed in Section 6.1
and Section 6.2, respectively. Section 6.3 briefly considers the effect of varying
aspiration level in the 2-country scenario. Section 6.4 analyses the trade dynamics
162 In the 2-country model, country 2 (the subordinate country) can catch-up with country 1 (the lead-
ing country) and then assume the role of leadership. Country 1 can then catch-up with country 2 and
assume the role of leadership, and vice versa.
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in order to obtain the equilibria and strictly stable states by assuming a continuous
strategy size. Section 6.5 illustrates two examples and discusses the strategies cho-
sen by the two countries, the trade dynamics and the strict equilibria. Section 6.6
concludes the chapter, highlighting important results from the 2-country scenario.
Section 6.7 is an appendix containing strategy moves by country 1 when country 2
becomes the leader.
6.1 The All-In-Autarky State  0,0
The all-in-autarky state  0,0z  is a strict equilibrium if:
       0 0i i iz z z z        , for 1,2i  . (6.1)
A selection of sample curves for  z  ,  i z  ,    iz z    are presented
below in Figure 6.1 in order to visualize condition (6.1), for countries 1 and 2.
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Figure 6.1. Comparison of  z  ,  i z  and    iz z    , for
1,2i  , where  0,0z  . Note that the parameter values ensure that the all-
in-autarky state is a strict equilibrium for all values of  only in (d) as the
payoff difference for both countries by increasing level of integration by  is
greater than the payoff difference by playing strategy A, that is 0iz  .
For 1i  :     1 2max ,z z     ,    21 1 11 11z a w       ,
   1 20 max ,z   ,  1 10 z  163. Condition (6.1) can be re-written as:
    21 2 1 11 1 1 2max , max ,z a w         164. (6.2)
163 When country 1 updates its strategy by  , country 2 continues to play 2 0z  , receiving payoff 2 .
So     1 2max ,z z     .
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If     1 2 1max ,z z     , then country 1 realizes its maximal payoff by
switching to strategy 1z  , so   1 2 2max ,z    is a necessary condition re-
quired for the all-in-autarky state to be a strict equilibrium.
Now,     21 2 2 1 11 1 2max , 1z a w            .
This gives:
 2 1
11 2
1
1w a
  

  . (6.3)
With   1 2 2max ,z    , condition (6.2) can be simplified as:
 22 1 11 1 1 2max ,a w        .
If 1 2  (recall that unlike the ia ’s, the i ’s are not necessarily ordered), then
 2 1
11 2
1
1w a
  

  and this has already been obtained in (6.3), so a necessary
condition for country 1 to stick with its strategy 1 0z  is (6.3).
If 1 2  , then a necessary condition for country 1 to stick with its strategy 1 0z 
is:
1
11
1
w a

 . (6.4)
For 2i  : The conditions for this case can be obtained by simply swapping the in-
dices for the Case 1i  .
Conditions (6.3) and (6.4) can be re-written with swapped indices as:
 1 2
22 2
2
1w a
  

  , (6.5)
164 Condition (6.1) gives:       21 2 1 11 1 1 2 1max , 1 max ,z a w             .
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2
22
2
w a

 . (6.6)
The equilibrium conditions for the all-in-autarky state can be summarized as per
below.
Lemma 6.1. The conditions required for the all-in-autarky state to be a strict equi-
librium are:
 2 1 2
11 22 1 22
1 2
1  and  forw wa a
      
    , (6.7)
 1 21
11 22 1 22
1 2
1 and  forw wa a
     
    , (6.8)
where 1/ K  , such that 1K  and K , as defined previously.
Proof. Conditions (6.3), (6.4), (6.5), (6.6) are necessary and sufficient for countries
1 and 2 to stick to their strategies 1 0z  , 2 0z  , respectively. These can be consol-
idated as conditions (6.7) and (6.8).165 
Note that the conditions obtained in Lemma 6.1 have also been obtained as condi-
tions for the all-in-autarky state to be a strict equilibrium for the general n-country
model in Subsection 5.3.1. The strength of these conditions remains to be analysed,
as does how advantageous it would be for a leading country to engage in trade with
the other country.
If equations (6.7) and (6.8) are compared, then it is found that the condition for 22w
is weaker in (6.7) than in (6.8), and the condition for 11w is weaker in (6.8) than in
(6.7), in the sense that the condition for 22w is more easily satisfied in (6.7) while
the condition for 11w is more easily satisfied in (6.8). This is true since for small  ,
the 11w -condition in (6.8) and the 22w -condition in (6.7) necessarily hold as
165 The conditions obtained in Lemma 6.1 can be used to determine which set of parameter values
used in the Figure 6.1 illustrations indicate  0,0z  is a strict equilibrium
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11 22, 1w w  , whereas the 11w -condition in (6.7) and the 22w -condition in (6.8) re-
quire parameter restrictions on not only the value of  , but also on the values of
ia ’s and i ’s.
In order to analyse and compare the strength of the iiw -conditions in (6.7) and (6.8)
via diagrams, two functions of  ,  ig  and  ih  , are defined below.
Let   2j i ii
i i
g a a
    
  and   ii
i
h a
  for 1,2i  and j i .
Then, for Figure 6.2,   22
2
h a
  ,  20limh   and   22 21h a
 ,
and,   2 1 11 2
1 1
g a a
    
  ,  10lim g   and   21 11g a
 .
The curve  1g  has a maximum point at 2max
1
2 1  
    
166. Note that 1 2  for
condition (6.7), hence max0 2  .
Let   be the solution of  1 0g   and * , ** be the solutions of  11 1w g  .
At   :   2 1 11 2
1 1
0g a a
    
   . Hence 2
1
1     . Note that 0 1   .
166 At the stationary point:    2 1 11 3 2
1 1
20 0g a a
    
     , which gives 1
2
2 1  
    
. Now
   2 1 11 4 3
1 1
6 2g a a
    
   and 1
2
2 1  
    
, so
   
   
   
 
4 4
1 2 1 2 1 1
1 4 3
1 1 1 2 1 1 2
4 4
1 1
3 3
1 1 2 1 1 2
4
1
3
1 1 2
2 6 2
16 8
6 2
16 8
2 .16
g a a
a a
a
     
    
 
   

 
         
  
 
Since 1 2  ,  31 2 0   and hence 1max
2
2 1  
    
.
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At * , ** :   2 1 111 1 2
1 1
w g a a
    
   . This gives the following quadratic in  :
 21 11 1 1 2 0a w         167.
Thus,  21 1 1 11 1 2*
1 11
4
2
a w
a w
       and  21 1 1 11 1 2**
1 11
4
2
a w
a w
       .
Note that * and ** are real if either 1 2  or  21 1 11 1 24a w    when 1 2  .
Using conditions in (6.7), a necessary condition for the solution of  11 1w g  is
 21 1 11 1 24a w    .
(a)    2 1h g  for 0 1  ,                 (b)    2 1h g  for some
** 1  . 0 1  , ** 1  .
167  2 22 1 111 1 11 2 1 1 1 11 1 1 22
1 1
0w a w a wa a
           
           .
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(c) ** 1  .
Figure 6.2. Graphical representation for 1 2  - Condition (6.7) holds for
* **    . Note that   22
2
h a
  ,   2 1 11 21 1g a a
    
  ,
 21 1 1 11 1 2*
1 11
4
2
a w
a w
       and  21 1 1 11 1 2**
1 11
4
2
a w
a w
       .
For Figure 6.3,   11
1
h a
  ,  10limh    and   11 11h a
 ,
and,   1 2 22 2
2 2
g a a
    
  ,  20lim g    and   12 2g a
  .
The curve  2g  has a maximum point at 1max
2
2 1  
    
. Note that 1 2  for
condition (6.7), hence max0 2  .
At   ,   1 2 22 2
2 2
0g a a
    
   . Hence, 1
2
1     . Note that 0 1   .
At   ,   :   1 2 222 2 2
2 2
w g a a
    
   . This gives the following quadratic in  :
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 22 22 2 2 1 0a w         168.
Thus,  22 2 2 22 2 1
2 22
4
2
a w
a w
        and  22 2 2 22 2 1
2 22
4
2
a w
a w
        .
Note that  and   are real if either 2 1  or  22 2 22 2 14a w    when 2 1  .
Also,   and   are real and positive if 1 2 22a w  , in which case 1 2 22a w  for
all  0,1  .
(a) 1   . (b) 1   .
Figure 6.3. Graphical representation for 1 2  - Condition (6.8) holds for
     . Note that   11
1
h a
  and   1 2 22 22 2g a a
    
  ,
 22 2 2 22 2 1
2 22
4
2
a w
a w
        and  22 2 2 22 2 1
2 22
4
2
a w
a w
        .
From Figure 6.2, the following observation is made: If the condition 222
2
w a


holds true, then w11 is required to be in the range * **,    for (6.7) to hold, so that
the all-in-autarky state is then an equilibrium for 1 2  . Similarly, from Figure
168  2 22 1 111 1 11 2 1 1 1 11 1 1 22
1 1
0w a w a wa a
           
           .
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6.3: If the condition 111
1
w a

 holds true, then 22w is required to be in the range
,     for (6.8) to hold, so that the all-in-autarky state is a strict equilibrium for
1 2  .
Looking at Figure 6.2 and Figure 6.3, it can be seen that condition (6.7) and (6.8)
can be satisfied for either large values of  , or an intermediate range * **    ,
     . This means that a leading country can pull the world economy out of
the all-in-autarky state if the strategy size  is small enough.
However, if the self-generating economic capacities of countries 1 and 2, 11w and
22w , respectively, lie in the critical range * **,    and ,     , then both coun-
tries 1 and 2 will remain in autarky, and neither country will have an incentive to
engage in trade with the other country.
Lemma 6.2. A necessary and sufficient condition for the all-in-autarky state to be a
strict equilibrium is:
 
2 for 1,2
max , andj i j iii
i i
w a ia i j
   
 
   . (6.9)
Proof. Combining conditions (6.7) and (6.8) gives:
2 1 1 1
11 2
1 1 1
w a a a
   
  
   if 1 2  and 1 2 2 222 2
2 2 2
w a a a
   
  
   if 1 2  ,
which can be consolidated as condition (6.9). 
The conditions obtained in Lemma 6.2 for the all-in-autarky state to be a strict
equilibrium are illustrated in Figure 6.4.
Condition (6.9) is easily satisfied for 1  and 0iiw  (and for relatively small
iiw ), 1,2i  . This implies that both countries tend to remain in the autarkic state if
the internal economic activities do not contribute significantly towards the payoffs.
However, as discussed in Chapter 5, it is not unreasonable to assume iiw is often
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large, as cross-border trade generally accounts for a relatively small proportion of
GDP for a country. This assumption implies it is rather unlikely for countries to
remain in the autarkic state. So countries integrate into the world economy and this
gives plausibility to the fact that complete economic autarkies are rare today.
The trade dynamics previously obtained in Chapter 3 for 1  , 0iiw  , 1,2i  also
show that the all-in-autarky state is a strict equilibrium, see Figure 3.1.
It remains to be investigated if the two countries will continue to take part in world
trade if the trade dynamics start off with the fully integrated state and if this can be
a strict equilibrium, for a small strategy size. This is explored in the next section.
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w11  2-2 a1 
1
 a1 
1
 a1
w22  1-2 a2 
2
 a2 
2
 a2
(a) Parameter values: 1 10a  , 2 7a  , 1 5  , 2 3  .
w11  2-2 a1 
1
 a1 
1
 a1
w22  1-2 a2 
2
 a2 
2
 a2
(b) Parameter values: 1 10a  , 2 7a  , 1 2  , 2 5  .
w11  2-2 a1 
1
 a1 
1
 a1
w22  1-2 a2 
2
 a2 
2
 a2
(c) Parameter values: 1 10a  , 2 8a  , 1 4  , 2 4  .
Figure 6.4. The regions of the iiw  plot for which the all-in-autarky state is
an equilibrium, i.e. condition (6.9) holds true:
*
2
j i
ii
i i
w a a
  
 
  , for 1,2i 
and j i , where  * max ,i j   . Note: The horizontal axes represent the
 -values, whereas the vertical axes represent the iiw -values.
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6.2 The Fully Integrated State  1,1
It has been shown that in the 2-country model, both countries cannot be fully inte-
grated if 1  and 0iiw  , 1,2i  (from the above analysis of countries choosing to
remain in autarky under such conditions and Figure 3.1).
Now, consider 0 1  .
First, consider country 1. It already obtains the maximal payoff of 1a by playing
strategy 1 1z  , so it does not update its strategy to 1 1z   , as obtained previously
in Lemma 5.1.
Next, consider country 2. As obtained previously in Chapter 5 - condition (5.13),
the condition required for country 2 to stick with its fully integrated strategy 2 1z 
is: 2 2 22 1 12 2
2 22
a a w a w
a w
    , and a necessary and sufficient condition required for
the fully integrated state  1,1z  to be a strict equilibrium for all  in the range
 0,1 is 1 12 2 2a w a   , as obtained previously in Chapter 5 - condition (5.14).
If condition (5.14) is not satisfied, then the fully integrated strict equilibrium does
not exist for 2 2 22 1 12 2
2 22
a a w a w
a w
    . It remains to be examined if a heterogene-
ous equilibrium  * * *1 2,z z z , such that * *1 20 , 1z z  exists for strategy size  .
6.3 Varying Aspiration Level
In the 2-country scenario so far,  is z  has been considered to be the payoff to
the leading country given the modified strategy profile. If other cases are consid-
ered, where  is z  is the average payoff of those countries which are currently
achieving a higher payoff than country i, or  is z  is the payoff of the country
whose payoff is currently closest to, but better than, country i’s, then the conditions
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remain the same for the 2-country trade game (existence of only one opponent im-
plies the country with better the payoff is the leading country).
For example, consider the all-in-autarky state. When 1C tries to update its strategy,
   21 11 1 1 20 max ,a w         and    1 20 0 max ,   for all three cases
above. However, for 2n  countries, the situation is more complex and is not con-
sidered further.
6.4 The Trade Dynamics
Recall that the strategy profile for a world with two countries 1C and 2C is
 1 2,z z z .
The trade weights matrix is 11 11
22 22
1
1
w wW w w
    
, where 11 220 , 1w w  .
From (5.1), the payoff to 1C is:
     1 1 1 11 1 11 2 1 11 1z a z w z w z z         . (6.10)
The payoff to 2C is:
     2 2 2 22 1 22 2 2 21 1z a z w z w z z         . (6.11)
Then, from (5.1), i ija w is the maximum gain from trade to iC obtained from com-
pletely open trade with jC (i.e. when 1i jz z  ).  When i j , this is the maximum
gain that iC can extract from its own economy (discounting any possible gains
from trade with other countries), as a direct result of international trade.
In this section, it is assumed that the leading country always seeks to maximize its
payoff (given the subordinate country’s strategy). The strategy size  is assumed to
be varied arbitrarily in order to visualize how countries can catch up with one an-
other to assume the leading position in international trade.
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The calculations below help determine the trade dynamics, using the fact that the
leading country seeks to maximize its payoff and the subordinate country tries to
minimize the gap between the leading country and itself.
Assume that 1C is the leading country. Then, the payoff to 1C is greater than the
payoff to 2C , which can be written as:
   1 2 0z z   .
Equation (6.10) can be written as:
   21 1 2 1 11 1 1 12 2 1 1 1,z z a w z a w z z      .
This convex surface is shown (for varying 2z ) graphically in Figure 6.5.
Country 1 will attempt to maximize its payoff. Since this quadratic is a convex
function of 1z (for fixed 2z ), it follows that it is maximized either at *1 0z  or at
*
1 1z  , or possibly both, see Figure 6.6.
Figure 6.5. The payoff function surface for country 1. Parameter values:
1 2 1 210, 7, 6, 3,a  a      11 220.8, 0.7.w  w 
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Figure 6.6. Curves for  1 1 2,z z , for a fixed 2z , showing the payoff func-
tion to country 1 is maximised either at *1 0z  or *1 1z  , or both.169
Case I: *2 0z
This case finds the range of parameter values for which the autarkic strategy is the
best strategy for country 1 (the leading country). The best reply of country 2 (the
subordinate country) given the leading country plays the autarkic strategy is also
obtained.
In this case, country 1 is in autarky and receives payoff 1 . This occurs if and only
if the fully integrated payoff is less than the autarkic payoff, that is:
   1 2 1 21, 0,z z  . This holds if and only if:
1 11 1 12 2 1a w a w z   . (6.12)
This is possible for non-negative 2z only if:
1 11 1a w  . (6.13)
169 Note that the minimum point for the curve  1 1 2,z z is at   1 1 12 21 min
1 112
a w zz a w
  , which implies
either  1 min 0z  , or  1 min 1z  , or  1 min0 1z  . In the first two cases, since  1 1 2,z z is convex,
*
1 0z  or *1 1z  , and in the last case *1 0z  or *1 1z  , or both.
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That is, the maximum gain 1C can extract from its own economy by opening to
trade with 2C is less than the payoff it receives from remaining in autarky. This
means that gains from trade with country 2 ( 1 12a w ) have to be sufficiently large to
pull country 1 out of autarky, otherwise autarky becomes the more favourable
strategy for country 1.
Given (6.13), condition (6.12) holds only for:
1 1 11
2 2
1 12
ˆ a wz z a w
   . (6.14)
The assumptions 1 1a  and 11 12 1w w  imply that 2ˆ 1z  170. Hence, this case can-
not arise if 2z is sufficiently large. That is, 2C can force 1C out of autarky by itself
investing in open trade to a large enough extent.171
This analysis must be compatible with the underlying assumption that 1C is the
leading country. That is, when *1 1 0z z  , the payoff to country 1 must be greater
than the payoff to country 2.  Thus, let:
     1 2 1 2 2 20, 0,q z z z   .
The surface generated by this function is represented diagrammatically in Figure
6.7.
170 Since 11 121w w  ,
 
1 1 11
2
1 12
1 1 12
1 12
1 1
1 12
ˆ
1
1 .
a wz a w
a w
a w
a
a w




 
 
Now 1 1a  , hence 2ˆ 1z  .
171 A lagging nation may be able to leapfrog a rival country as a reaction to major exogenous change
in technology, see Brezis, Krugman and Tsiddon [3].
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(a) Saddle surface of    1 2z z  .
(b) Curve of  1 2q z .172
Figure 6.7. Surface generated by payoff difference    1 2z z  .
Note that *1 0z  in (b) so country 1 is in autarky and receives payoff 1 ,
and the curve in (b) is a cross-section of the surface in (a).
Parameter values: 1 2 1 2 11 2210, 7, 6, 3, 0.8, 0.7.a  a    w  w      
Then, the following condition is required to hold for country 1 to be the leading
country for all 2z :
    21 2 1 2 2 2 2 22 2 0q z z a w z       . (6.15)
172      1 2 1 2 2 20, 0,q z z z   as introduced previously in this section.
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For example, when 2 0z  , 1C is the leading country only when its autarky payoff
1 is greater than the autarky payoff 2 of 2C . When 2 1z  , 1C is the leading coun-
try only when:
1 2 22a w  . (6.16)
That is, the maximum gain that 2C can obtain from its own economy as a result of
openness to trade when 1C is in autarky, is not greater than 1C ’s autarky payoff 1 .
More generally, consider the discriminant for  1 2q z :
 22 2 22 1 24D a w     . (6.17)
Then,  1 2q z has no real roots if and only if 0D  . This can occur only if 2 1 
and 2 22a w is sufficiently large. That is, 2C ’s autarky payoff must be greater than
that of 1C , and the maximum gain that 2C can obtain from its own economy must
be sufficiently large (i.e. 2 22 1a w  ). Then,  1 2 0q z  for all 2z .  In this case, 1C
cannot be the leading country by remaining in autarky, whatever 2C does. Thus,
0D  contradicts the assumption that 1C is the leading country.
Suppose 0D  . That is, either 1 2  or 2 1  and 2 22a w is not too large. Then,
 1 2q z has two real roots since it is concave:
  22 2 2 2 22 1 2
2 22
1 42z a wa w      
  , (6.18)
in addition, condition (6.15) holds for 2z in the range:
   2 2 2max 0, min ,1z z z   . (6.19)
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For example, if 1 2  , then the left-hand limit in (6.19) is always 2 0z  , and the
right-hand limit is 2 1z  provided 2 22 1a w  173. In this case, 1C is the leading coun-
try while remaining in autarky, whatever 2C does. The constraint on *1 0z  being a
best strategy against 2z is determined by (6.14); so it is only required that
2 2ˆ0 z z  .
If 2 22 1a w  , then 2C ’s maximum gain from its own open economy is larger than
1C ’s autarky payoff. In this case, still assuming that 1 2  , the following is ob-
tained: 2 1z  . Thus, 1C is the leading country while remaining in autarky provided
2C uses a strategy in the range 2 2z z . Thus, for *1 0z  to be a best strategy for the
leading country 1C requires  2 2 2ˆ0 min ,z z z  .
Finally, if 2 1  but 0D  , then 2 0z  , and so there is a range of near-autarky
strategies for 2C , for which 1C ceases to be the leading country when it remains in
autarky.
Given that 1C is the leading country playing in autarky, a look at what 2C should
do is now examined. 2C is required to choose a best strategy against *1 0z  by min-
imizing the payoff difference  1 2q z while retaining the constraint (6.15) -
 1 2 0q z  ; i.e. that 1C should remain the leading country. Now  1 2q z is a concave
function of 2z , see Figure 6.8, and there are various possibilities to consider as per
below.
173 The right-hand limit is 1 if and only if   22 2 2 2 22 1 2
2 22
1 4 12z a wa w    
      . Simplifying
this:
  
 
2
2 2 2 22 1 2
2 22
2
2 2 22 1 2 2 22 2
2 2 2 2
2 2 22 1 2 22 2 2 22 2 2 22 2
1 2 22
1 4 12
4 2
4 4 4 4
.
a wa w
a w a w
a w a w a w a w
a w
   
   
    

   
    
     
 
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Figure 6.8. The concave function  1 2q z .
There are several possibilities:
(i) 2 2ˆ0 z z  : In this case, since 2 2ˆz z  , it follows from (5.7) and (5.18) that
2 2z z is an allowable strategy, and by definition that  1 2 0q z  . Hence, 2C
can catch up with 1C (reduce the payoff difference to 0), and any further de-
velopment by 2C (i.e. increase in 2z above 2z ) will lead to it assuming the
role of leading country.
Figure 6.9. Country 2’s strategy when 2 2ˆ0 z z  : Increase its level of
trade integration to 2z and catch up with country 1. Any further in-
crease in 2z leads to  1 2 0q z  , which means country 2 becomes the
leading country.
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(ii) 2 2ˆ0 z z  : In this case, (6.14) and (6.19) imply that 2 2z z is an allowable
strategy, and by definition  1 2 0q z  . Again, 1C can catch up with 1C (re-
duce the payoff difference to 0), and any further development by 2C (i.e. de-
crease in 2z below 2z ) will lead to its assuming the role of leading country.
Figure 6.10. Country 2’s strategy when 2 2ˆ0 z z  : Decrease its level
of trade integration to 2z and catch up with country 1. Any further de-
crease in 2z leads to  1 2 0q z  , which means country 2 becomes the
leading country.
(iii) 2 2 2ˆ0 z z z    : In this case, both (i) and (ii) hold simultaneously, and it is
possible for 2C to catch up with 1C either by playing a more integrative
strategy 2z , or a more autarkic strategy 2z . Note that the choice of strategy
in this case depends on the side of the maximum point   1,m mz q z of
 1 2q z the trade dynamics for 2C start from. If 2 mz z , then 2C increases its
level of integration; and if 2 mz z , then 2C decreases its integration to 2z . If
the dynamics start from   1,m mz q z , then either of the strategies 2 2z z or
2 2z z are feasible options.
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Figure 6.11. Country 2’s strategy when 2 2 2ˆ0 z z z    : Decrease its
level of trade integration to 2z or increase its level to 2z , depending on
the starting point of the dynamics for 2C (any further decrease or in-
crease, respectively, in 2z leads to  1 2 0q z  , which means country 2
becomes the leading country).
(iv) 2 0z  : In this case, 2C can catch up with 1C by itself reverting to autarky.
From (6.18), this case can only arise when 1 2  .
(v) 2 2 2ˆ0z z z    : In this case, the allowable range of 2C strategies,
2 2ˆ0 z z  , contains no root of  1 2q z , and hence  1 2 0q z  for any 2z in
this range. It follows that  1 2q z is minimized at an extreme point; i.e., ei-
ther by taking 2 0z  or by taking 2 2ˆz z . This is explored further below.
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Figure 6.12. Country 2’s strategy when 2 2 2ˆ0z z z    : Decrease its
strategy to 2 0z  or increase its level to 2 2ˆz z , (depending on the
starting point of the dynamics for 2C ).
Consider the function:
       2 1 1 2 2 2 22 2 2ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ0R z q q z z a w z     .
Then, 2 0z  is the unique optimal 2C strategy if 22
2 22
zˆ a w
 , and 2 2ˆz z is the
unique optimal strategy if 22
2 22
zˆ a w
 . If 22
2 22
zˆ a w
 , then 2C is indifferent between
these two strategies.
Thus, from (6.14), the non-autarkic strategy 2 2ˆz z is an optimal strategy provided:
  1 2 22 2 1 12 1 11 2 22a w a w a w a w   .
It is the unique optimal strategy if this inequality is strict.
Note from (6.18) that the condition 2 0z  can hold only if 1 2  and 22 0w  .
Now consider the condition 2 2zˆ z . By definition, this holds if and only if
 1 2ˆ 0q z  . That is:
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 
2
1 1 11 1 1 11
1 2 2 2 22
1 12 1 12
0a w a wa wa w a w
                  .
In this case,    1 2 2ˆ, 0,z z z is a Nash equilibrium.174
Case II: *2 1z
This case finds the range of parameter values for which the fully integrated strategy
is the best strategy for country 1 (the leading country). The best reply of country 2
(the subordinate country) given the leading country plays the fully integrated strat-
egy is also obtained.
1C is fully integrated into the world economy and receives payoff 1 11 1 12 2a w a w z .
The first contribution is from maximizing the payoff from its own economy, and
the second is obtained from gains in trade with 2C .  For *1 1z  to be 1C ’s unique
best reply to 2z , the following condition is required to hold:    1 2 1 21, 0,z z  ,
which gives:
1 11 1 12 2 1a w a w z   . (6.20)
This always holds for 2 1z  since 11 12 1w w  and 1 1a  . On the other hand, it
holds for 2 0z  only if 1 11 1a w  ; i.e. 1C ’s maximum gain from its own economy is
at least as big as its autarky payoff.
If this is not the case – i.e. if 1 11 1a w  – and condition (6.13) holds, then (6.20)
can hold only if 2 2ˆz z , with 2zˆ as in (6.14). When 2 2ˆz z , the inequalities (6.12)
and (6.20) are replaced by an equality, and 1C is then indifferent between autarky
( *1 0z  ) and full engagement ( *1 1z  ).
174 Country 1 is the leading country playing in autarky. By the very definition of this case, country 1
maximizes its payoff against country 2 by doing so. Country 2 minimizes the payoff difference at
2 2ˆz z . Hence,    1 2 2ˆ, 0,z z z is a Nash equilibrium.
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It remains to be determined whether *1 1z  is compatible with 1C being the leading
country. To determine this, consider:
     1 2 1 2 2 21, 1,r z z z   .
Then, 1C is the leading country only if  1 2 0r z  . Thus, the following condition is
required to hold:
      21 2 1 11 2 1 12 2 21 2 2 2 22 2 0r z a w a w a w z a w z        . (6.21)
For example, when 2 0z  this can hold only if 1 11 2a w  . At the other extreme,
when 2 1z  :  1 1 21r a a  , and this is positive if 1 2a a ; i.e. when 1C ’s economy
is intrinsically bigger than 2C ’s economy, so that 1C is a natural leader. However,
as it has been seen in Case I, when 1C stays in autarky, in some circumstances, 2C
can catch up with it, and assume the role of leading country itself. Thus, if 1 2a a
then 2C would be the natural leader, and could become so by playing a strategy 2z
which is sufficiently close to 2 1z  .
Figure 6.13. Curve of  1 2r z . Parameter values:
1 2 1 2 11 2210, 7, 6, 3, 0.4, 0.7.a  a    w  w      
Consider the discriminant for  1 2r z :
   21 12 2 21 2 1 11 2 2 224E a w a w a w a w      . (6.22)
Clearly this is always non-negative if 1 11 2a w  .
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For E to be negative requires 2 1 11a w  and 2 22a w sufficiently large. That is, the
autarky payoff to 2C must be greater than 1C ’s maximum gain from its own econ-
omy, while the maximum gain to 2C from its own economy must be sufficiently
large.  These are an unlikely set of circumstances. However, were they to occur,
then  1 2r z has no real roots, and hence, from (6.21),  1 2 0r z  for all 2z , which is
not compatible with 1C being the leading country.
It can therefore be assumed that 0E  , so that  1 2r z has two real roots:
      22 1 12 2 21 2 1 12 2 21 2 1 11 2 2 22
2 22
1 42z a w a w a w a w a w a wa w   
        
(6.23)
and condition (6.21) holds if and only if:
   2 2 2max 0, min ,1z z z   . (6.24)
Now, note that it is always the case that 2 0z  . Clearly this is the case if 2 1 11a w 
and 22 0w  . If 2 1 11a w  and 22 0w  (but 2z are real), then 2z can be negative on-
ly if  1 12 2 21 2 0a w a w    . However:
 
 
   
1 12 2 21 2 1 11 2 21 2
1 2 21 2 1 11
1 2 2 1 11
1
0.
a w a w a w a w
a a w a w
a a a w
 


     
   
   

This yields a contradiction.  Thus, it is always the case that 2 0z  .
Clearly, 2 0z  if 2 1 11a w  and 22 0w  (with equality if and only if 2 1 11a w  or
22 0w  ). However, if 2 1 11a w  and 22 0w  (but 2z are real), then the above ar-
gument shows that 2 0z  .
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However, it can be shown that it is always the case that 2 1z  . Suppose not. Then,
from the above discussion the following conditions hold: 2 1 11a w  and 22 0w  .
Thus, from (6.23), 2 1z  if and only if:
1 12 2 21 2 2 222a w a w a w E    .
Since 21 22 1w w  , the left-hand side can be written as    1 12 2 22 2 2a w a w a    .
If this is negative, then clearly the above inequality cannot hold. If it is non-
negative, then the above inequality holds if and only if:
    21 12 2 22 2 2a w a w a E       .
Using (6.22) and 21 221w w  , E can be re-written as:
     
        
2
1 12 2 22 2 2 1 11 2 2 22
2 2
1 12 2 22 2 2 2 2 1 12 2 22 2 22 1 11 2
4
2 4 .
E a w a w a a w a w
a w a w a a a w a w a w a w
 
  
        
        
From above,
   
      
2
2 1 12 2 22 2 2
2 2
1 12 2 22 2 2 2 2 1 12 2 22
1
2 .
z a w a w a E
         a w a w a a a w a w E

 
         
       
Using the expression for E, this inequality holds true if and only if:
  
    
1 12 2 22 2 2 1 12 2 22
1 12 2 22 2 2 1 12 2 22 2 22 1 11 2
2 2
2 2 4
a w a w a a w a w
          a w a w a a w a w a w a w

 
    
    
  
 
   
   
 
2 2 1 12 2 22 1 12 2 22
2 22 1 12 2 22 1 11 2
2 22 2 2 2 22 1 12 1 11 2
2 22 2 2 2 22 1 2
2 22 2 1
2
4 4
4 4
4 4
4 0.
a a w a w a w a w
          a w a w a w a w
a w a a w a w a w
a w a a w a
a w a a


 
 
     
 
    
   
  
Thus, it can be concluded that 2 1z  if and only if 2 1a a , which contradicts the
basic assumption: 1 2a a . Thus, 2 1z  must hold true, as claimed.
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On the other hand, it can also be claimed that it is always true that 2 1z  . Since 2z
is always non-negative, it follows from (6.23) that 2 1z  if and only if:
     2 22 1 12 2 21 2 2 2 1 12 2 222E a w a w a w a a w a w         .
If the right-hand-side is negative, this is always true. Otherwise, it is true if and
only if:
    22 2 2 1 12 2 22E a a w a w       .
As in the previous argument, it is now easy to show that this holds if and only if
1 2a a . It can therefore be concluded that 2 1z  , as claimed.
It now follows from (6.24) that 1C is the leading country provided:
 2 2max 0, 1z z   .
Furthermore,  2max 0, 0z  if 2 1 11a w  and 22 0w  , and  2 2max 0, 0z z   if
2 1 11a w  and 22 0w  .
It remains to be found what 2C should do given that *1 1z  and 1C remains the lead-
ing country. Thus, in choosing an optimal reply, 2C must minimize  1 2r z subject
to the constraint  1 2 0r z  .
There are several possibilities:
(i) 1 11 1a w  and 1 12 2 2a w a   . Then, the full range 20 1z  is compatible
with (6.21). Also,    1 1 1 12 2 21 0r r a w a     .
Hence, in this case    1 11 0r r , and hence *2 0z  provided  1 0 0r  ; i.e.
provided 1 11 2a w  (this is necessarily the case if 1 2  ). In this case, there
is a unique Nash equilibrium    1 2, 1,0z z  in which 1C is fully engaged in
the world economy but 2C remains in autarky.
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Figure 6.14. Country 2’s strategy when 1 11 1a w  and 1 12 2 2a w a   .
On the other hand, if 1 11 2a w  (and hence 2 1  ),  1 0 0r  and 2 0z  . In
this case, *2 2z z , and by playing this strategy, 2C can catch up with 1C .
Figure 6.15. Country 2’s strategy when 1 11 2a w  ,  1 0 0r  and 2 0z  .
(ii) 1 11 1a w  and 1 12 2 2a w a   . Again, the full range 20 1z  is compatible
with (6.21). However, now    1 11 0r r . If this inequality is strict, then
*
2 1z  is the unique best reply, and so    1 2, 1,1z z  is the unique Nash equi-
librium in which both countries are fully engaged in the world economy.
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Figure 6.16. Country 2’s strategy when 1 11 1a w  and 1 12 2 2a w a   .
If 1 12 2 2a w a   , then    1 11 0r r and 2C is indifferent between autarky
and full engagement. However, this is a very non-generic scenario.
(iii) 1 11 1a w  and  1 2ˆ 0r z  . In this case, only the range 2 2ˆ 1z z  is compatible
with (6.21). Further, 2 0z  . Since  1 2ˆ 0r z  , it must be true that 2 2ˆz z  , and
hence 2C can catch up with 1C by playing *2 2z z . Strategy change is simi-
lar to that shown in Figure 6.15.
(iv) 1 11 1a w  and  1 2ˆ 0r z  . In this case 2 2ˆz z  and it is necessarily the case
that  1 2 0r z  for all 2z in the range 2 2ˆ 1z z  . Thus, 2C should play *2 1z 
if    1 1 2ˆ1r r z (strategy change in this case is similar to that shown in Fig-
ure 6.16), and should play *2 2ˆz z if    1 1 2ˆ1r r z . These give Nash equilib-
ria    1 2, 1,1z z  and    1 2 2ˆ, 1,z z z , respectively. If    1 1 2ˆ1r r z then 2C
is indifferent between these two strategies. The conditions for
   1 1 2ˆ1 0r r z  , leading to the unique Nash equilibrium    1 2 2ˆ, 1,z z z
are:
   
2
1 1 11 1 1 11
1 11 2 1 12 2 21 2 2 22 1 2
1 12 1 12
0 .a w a wa w a w a w a w a aa w a w
                    
Now if 2C assumes the role of the leading country, then:
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   2 1 0z z   . (6.25)
Also:
   22 1 2 2 22 2 2 21 1 2 2 2,z z a w z a w z z      .
As the leading country, 2C will now attempt to maximize its payoff, either at *2 0z 
or at *2 1z  , or possibly both.
Case III: *2 0z
Similar results are obtained to the case when 2C becomes the leading country and it
attempts to maximize its payoff. So, the indices can be swapped between 1 and 2
from the previous analysis where 1C is the leading country, in order to obtain con-
ditions for 2C ’s strategy changes as the leading country, see Section 6.7 (appen-
dix).
Case IV: *2 1z
It remains to be examined if 1C does catch up with 2C , and assumes the leadership
role again175. Similar results are obtained by swapping indices 1 and 2 from the
previous analysis where 1C is the leading country. The strategy changes for 1C and
2C , obtained in Section 6.7 (appendix), show that 1C can also catch up with 2C and
gain back its leadership.
The main results from this section are summarized in the tables below.
175 It is assumed that 1 2a a , so that 1C is the natural leader.
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1C -strategy 1 0z  1 1z 
1C maximizes
payoff if:
1 11 1a w  and 2 2ˆz z 176 1 11 1a w  when 20 1z  ,
but 2 2ˆz z when 1 11 1a w 
1C remains
leading country
if:
 2 2 2ˆ0 min ,z z z  177 1 11 2a w 
if 20 1z  ,
1 2a a if 2 1z  ,
2 1 11a w  and 22 0w  when
20 1z  ,
2 1 11a w  and 22 0w  when
2 2 1z z   178
2C ’s optimal
strategy
*
2 2z z
if 2 2ˆ0 z z 
2C catches up with 1C and becomes
the leading country by playing
*
2 2z z
*
2 0z 
if 1 11 2a w  , 1 11 1a w  and
1 12 2 2a w a  
2C does not catch up with 1C ,
 1,0 is a unique Nash equilibri-
um
176 1 1 11
2
1 12
ˆ a wz a w
  .
177   22 2 2 2 22 1 2
2 22
1 42z a wa w    
     .
178       22 1 12 2 21 2 1 12 2 21 2 2 22 1 11 2
2 22
1 42z a w a w a w a w a w a wa w   
         .
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2C ’s optimal
strategy
*
2 2z z
if 2 2ˆ0 z z  179
2C catches up with 1C and be-
comes the leading country by play-
ing *2 2z z
*
2 1z 
if 1 11 1a w  and 1 12 2 2a w a  
2C does not catch up with 1C ,
 1,1 is the unique Nash equilibri-
um
2C ’s optimal
strategy
*
2 2z z or *2 2z z
if 2 2 2ˆ0 z z z   
2C catches up with 1C and becomes
the leading country by playing
*
2 2z z or *2 2z z
*
2 2z z
if 1 11 1a w  and  1 2ˆ 0r z  180
2C catches up with 1C and be-
comes the leading country by
playing *2 2z z
2C ’s optimal
strategy
*
2 0z 
if 2 2 2ˆ0z z z    and
  1 2 22 2 1 12 1 11 2 22a w a w a w a w  
2C does not catch up with 1C ,
   * *1 2, 0,0z z  is a Nash equilibri-
um
*
2 1z 
if    1 1 2ˆ1r r z , 1 11 1a w  and
 1 2ˆ 0r z 
2C does not catch up with 1C ,
 1,1 is the unique Nash equilibri-
um
2C ’s optimal
strategy
*
2 2ˆz z
if 2 2 2ˆ0z z z    ,
  1 2 22 2 1 12 1 11 2 22a w a w a w a w  
and   21 2 2 2 2 22 2ˆ ˆ 0z a w z     
2C does not catch up with 1C ,
   * *1 2 2ˆ, 0,z z z is a Nash equilibri-
um
*
2 2ˆz z
if    1 1 2ˆ1 0r r z  and 1 11 1a w 
2C does not catch up with 1C ,
 2ˆ1, z is the unique Nash equilib-
rium
Table 6.1. 1C is the leading country, 1 2  .
179   22 2 2 2 22 1 2
2 22
1 42z a wa w    
     .
180       21 2 1 11 2 1 12 2 21 2 2 2 22 2r z a w a w a w z a w z       .
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1C -strategy 1 0z  1 1z 
1C maximizes
payoff if:
1 11 1a w  and 2 2ˆz z 181 1 11 1a w  when 20 1z  ,
but 2 2ˆz z when 1 11 1a w 
1C remains
leading country
if:
1C cannot be the leading country
by remaining in autarky182
1 11 2a w  when 20 1z  ,
1 2a a if 2 1z  ,
2 1 11a w  and 22 0w  when
20 1z  ,
2 1 11a w  and 22 0w  when
2 2 1z z   183
2C ’s optimal
strategy
2 0z  2C becomes the leading country *2 2z z if 1 1 11 2a w   and
1 12 2 2a w a  
2C catches up with 1C
Table 6.2. 1C is the leading country, 1 2  .
181 1 1 11
2
1 12
ˆ a wz a w
  .
182 There is a range of near-autarky strategies for 2C , for which it assumes the role of leading country
183       22 1 12 2 21 2 1 12 2 21 2 2 22 1 11 2
2 22
1 42z a w a w a w a w a w a wa w   
         .
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2C -strategy 2 0z  2 1z 
2C maximizes
payoff if:
2 22 2a w  and 1 1ˆz z 184 2 22 2a w  when 10 1z  ,
but 1 1ˆz z when 2 22 2a w 
2C remains
leading country
if:
2C cannot be the leading country
by remaining in autarky185
1 1z  ,
1 2 22a w  , 11 0w  , 1 10 z z  186
and 1 1zˆ z
1C ’s optimal
strategy
1 0z  1C becomes the leading country *1 1z z
if 2 22 2a w 
( 1 10 z z  is compatible with
2 1z  being 2C ’s unique best reply)
1C catches up with 2C and be-
comes the leading country by
playing *1 1z z
Table 6.3. 2C is the leading country, 1 2  .
184 2 2 22
1
2 21
ˆ a wz a w
  .
185 There is a range of “near-autarky” strategies for 1C , for which it assumes the role of leading country
186       21 2 21 1 12 1 2 21 1 12 1 1 11 2 22 1
1 11
1 42z a w a w a w a w a w a wa w   
         .
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2C -strategy 2 0z  2 1z 
2C maximizes
payoff if:
2 22 2a w  and 1 1ˆz z 187 2 22 2a w  when 10 1z  ,
but 1 1ˆz z when 2 22 2a w 
2C remains
leading country
if:
 1 1 1ˆ0 min ,z z z  188 1 1z  ,
1 2 22a w  , 11 0w  , 1 10 z z  189
and 1 1zˆ z
1C ’s optimal
strategy
*
1 1z z
if 1 1ˆ0 z z 
1C catches up with 2C and becomes
the leading country by playing
*
1 1z z
*
1 1z z
if 2 22 2a w 
( 1 1 1zˆ z z  is compatible with
2 1z  being 2C ’s unique best reply)
1C catches up with 2C and be-
comes the leading country by
playing *1 1z z
187 2 2 22
1
2 21
ˆ a wz a w
  .
188   21 1 1 1 11 2 1
1 11
1 42z a wa w    
     .
189       21 2 21 1 12 1 2 21 1 12 1 1 11 2 22 1
1 11
1 42z a w a w a w a w a w a wa w   
         .
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1C ’s optimal
strategy
*
1 1z z
if 1 1ˆ0 z z  190
1C catches up with 2C and becomes
the leading country by playing
*
1 1z z
1C ’s optimal
strategy
*
1 1z z or *1 1z z
if 1 1 1ˆ0 z z z   
1C catches up with 2C and becomes
the leading country by playing
*
1 1z z or *1 1z z
1C ’s optimal
strategy
*
1 0z 
if 1 1 1ˆ0z z z    and
1C does not catch up with 2C ,
  2 1 11 1 2 21 1 11 2 22a w a w a w a w   is
a Nash equilibrium
1C ’s optimal
strategy
*
1 1ˆz z
if 1 1 1ˆ0z z z    ,
  2 1 11 1 2 21 1 11 2 22a w a w a w a w  
and   22 1 1 1 1 11 1ˆ ˆ 0z a w z     
1C does not catch up with 2C ,
   * *1 2 1ˆ, ,0z z z is a Nash equilibri-
um
Table 6.4. 2C is the leading country, 1 2  .
190   21 1 1 1 11 2 1
1 11
1 42z a wa w    
     .
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6.5 Example Models
6.5.1 Example 1
Consider parameter values: 1 2 1 2 11 2210, 7, 6, 3, 0.8, 0.7a a w w       .
The surfaces for  1 z and  2 z can be obtained as in Figure 6.17.
Figure 6.17. Example 1 - Payoff functions to countries 1 and 2. Note
that the top surface represents  1 z and the bottom surface represents
 2 z .
In this example, country 1 has a higher payoff than country 2 for all 1z and all 2z . It
therefore seeks to maximize its own payoff, which occurs at *1 1z  . In addition,
given this strategy is chosen by country 1 as its best strategy, country 2 seeks to
minimize the difference in the maximal payoff (which is the payoff to country 1)
and its own payoff. From Figure 6.17, this occurs at *2 1z  . So in this case,  1,1 is
a  -equilibrium for all feasible  . Therefore, countries 1 and 2 find it advanta-
geous to trade with one another, which either maximises its own payoff (as for
country 1) or reduces the behavioural gap as discussed in the previous chapters (as
for country 2).
 2 z
 1 z
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6.5.2 Example 2
Consider parameter values: 1 2 1 2 11 2210, 7, 3, 5, 0.8, 0.7a a w w       .
The surfaces for  1 z and  2 z can be obtained as in Figure 6.18.
Figure 6.18. Example 2 - Payoff functions to countries 1 and 2. Note that
the payoff function surface for country 1 lies below the surface for coun-
try 2 for lower values of 1z .
In this example, country 1 increases its level of integration into world trade – either
to reduce the behavioural gap (as the payoff to country 2 is greater than its own
payoff) for lower values of 1z , or to increase its payoff function for higher values
of 1z (for which the payoff to country 2 is less than its own payoff). Country 1
maximizes its payoff at *1 1z  . Note that    2 20,0 0,1 3   . Hence, country 2 is
indifferent between *2 0z  and *2 1z  and its strategy choice depends on its starting
position, i.e. to the left or right, respectively, of the minimum point on its payoff
curve at *1 1z  . In this case either  1,0 or  1,1 is a  -equilibrium. If the dynamics
for country 2 start at the minimum point of its payoff curve, then both  1,0 and
 1,1 are  -equilibria.
 2 z
 1 z
*
1 1z 
*
2 0z 
*
2 1z 



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6.6 Conclusions
Conclusion 6.1. If 1C is assumed to be a natural leader, then 2C can catch-up with
1C under some conditions (see Table 6.1 and Table 6.2), and subsequently 1C can
catch up and assume the role of leadership again (see Table 6.3 and Table 6.4).
One analysis of this trade game model reveals some sort of cyclic dynamics operat-
ing in the 2-country scenario, where it is easier for 1C (being a natural leader) to
catch up if it lags behind 2C , than vice versa.
The strategy size  plays an interesting role in these dynamics as the equilibrium
and strict stability conditions require constraints on the strategy size. For example,
if 2 2 22 1 12 2
2 22
a a w a w
a w
    , then the fully integrated state is a strict equilibrium
for the 2-country trade game with strategy size  , see condition (5.13). This condi-
tion requires the strategy size to be small enough so that country 2 cannot obtain a
better payoff (when compared with the payoff to the leading country) by decreas-
ing its openness to cross-border trade. Country 1 already has no incentive to move
away from its fully integrated strategy in this case as it yields the maximal payoff
so a small strategy size can ensure a strictly stable fully integrated equilibrium.
The  -equilibria and the  -stable equilibria are found using the tables in the previ-
ous section. Let 1C be the leading country playing *1 0z  . Consider the curve for
 1 2q z , for 1 2  and 2 22 1a w  , see Figure 6.19. If the 2z -coordinate of its max-
imum point is labelled as 2mz , then the stability of the states  0,0 and  0,1 de-
pends on the starting point of the dynamics. If the trade dynamics start on the left
side of the maximum point, then  0,0 is a  -stable equilibrium. However, if the
trade dynamics start on the right side of the maximum point, then  0,1 is a  -
stable equilibrium.
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Similarly, the curves can be obtained for all other cases defined in Table 6.1, Table
6.2, Table 6.3, Table 6.4, and the  -stable equilibria are obtained as  0,0 ,  0,1 ,
 1,0 and  1,1 .191
Conclusion 6.2.  0,0 ,  0,1 ,  1,0 and  1,1 are  -stable equilibria, whereas
 2ˆ1, z and  1ˆ,1z are  -equilibria, for a given set of parameter values.
Figure 6.19.  0,0 and  0,1 are both  -stable equilibria. If the trade dy-
namics start to the left of the point   2 2,m mz q z , then they converge to
 0,0 ; if the trade dynamics start to the right of the point   2 2,m mz q z ,
then they converge to  0,1 .
Therefore, the purely autarkic and fully integrated strategies, along with the pure
heterogeneous strategies192 are stable when countries are allowed to change their
191 Note that the states  2ˆ1, z and  1ˆ,1z are  -equilibria, but they are not stable, as by deviating from
the strategies 1ˆz and 2zˆ , respectively, 1C and 2C can reduce the payoff difference between the coun-
tries.
192  0,1 and  1,0 in the 2-country model.
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strategy by size  . The analysis of intermediate states193 is more complicated and
can be explored as further research to this thesis.
6.7 Appendix
This section is an appendix that shows that if country 2 assumes the role of leader-
ship and plays a purely autarkic strategy ( 2 0z  ) or fully integrated strategy
( 2 1z  ), then country 1 uses strategies similar to those used by country 2 when
country 2 was the lagging country (and trying to catch up with country 1).
Case: *2 0z
Country 2 assumes the role of the leading country and plays 2 0z  .
So 2C is in autarky and receives payoff 2 . This occurs if and only if
   2 1 2 1,0 ,1z z  . That is, if and only if:
2 22 2 21 1 2a w a w z   . (6.26)
This is possible for non-negative 1z only if:
2 22 2a w  . (6.27)
That is, the maximum gain 2C can extract from its own economy by opening to
trade with 1C is less than it receives from remaining in autarky.
Given (6.13), condition (6.26) holds only for:
2 2 22
1 1
2 21
ˆ a wz z a w
   . (6.28)
193  2ˆ1, z and  1ˆ,1z in the 2-country model.
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The assumptions 2 2a  and 21 22 1w w  imply that 1ˆ 1z  . Hence, this case can-
not arise if 1z is sufficiently large. That is, 1C can force 2C out of autarky by itself
investing in open trade to a large enough extent.
An analysis similar to Section 6.4 – Case I gives the following possibilities:
(i) 1 1ˆ0 z z  . In this case, 1C can catch up with 2C (reduce the payoff differ-
ence to 0), and any further development by 1C (i.e. increase in 1z above 1z )
will lead to its assuming the role of leading country.
(ii) 1 1ˆ0 z z  . Again, 1C can catch up with 2C (reduce the payoff difference to
0), and any further development by 1C (i.e. decrease in 1z below 1z ) will
lead to its assuming the role of leading country.
(iii) 1 1 1ˆ0 z z z    . In this case, it is possible for 1C to catch up with 2C either
by playing a more integrative strategy 1z , or a more autarkic strategy 1z .
(iv) 1 0z  . Then, 1C can catch up with 2C by itself reverting to autarky.
(v) 1 1 1ˆ0z z z    . In this case,    1 2 1ˆ, ,0z z z is a Nash equilibrium.
Case: *2 1z 
In this case, 2C is fully integrated into the world economy and receives payoff
2 22 2 21 1a w a w z . The first contribution is from maximizing the payoff from its own
economy, and the second is obtained from gains in trade with 2C .  For *2 1z  to be
2C ’s unique best reply to 1z , the following inequality is required to hold:
   2 1 2 1,1 ,0z z  , which gives:
2 22 2 21 1 2a w a w z   . (6.29)
This always holds for 1 1z  since 21 22 1w w  and 2 2a  . On the other hand, it
holds for 1 0z  only if 2 22 2a w  ; i.e. 2C ’s maximum gain from its own economy
is at least as big as its autarky payoff.
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If this is not the case – i.e. if 2 22 2a w  and condition (6.27) holds, then (6.29) can
hold only if 1 1ˆz z , with 1ˆz as in (6.28). When 1 1ˆz z , the inequalities (6.26) and
(6.29) are replaced by an equality, and 2C is then indifferent between autarky
( *2 0z  ) and full engagement ( *2 1z  ).
It remains to be determined whether *2 1z  is compatible with 2C being the leading
country. To determine this, consider:
     2 1 2 1 1 1,1 ,1r z z z   .
Then, 2C is the leading country only if  2 1 0r z  . Thus, the following condition is
required to hold:
      22 1 2 22 1 2 21 1 12 1 1 1 11 1 0r z a w a w a w z a w z        . (6.30)
For example, when 1 0z  this can hold only if 2 22 1a w  . At the other extreme,
when 1 1z  , then  2 2 11r a a  , and this is negative if 1 2a a ; i.e. when 1C ’s econ-
omy is intrinsically bigger than 2C ’s economy, so that C1 is a natural leader.
Consider the discriminant for  2 1r z :
   22 21 1 12 1 2 22 1 1 114E a w a w a w a w      . (6.31)
Clearly this is always non-negative if 2 22 1a w  .
For E to be negative, the conditions required are: 1 2 22a w  and 1 11a w sufficiently
large. That is, the autarky payoff to 1C must be greater than 2C ’s maximum gain
from its own economy, while the maximum gain to 1C from its own economy must
be sufficiently large.  These are an unlikely set of circumstances. However, were
they to occur, then  2 1r z has no real roots, and hence, from (6.30),  2 1 0r z  for all
1z , which is not compatible with 2C being the leading country.
It can therefore be assumed that 0E  , so that  2 1r z has two real roots:
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      21 2 21 1 12 1 2 21 1 12 1 1 11 2 22 1
1 11
1 42z a w a w a w a w a w a wa w   
         ,
(6.32)
and condition (6.30) holds if and only if:
   1 1 1max 0, min ,1z z z   . (6.33)
Now, note 1 0z  if 1 2 22a w  and 11 0w  . If 1 2 22a w  and 11 0w  (but 1z are
real), then 1z can be negative only if  2 21 1 12 1 0a w a w    . However:
 
 
   
2 21 1 12 1 2 22 1 12 1
2 1 12 1 2 22
2 1 1 2 22
1
.
a w a w a w a w
a a w a w
a a a w
 


     
   
   
Thus, it not is always the case that 1 0z  194. In fact, 1 0z  when 1 2 22a w  and
11 0w  (but 1z are real) only if 1 1 12 2 21a w a w   195. But, if 1 1 12 2 21a w a w   , then
1 0z  and  2 1 0r z  for all 1z , so that 2C no longer remains the leading country,
whatever 1C does.
Clearly, 1 0z  if 1 2 22a w  and 11 0w  196. However, if 1 2 22a w  and 11 0w  (but
1z are real), then the above argument shows that 2 0z  only if 1 1 12 2 21a w a w   .
It can be shown that 1 1z  if 1 1 12 2 21a w a w   . Suppose not. Then, from the above
discussion it must be true that 1 2 22a w  and 11 0w  . Thus, from (6.32), 1 1z  if
and only if:
2 21 1 12 1 1 112a w a w a w E    .
194
1 0z  only if 1 1 12 2 21a w a w   and either 1 2 22a w  or 11 0w  .
195 Note that when 1 2 22a w  , 11 0w  and 1 1 12 2 21a w a w   , then  2 1r z has no real roots.
196 Equality holds if and only if 1 2 22a w  or 11 0w  .
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Since 11 12 1w w  , the left-hand side can be written as    2 21 1 11 1 1a w a w a    . If
this is negative, then clearly the above inequality holds. If it is non-negative, then
the above inequality holds if and only if:
    22 21 1 11 1 1a w a w a E       .
From (6.31), E can be written as:
     22 21 1 11 1 1 2 22 1 1 114E a w a w a a w a w          .
By expanding the  2 , it can be concluded that 1 1z  if and only if 2 1a a , which
contradicts the basic assumption: 1 2a a . Thus, it must be true that 1 1z  when
1 1 12 2 21a w a w   . In this case  2 1 0r z  for all 1z , i.e. 1C becomes the leading
country.
Similarly it can be shown that 1 1z  if 1 2 22a w  and 11 0w  . But if 1 2 22a w  and
11 0w  , then 1 1z  only if 1 1 12 2 21a w a w   . 1 1 12a w 
If 2 22 2a w  and 1 1zˆ z , then  2 1ˆ 0r z  and 2C no longer remains the leading
country for 1 1ˆz z . Therefore, the following condition must hold: 1 1zˆ z .
It now follows from (6.33) that 2C is the leading country provided:
1 1 1 2 22 11 1 1ˆ0 ,  ,  0 andz z a w w z z      . (6.34)
In choosing an optimal reply, 1C must minimize  2 1r z subject to the constraint
 2 1 0r z  .
There are two possibilities:
(i) 2 22 2a w  . Then, the range 1 10 z z  is compatible with (6.29). Also,
   2 1 2 1 2 220 0r z r a w     .
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Hence, in this case 1C catches up with 2C by playing 1 1z z , and any further
development by 1C (i.e. increase in 1z above 1z ) will lead to its assuming the
role of leading country.
(ii) 2 22 2a w  . In this case, the range 1 1 1zˆ z z  is compatible with (6.29).
Again 1C can catch up with 2C by playing 1 1z z .
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Chapter 7
Summary and Conclusions
This chapter summarizes the main conclusions and results obtained in both ver-
sions of the trade models. The chapter is concluded with possible areas of further
research.
7.1 Summary and Results
The original trade game model proposed by D’Artigues and Vignolo [33] states
that when countries try to imitate the leading country (in the sense of minimizing
the gap between the maximal payoff and their own payoff), the desire of conver-
gence may paradoxically lead to a more partitioned world economy. Instead of
choosing a strategy that increases its payoff so that the behavioural gap is reduced,
a country may deliberately choose a strategy that degrades the situation of the lead-
ing country.
The trade game model considered in Chapter 3 defined clearly the maximal payoff
obtained in each unit time and examined the complex dynamics underlying the
model. The 2-country scenario verified the result obtained by D’Artigues and Vi-
gnolo [33] in the sense that the lagging country finds it more advantageous to not
trade with the leading country. However, the leading country also found it advan-
tageous to not engage in trade with the lagging country, making the all-in-autarky
state (where countries do not trade with one another) a strict equilibrium. In the
case of 3 countries, four out of eight states could be strict equilibria (subject to pa-
rameter constraints). But only two out of these four could coexist for a given set of
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parameters at any given time period, one of which was always the all-in-autarky
state. Further analysis via numerical computations in Chapter 4 revealed that a het-
erogeneous state where the leading country and the lagging country trade with one
another while the country in the second position chooses to stay in autarky (which
can be viewed as a deliberate attempt to degrade the situation of the leading coun-
try) is a more favourable strict equilibrium than a heterogeneous state where the
two leading countries trade with one another while the lagging country chooses to
remain in autarky. Looking at the model output for the 3-country model, it was de-
duced that a state where a single country chose to not trade with the others was
more favourable to be a strict equilibrium over the fully integrated state (where all
countries trade with one another). In the 4-country model, similar results were ob-
tained when the heterogeneous states that could potentially be strict equilibria were
considered, where the country in the second position chose to not trade with the
rest of the countries, while the leading country traded with the lagging countries. In
addition, these heterogeneous states were also more likely to be strict equilibria
than the fully integrated state197. A general result for n countries was that the all-in-
autarky state was always a strict equilibrium, regardless of parameter constraints.
The numerical computations output for the all-in-autarky state revealed that the
probability of the all-in-autarky state being a strictly stable equilibrium increased
as the number of countries participating in the trade game increased, and this prob-
ability approached 1 as the number of countries reached 200. On the other hand,
the probability of the fully integrated state being a strict equilibrium decreased as
the number of countries participating in the trade game increased, and this proba-
bility approached 0 as the number of countries reached 200. This meant countries
found it individually more advantageous to remain in autarky as opposed to trading
with all or some of the other countries. This recaptured the original idea presented
by D’Artigues and Vignolo [33] in the sense of negative behaviour of weaker
countries by not participating in world trade so that the leading countries are not
able to substantially benefit from opening up to world trade. However, since com-
plete autarkies don’t exist today, this model was extended so that countries could
choose intermediate strategies as opposed to fully integrated or autarkic strategies.
197 Based on the results obtained for the 3-country and the 4-country models in Chapter 4.
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The new model incorporated a strategy size 0  , and introduced the concept of
trade weights so that countries had different levels of openness to trade with differ-
ent countries. In the 2-country model, country 1 was assumed to be the natural
leader with the aim of maximising its payoff. Country 2 was assumed to be the
lagging country, trying to reduce the gap between its payoff and country 1’s pay-
off. It was shown via the analysis of the trade dynamics that it was possible for
country 2 to catch up with country 1 and become the leading country. Moreover,
once country 2 assumed the role of leadership, it was possible for country 1 to
catch up with country 2 and overtake it to reassume its leading position.
The 2-country model with pure strategies had only one strict equilibrium (regard-
less of the parameter values): the all-in-autarky state, where both countries found it
advantageous to not trade with one another. In this model, even though country 1
was assumed to be the natural leader of international trade (since 1 2a a ), yet
country 2 could become the leader with the trade dynamics in its equilibrium state,
if 1 2  . In the 2-country model with strategy size  , both countries could adjust
their strategies by small amounts, instead of switching between the pure strategies
(full integration or complete autarky). Several equilibria were obtained over a
range of parameter values. All pure states:    1 2, 1,1z z  ,  1,0 ,  0,1 ,  0,0 were
found to be strict equilibria depending on the starting point of the trade dynamics
and the parameter values.  In addition, two more equilibria of the form  2ˆ1, z and
 1ˆ,1z were obtained, where 2 2 221
2 21
ˆ a wz a w
  and 1 1 112
1 12
ˆ a wz a w
  , given certain re-
strictions on the parameter values.
7.2 Further Research
In this thesis, the trade game with pure strategies has been analysed for n countries,
in order to find strict equilibria. However, the trade game with strategy size  has
only been analysed for 2 countries. The analysis of complex conditions required for
the more general n-country model with strategy size  is left for further research.
The non-generic cases of countries having the option of choosing between strate-
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gies (by assigning probabilities to each strategy) that are best replies (under the
behavioural rule that minimizes the payoff difference between the countries) could
also be explored as a topic of further research.
In this thesis,  is assumed to be a small increment to investment in international
trade, such that 1/ K  , where K and 1K  .  The strategy size  is also var-
ied continuously in Chapter 6 to find  -equilibria and  -stable equilibria. Another
work on future research could investigate the model in the limit 0  , which has
not been covered in this thesis.
In this thesis, the parameters are assigned values as a primary step in the determi-
nation of the trade dynamics. With the assumption of non-degeneracy, once a play-
er is chosen to update its strategy, the best move is determined without ambiguity.
Each player has an equal chance of being the chosen one to change. A unique ab-
sorbing state is reached in the long run since the sequence of countries that makes
the system reach the absorbing state will eventually occur after a long period of
time. This thesis is concerned with the possible equilibria and their local stability.
In future work, mutations could be added in each time step and it would be inter-
esting to see whether the equilibrium selection worked.
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